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Abstract
Industrial networks interconnect sensors and actuators to perform mea-
surement, supervision and protection functions in different domains,
such as transportation or automation and control systems. These Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) generally rely on multiple networks, whether
wired or wireless, to which demand industrial-grade requirements, where
dependability, safety and performance characteristics of critical and non-
critical services coexist. In such a scenario, the control and management
functions should be tightly coupled to the different underlying condi-
tions. Thus, industrial networks are evolving to meet new needs related
to flexibility, maintainability, and adaptability, at the same time that
the Quality of Service (QoS) and real-time constraints are not affected.
However, traditional network control strategies generally fail to support
for heterogeneous and dynamic environments.
After defining a set of requirements and discussing the shortcomings of
the existing solutions, the analysis shows that a deeper and more flexible
control can be achieved by means of a set of network functions operat-
ing independently from network hardware. In this way, the Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm provides programmability for ex-
plicitly controlling the forwarding plane. This research explores the
potential role and applicability of this paradigm and, specifically, the
OpenFlow protocol, in industrial automation systems. To illustrate this
approach, automation networks based on the IEC 61850 standard have
been used as a case study. In particular, this standard is now one of the
most widely accepted technologies for power grid communications, such
as Substation Automation Systems (SASs), and it defines different ser-
vices and protocols with stringent requirements that need to be fulfilled
with advanced traffic engineering techniques.
Consequently, leveraging the flexibility of the software-defined networks,
an OpenFlow-based control framework is proposed to improve the per-
formance of modern SASs through management and monitoring tools
that provide a global view of the network. Hence, different types of
flows are handled according to their patterns, priorities and the network
status.
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Moreover, considering that SASs are considered mission-critical systems,
as a failure can have serious economic and safety consequences, these in-
frastructures must be extremely reliable. The network robustness is
strongly influenced by the implementation of redundancy and its abil-
ity of reacting to changes. However, Ethernet mesh networks, in which
industrial applications tend to be supported, usually use redundant re-
sources as backup solutions, being underutilized most of the time. On
the contrary, the IEC 62439-3 standard defines the Parallel Redundancy
Protocol (PRP) and the High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR)
protocol, which provide zero recovery time in case of failure by using
active redundant paths in Ethernet networks. Despite this, the manage-
ment of PRP and HSR networks is static and inflexible, which, added
to the bandwidth reduction due to data duplication, makes it difficult
to efficiently control the network resources. Thus, this thesis proposes
a novel SDN-based implementation of redundancy control techniques
that effectively exploit mesh topologies and ensure adequate availabil-
ity of industrial control applications. Specifically, it is discussed how
the OpenFlow protocol allows an external controller to configure multi-
ple redundant paths between dual-homed devices, as well as the analy-
sis of redundancy influence on the performance of Wireless Local Area
Networks (WLANs). As a result, critical services can be protected in
interference and mobility situations.
The assessment of the adequacy of the solutions has been mainly con-
ducted by emulating different topologies and traffic types. This way, the
performance of different flow-based services has been presented. Fur-
thermore, analytic models and extensive experiments have shown how
latency is improved by reducing the number of hops with respect to
spanning trees, as well as by load balancing in layer 2 networks. Also, a
robustness analysis has been performed to determine the improvement
achieved by using PRP in combination with OpenFlow. Another study
has demonstrated the efficiency of combining HSR networks and traffic
priority control, in comparison to the standard operation and other pro-
posals. The promising results show that the proposed SDN model could
significantly improve the performance of a typical industrial network
and be effective in mission-critical systems.
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Resumen
Las redes industriales interconectan sensores y actuadores para llevar a
cabo funciones de monitorización, control y protección en diferentes en-
tornos, tales como sistemas de transporte o sistemas de automatización
industrial. Estos sistemas ciberfísicos generalmente están soportados
por múltiples redes de datos, ya sean cableadas o inalámbricas, a las
cuales demandan nuevas prestaciones, de forma que el control y gestión
de tales redes deben estar acoplados a las condiciones del propio sis-
tema industrial. De este modo, aparecen requisitos relacionados con la
flexibilidad, mantenibilidad y adaptabilidad, al mismo tiempo que las
restricciones de calidad de servicio no se vean afectadas. Sin embargo,
las estrategias de control de red tradicionales generalmente no se adap-
tan eficientemente a entornos cada vez más dinámicos y heterogéneos.
Tras definir un conjunto de requerimientos de red y analizar las lim-
itaciones de las soluciones actuales, se deduce que un control provisto
independientemente de los propios dispositivos de red añadiría flexi-
bilidad a dichas redes. Por consiguiente, la presente tesis explora la
aplicabilidad de las redes definidas por software (Software-Defined Net-
working, SDN) en sistemas de automatización industrial. Para llevar a
cabo este enfoque, se ha tomado como caso de estudio las redes de au-
tomatización basadas en el estándar IEC 61850, el cual es ampliamente
usado en el diseño de las redes de comunicaciones en sistemas de dis-
tribución de energía, tales como las subestaciones eléctricas. El estándar
IEC 61850 define diferentes servicios y protocolos con altos requisitos en
términos de latencia y disponibilidad de la red, los cuales han de ser
satisfechos mediante técnicas de ingeniería de tráfico. Como resultado,
aprovechando la flexibilidad y programabilidad ofrecidas por las redes
definidas por software, en esta tesis se propone una arquitectura de con-
trol basada en el protocolo OpenFlow que, incluyendo tecnologías de
gestión y monitorización de red, permite establecer políticas de tráfico
acorde a su prioridad y al estado de la red.
Además, las subestaciones eléctricas son un ejemplo representativo de
infraestructura crítica, que son aquellas en las que un fallo puede resul-
tar en graves pérdidas económicas, daños físicos y materiales. De esta
forma, tales sistemas deben ser extremadamente seguros y robustos,
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por lo que es conveniente la implementación de topologías redundantes
que ofrezcan un tiempo de reacción ante fallos mínimo. Con tal obje-
tivo, el estándar IEC 62439-3 define los protocolos Parallel Redundancy
Protocol (PRP) y High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR), los
cuales garantizan un tiempo de recuperación nulo en caso de fallo me-
diante la redundancia activa de datos en redes Ethernet. Sin embargo,
la gestión de redes basadas en PRP y HSR es estática e inflexible, lo
que, añadido a la reducción de ancho de banda debida la duplicación
de datos, hace difícil un control eficiente de los recursos disponibles.
En dicho sentido, esta tesis propone control de la redundancia basado
en el paradigma SDN para un aprovechamiento eficiente de topologías
malladas, al mismo tiempo que se garantiza la disponibilidad de las apli-
caciones de control y monitorización. En particular, se discute cómo el
protocolo OpenFlow permite a un controlador externo configurar múlti-
ples caminos redundantes entre dispositivos con varias interfaces de red,
así como en entornos inalámbricos. De esta forma, los servicios críticos
pueden protegerse en situaciones de interferencia y movilidad.
La evaluación de la idoneidad de las soluciones propuestas ha sido llevada
a cabo, principalmente, mediante la emulación de diferentes topologías
y tipos de tráfico. Igualmente, se ha estudiado analítica y experimen-
talmente cómo afecta a la latencia el poder reducir el número de saltos
en las comunicaciones con respecto al uso de un árbol de expansión, así
como balancear la carga en una red de nivel 2. Además, se ha realizado
un análisis de la mejora de la eficiencia en el uso de los recursos de red
y la robustez alcanzada con la combinación de los protocolos PRP y
HSR con un control llevado a cabo mediante OpenFlow. Estos resulta-
dos muestran que el modelo SDN podría mejorar significativamente las
prestaciones de una red industrial de misión crítica.
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Laburpena
Sare industrialek sentsoreak eta eragingailuak interkonektatzen dituzte
monitorizazio, kontrol eta babes funtzioak aurrera eraman ahal izateko
ingurune ezberdinetan, besteak beste, garraio sistemetan edo indus-
tria automatizazioan. Sistema ziberfisiko hauek orokorrean sare anitzen
gainean lan egiten dute, haridunak eta haririk gabekoak, hauen kon-
trol eta kudeaketa sistema industrialaren eskakizunei egokituak egon
behar direlarik. Hau horrela izanda, malgutasunari, mantentzeari eta
moldakortasunari lotutako eskakizunak agertzen dira, zerbitzu kalitatea
bermatuak izan behar diren bitartean. Sare tradizionalen kontrola ordea
ez da modu egokian moldatzen gero eta dinamikoak eta heterogeneoak
diren inguruneetara.
Sare eskakizun batzuk definitu ondoren eta egungo soluzioen mugak
aztertu eta gero, sare dispositiboekiko independentea izango den kon-
trola, sare horien malgutasuna handituko lukeela ondorioztatzen da.
Hau horrela izanda, tesi honek software bidez definitutako sareen (bere
ingeleseko sigletatik, Software-Defined Networking, SDN) ezargarrita-
suna aztertzen du industria automatizazio sistemetan. Azterketa hau
aurrera eramateko, IEC 61850 estandarrean oinarritutako automatizazio
sareak hartu dira kasu azterketa moduan, zeinak energia banaketa sis-
temetan, azpi-estazio elektrikoetan adibidez, hedatuta dauden. IEC
61850 estandarrak zerbitzu eta protokolo ezberdinak definitzen ditu, la-
tentzia eta erabilgarritasun eskakizun handiak bete behar dituztenak
trafiko ingeniaritza teknikak erabiliz. Ondorioz, software bidez defini-
tutako sareen malgutasuna eta programagarritasuna aprobetxatuz, tesi
honetan OpenFlow protokoloan oinarritutako kontrol arkitektura bat
proposatzen da, zeinak sare kudeaketa eta monitorizazio teknologien
bitartez, lehentasunaren eta sarearen egoeraren araberako trafiko poli-
tikak zehazteko gai dena.
Gainera, azpi-estazio elektrikoak azpiegitura kritikoen baitan kokatzen
dira, alegia sare horietan gertatutako akats batek galera ekonomiko,
fisiko eta materialak eragin ditzake. Hau horrela izanda, sistema
hauek seguruak eta sendoak izan behar dira, beraz gomendagarria da
topologia erredundanteen ezarpena, akatsen aurrean erreakzio denbora
minimoak lortzeko. Helburu hori lortzeko, IEC 62439-3 estandarrak
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ethernet sareetan errekuperazio denbora nulua bermatzen duten
Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) eta High-availability Seamless
Redundancy (HSR) protokoloak definitzen ditu. Hala ere, PRP eta HSR
protokoloetan oinarritutako sare kudeaketa estatikoak eta zorrotzak,
datuen bikoizketak eragindako banda zabalaren murrizpenarekin bat-
era, zaila egiten du baliabideen kudeaketa eraginkorra. Horrexegatik,
tesi honek SDN paradigman oinarritutako erredundantzia kontrola
proposatzen du amaraun topologien aprobetxamendu eraginkorra
bermatzeko, monitorizazio eta kontrol aplikazioen erabilgarritasuna
bermatzen duen bitartean. Zehazki, OpenFlow protokoloarekin, sare-
kanpoko kontrolatzaile batek, sare interfaze ugaridun gailuen artean
(haririk gabeko inguruneetan barne) bide erredundanteak eratzeko erak
aztertzen dira. Modu honetan, zerbitzu kritikoak interferentzia eta
mugikortasunaren aurrean babestea bilatzen da.
Proposatutako ebazpenen egokitasunaren ebaluaketa, trafiko mota eta
topologia ezberdinen emulazioaren bitartez egin da bereziki. Era berean,
analitikoki eta esperimentalki aztertu da jauzi kopuruen murrizpenak la-
tentzian duen eragina spanning tree-rekin alderatuta, baita 2. mailako
zama banaketa ere. Horrez gain, PRP eta HSR protokoloek, Openflow
bidezko kontrol batekin, sare baliabideen eraginkortasunean eta sendo-
tasunean eskaintzen duten hobekuntza aztertu da. Lortutako emaitzak
egiaztatzen dute SDN ereduak eginkizun kritikoetako sare industriale-
tako zerbitzuak nabarmenki hobetu ditzakeela.
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Resumen extendido
Introducción
Las redes industriales permiten la comunicación en tiempo real entre
aplicaciones que requieren un alto grado de fiabilidad y seguridad. Como
ejemplo representativo de sistemas de misión crítica, las Smart Grids en-
globan procesos de supervisión y control de las infraestructuras de gene-
ración y suministro eléctrico, en los que cumplir rigurosos requisitos de
latencia y disponibilidad. Por otro lado, se demandan nuevas presta-
ciones relacionadas con la flexibilidad, mantenibilidad y adaptabilidad a
las condiciones existentes en dichos sistemas. Sin embargo, las estrate-
gias de red tradicionales no se adaptan eficientemente a entornos dinámi-
cos y heterogéneos. Sin embargo, la gestión de redes basadas en PRP
y HSR es estática e inflexible, lo que, añadido a la reducción de ancho
de banda debida la duplicación de datos, hace difícil un control eficiente
de los recursos disponibles. Esto puede ser una limitación importante,
teniendo en cuenta que los sistemas de control y automatización tienden
a integrar servicios que generan grandes cantidades de datos. En efecto,
tal y como se indica en (Li, F. et al., 2010), las redes eléctricas existentes
no implementan tecnologías de red adaptativas, las cuales permitirían
tener un control en tiempo real de la resiliencia y utilización de los recur-
sos disponibles. Además, según los autores, dichas tecnologías deberían
estar basadas en soluciones abiertas y estandarizadas.
Dadas las limitaciones de las infraestructuras de red tradicionales, este
trabajo explora la aplicabilidad de las redes definidas por software (SDN)
a las redes de automatización industrial, tales como las subestaciones
eléctricas basadas en el estándar IEC 61850. Por consiguiente, con el
objeto de incorporar programabilidad a la red, en este trabajo se pro-
pone una arquitectura SDN que, incluyendo funcionalidades de monitor-
ización y control, permite implementar calidad de servicio, mecanismos
de seguridad y gestión de la redundancia.
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Planteamiento y objetivos de la investigación
Con el propósito de ofrecer unas prestaciones de red adecuadas, las
funciones de control y gestión deben ser conscientes de los recursos
disponibles, así como de los requerimientos específicos del tráfico. Así,
el planteamiento de la tesis resultante es:
ä El uso de tecnologías SDN permite a los sistemas industriales
obtener un mejor control de los recursos de red, al mismo tiempo
que posibilitan cumplir los requerimientos de calidad de servicio.
Además, un enfoque basado en un control de tráfico basado en
flujos permite a las aplicaciones de misión crítica operar con alta
disponibilidad.
De este modo, esta disertación está motivada por las siguientes cues-
tiones:
ä ¿Cómo impacta el uso de las SDNs a las redes industriales, tales
como las basadas en el estándar IEC 61850?
ä ¿Podrían las SDNs mejorar las prestaciones de los protocolos de
redundancia de red?
Análisis del estado del arte
El principal objetivo del estándar IEC 61850 Power Utility Automation
es flexibilizar el diseño de los sistemas de automatización de subesta-
ciones, así como facilitar la interoperabilidad entre dispositivos de dis-
tintos fabricantes. Dicho estándar define, entre otros aspectos, los ser-
vicios y requisitos de diversos protocolos de comunicaciones, de forma
que se distinguen diferentes clases de tráfico. Por tanto, es esencial la
gestión del tráfico de datos para garantizar las prestaciones de diferentes
servicios con exigentes requisitos. Posteriormente, se muestra una arqui-
tectura lógica de la red de área local de una subestación basada en el
estándar IEC 61850.
Se han analizado multiples funcionalidades exigidas en este tipo de in-
fraestructuras, tales como medidas de restricción y priorización del trá-
fico. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de políticas de control de tráfico
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de alto nivel mediante métodos tradicionales requiere operar con con-
figuraciones de bajo nivel específicas de los fabricantes de dispositivos
de red, lo cual hace difícil obtener un comportamiento flexible y recon-
figurable. Además, se ha de proveer alta disponibilidad para aquellos
servicios críticos haciendo uso de redundancia dinámica en entornos ca-
bleados e inalámbricos. Sin embargo, esto es difícil de lograr haciendo
uso de mecanismos de redundancia poco eficientes (p.ej., protocolos de
spanning tree), o mediante un encaminamiento de los datos indepen-
diente del tipo de tráfico (p.ej., únicamente basado en direcciones MAC
origen y destino o protocolos como PRP o HSR). Dichos objetivos po-
drían facilitarse a través de un control centralizado que haga uso de
protocolos estandarizados.
Por ello, y de acuerdo a la Recomendación ITU-T Y.3300, el término
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) se define como “un conjunto de
técnicas que permiten programar, orquestar y gestionar los recursos de
red, lo que facilita el diseño, provisión y operación de los servicios de
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red de una forma dinámica y escalable”. En (Kim & Feamster, 2013)
se resumen las posibilidades de mejora en la gestión a través de este
paradigma, pudiendo llevar a cabo un control flexible del plano de datos
mediante tecnologías estandarizadas.
Propuesta para aplicar las SDNs a las redes industriales
Se propone una solución SDN que permite implementar mecanismos
automatizados de ingeniería de tráfico en los sistemas IEC 61850, consi-
guiendo un control de la red más flexible. En la siguiente figura se ilus-
tran los diferentes elementos de la arquitectura propuesta, incluyendo la
pila de protocolos existente en los sistemas IEC 61850. Así, el protocolo
OpenFlow junto con otras tecnologías de monitorización y gestión son
usados para establecer políticas de tráfico acorde a su prioridad y estado
de la red.
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Además, se mapea la información de configuración de una subestación,
y se traslada a la plataforma de gestión y control. Por tanto, se con-
sigue unificar el proceso de diseño de la infraestructura eléctrica con la
configuración de la red. Esta propuesta resulta apropiada para auto-
matizar la administración de una red, lo cual fue visto como necesario
por (Ingram et al., 2011), donde se sugiere que “la complejidad de la
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configuración de la red de datos para subestaciones grandes hace que
la gestión automatizada de switches sea una opción atractiva […] her-
ramientas de automatización podrían ser implementadas para extraer
información de filtrado VLAN y multicast para configurar switches de
múltiples fabricantes”.
Algunas de las características principales de esta solución son:
ä Filtrado de tráfico y calidad de servicio: la arquitectura permite,
de forma centralizada, la generación e instalación automática de
reglas de encaminamiento, así como el establecimiento de políticas
de control de consumo de ancho de banda para diferentes tipos de
flujos.
ä Despliegue de políticas de seguridad: la plataforma permite es-
tablecer reglas que restrinjan el tráfico de los dispositivos descono-
cidos. Además, pueden determinarse umbrales de monitorización
asociados a diferentes flujos de forma que, en caso de ser sobrepasa-
dos, se establezcan las acciones pertinentes
ä Uso eficiente de recursos redundantes y mejora de protocolos de
redundancia activa: la solución propuesta permite computar los
caminos más cortos entre los diferentes nodos finales, así como
balancear la carga en la red. Por otro lado, se consigue un mejor
rendimiento de los protocolos PRP y HSR en términos de disponi-
bilidad y consumo de recursos.
Validación
Como resultado, la evaluación de la idoneidad de las soluciones ha
sido llevada a cabo, principalmente, mediante la emulación de distintas
topologías y tipos de tráfico. Se ha estudiado analítica y experimen-
talmente cómo afecta a la latencia el poder reducir el número de saltos
en las comunicaciones con respecto al uso de un árbol de expansión,
así como balancear la carga en una red de nivel 2. Se ha realizado un
análisis de la robustez alcanzada con la combinación del protocolo PRP
con un control llevado a cabo mediante OpenFlow. Asimismo, se ha
presentado un estudio sobre la mejora de la eficiencia en el uso de los
recursos de red al combinar redes HSR y un control del tráfico basado
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en la criticidad del mismo. Dicho estudio incluye la comparación con
el comportamiento estándar del protocolo, así como con propuestas de
otros autores.
Conclusiones
Las distintas contribuciones de la presente tesis muestran cómo una
plataforma basada en tecnologías SDN permite configurar los elemen-
tos de una red industrial a través de una interfaz común. La arqui-
tectura propuesta obtiene una visión global de la topología y recursos
disponibles y se beneficia de la programabilidad de las SDN, automati-
zando la configuración de recursos y aportando técnicas de diagnóstico
de las condiciones de red. Así, usar un agente externo permite llevar a
cabo el control dinámico de flujos con diferentes prioridades, incluyendo
filtrado y catalogación de tráfico, balanceo de carga, o servicios de se-
guridad de red.
Los resultados de la presente investigación han sido recogidos en diez
publicaciones, de los cuales cinco1 son artículos publicados en revistas
indexadas en el Journal Citation Reports (JCR), y el resto en conferen-
cias nacionales e internacionales.
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Traditional Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are converging to ad-
vanced Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that integrate monitoring, coor-
dination, control and communication functions to interact with physical
elements. In fact, CPSs are emerging in many different fields, being
especially relevant in the context of automation systems where sensors,
controllers and actuators use communication networks to exchange in-
formation about safety-critical1 processes and physical functions.
This work is focused on applying the SDN paradigm into industrial
systems in order to improve the control and robustness of critical data
1The term safety-critical systems is used to refer to those infrastructures where
some actions or failures could cause damage to people or equipment, and result in
significant economic losses. Examples of safety-critical systems include avionics,
intelligent transportation systems, military equipment, medical devices, power
grid control systems, etcetera.
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traffic, as well as the efficiency of redundant, and even wireless, networks.
The key terms that highlight the scope of this dissertation are:
Management of critical networks OpenFlow
High-availability Reliability
IEC 61850 Seamless redundancy
IEC 62439 Smart Grid
Industrial Ethernet networks Software-Defined Networking
Industrial wireless networks Substation automation
This chapter provides a brief overview of mission-critical industrial sys-
tems.
1.1 Background and context
Recently-coined terms, such as for example, Industry 4.0 [1], the Fourth
Industrial Revolution or Industrial Internet, revolve around the use of
CPSs; that is to say, complex architectures where physical entities or
processes are remotely controlled by cyber-components. These compo-
nents are in charge of performing the configuration of communication
capabilities and the data-processing functions, as sketched in Figure 1.1.
The purpose of this figure is to illustrate the communication between
the physical domain, formed by networked nodes, and the cyber do-
main, where the control plane should ensure satisfactory performance
in meeting different requirements related to system manageability, se-
curity, reliability, and so on. Figure 1.1 also shows a wide range of
mission-critical applications, such as transportation, industrial automa-
tion systems or electrical power grids, and some illustrative scenarios
that have received considerable attention in recent years. In particular,
networks in power supply facilities are considered in this thesis as they
have been identified as the spearhead of future industrial automation
environments. Specifically, despite the fact that electric power systems
comprise a variety of domains and subsystems, this thesis focus on Sub-
station Automation Systems (SASs), and in particular, on those based
on the IEC 61850 standard.
CPSs have emerged on the basis of ICSs, where data acquisition and
processing elements of an Networked Control System (NCS) are tradi-
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Figure 1.1: CPS feedback operation, use cases and requirements.
tionally arranged in hierarchical levels and applications, as can be seen
in the ANSI/ISA-95 model [2]:
ä Field: Input/Output physical processes.
ä Control: Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and other intel-
ligent devices.
ä Process control: Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) functionalities.
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ä Plant management: Manufacturing Operations Manage-
ment (MOM) and Batch execution systems.
ä Enterprise: Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems.
The differences between industrial and conventional networks have been
described in surveys [3], [4]. It is remarkable the impact of service fail-
ure severity and the stringent latency requirements. In addition, these
authors detailed specific industrial Ethernet stack implementations, and
highlight the industrial wireless communication as an important current
research area. Both studies reflected an evolution from heterogeneity of
isolated networks towards heterogeneous systems that share the same
network infrastructure, using the standard TCP/IP stack. According
to Sauter et al. [3], a common integration strategy in heterogeneous
network environments had been to introduce middleware schemes for
translating protocols and dynamically adjust QoS parameters. How-
ever, these adaptation layers are usually complex and resource consum-
ing. The same authors envisioned that a combination of Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802-based networking so-
lutions in both wired and wireless domains tends to facilitate seamless
network integration. Thus, converging technologies reduce the number
of gateways and simplify the overall management.
In this way, nowadays advanced industrial systems are adopting
multi-service networks to optimize the usage of resources. For example,
focused on the interoperability, the use of the Ethernet standard
(ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-3) allows industrial systems to reuse existing
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) management
tools. Besides, since vendor dependence increases complexity in the
management process based on non-open interfaces, proprietary legacy
systems are being replaced, moving towards interoperable solutions.
Yet, according to the IEC 61158 and IEC 61784 specifications, there
are a plethora of Ethernet-based technologies that, among other topics,
add real-time features on top of link layer. Due to this segmentation,
today there is a growing need to harmonize the different Ethernet-based
communications, and thereby to avoid vendor-specific implementations.
The importance of this topic can be understood with emerging efforts,
such as the IEEE 802.1 Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) Task Group
[5], whose goals are to provide reliable communication over Ethernet,
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ultra-low and deterministic end-to-end latency. This project is con-
sidered a new extended generation of the IEEE Audio Video Bridging
(AVB) protocol (IEEE 1722) for general mission-critical scenarios.
In the same context, regarding Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
initiatives, whose interest lies in the upper layers, the recently-
formed Deterministic Networking (DetNet) group aims to establish
time-sensitive solutions in Wide Area Networks (WANs).
1.2 Motivation and problem statement
From another point of view, until now, the design of industrial automa-
tion networks has been based on an isolation model. However, despite
the previously mentioned levels representing a hierarchical architecture,
a CPS tends to be designed as a network of interacting physical and
computational elements that form a dynamic flatter information-driven
infrastructure [6]. Thus, the significance of the CPSs lies on a fully inte-
gration between production processes and communications. As a result,
emerging CPSs pose new challenges to the current network architectures,
being necessary to design communication systems that enable dynamic
performance, where changes in physical device settings involve responses
from the network configuration.
Specifically, the Smart Grid, being a significant industrial case study, is
a broad concept that encompasses monitoring, protection, and control
of electric power systems. However, according to [7], “communication
technologies are not yet mature for the revolution of transmission grids,
and the existing grids lack enough compatibility to accommodate the
implementation of spear-point technologies in the practical networks”.
The same authors predicted that adaptive networks would allow open-
standardized communication protocols to operate on a unique platform.
As also stated by the authors, “real-time control based on a fast and ac-
curate information exchange in different platforms will improve system
resilience by enhancing the reliability and optimization of the transmis-
sion asset utilization”.
The cooperative interaction between network protocols and advanced
control systems will provide a new ecosystem for future CPS applica-
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tions. This gives the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm the
opportunity to play a leading-edge role in building CPSs. Software-
defined networks are those in which “the control and data planes are
decoupled, network intelligence and state are logically centralized, and
the underlying network is abstracted from the applications” [8]. Stan-
dardized protocols, such as OpenFlow [9], Forwarding and Control Ele-
ment Separation (ForCES, RFC 5810) or the combination of the Path
Computation Element Protocol (PCEP, RFC 5440) and BGP Link-State
Distribution (BGP-LS) schemes allow external entities to have a global
view of the network. Particularly, the OpenFlow protocol, which has
special relevance to this study, allows an independent controller to set
and modify the network data paths by using flow-based forwarding rules.
SDN technologies are being commonly used in data center and telecom
environments, whereas industrial networks are an application domain
that have received little attention so far. The motivation for focusing on
the latter is that the provided programmability may also be adequate
to meet strict QoS constraints imposed by safety-critical systems. Be-
sides, in industrial applications, it is necessary to develop mechanisms for
ensuring network performance, including security and reliability, such
that the provided services are not jeopardized. Besides, the design of
industrial networks must meet the requirements of flows with different
priorities, such as maximum latency, minimum throughput or maximum
recovery time in case of failure. In terms of availability and robustness,
“although the time latency associated with availability can vary, it is
generally considered the most critical security requirement”, in accor-
dance with the Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber-Security [10] issued by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Therefore, the design of a network requires a robustness study, which
is closely related to the use of techniques that minimize service down-
time, frame losses, delay, jitter, and, in general, network vulnerabilities
affecting the stability of the entire system. As a rule, network reliability
and resilience are improved avoiding single points of failure and, toward
this end, deploying redundant nodes and links reduces the interruption
time in case of faults. Thus, redundancy is generally the most widely
used methods for preventing the disruption of the normal operation of
an infrastructure. Nevertheless, the fact is that nowadays Ethernet Lo-
cal Area Networks (LANs), to which safety-critical environments are
6
1.2 Motivation and problem statement
tending, are usually based on traditional spanning tree protocols that
prevent loops at the expense of disabling redundant paths. Namely,
they are configured in active-passive mode, so that protection links are
used as spare elements. This, along with a forwarding scheme only based
on Media Access Control (MAC) learning, means that traffic flows can-
not be balanced or forwarded along the shortest paths, so that network
resources are not efficiently utilized.
Furthermore, there are several reasons why the IEC 61850 standard has
been chosen as a research subject. First, it is an evolving standard that
includes, inter alia, communication services and network architectures
based on Ethernet LANs for power automation systems. This standard
defines protocols to transmit monitoring and control data, which pose
stringent performance requirements (e.g. bandwidth or delay) on the un-
derlying network infrastructure. This way, communication management
systems have to deal with time-sensitive flows requiring minimal latency
and loss of information. Indeed, another compelling reason to focus this
thesis on the IEC 61850 standard is that it defines communication pro-
files that require seamless connectivity, which makes necessary the use
of active redundancy strategies to reduce the recovery time in the pres-
ence of network failures. However, despite new insights have expanded
the Ethernet standards to be redundant, there are not many options to
provide zero recovery time in LANs. Among them, this study focuses on
the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-availability Seamless
Redundancy (HSR) protocols, which have been recently standardized by
the IEC and adopted by the IEC 61850 to protect critical services. How-
ever, it is necessary to improve performance of these technologies; for ex-
ample, increasing the efficiency in bandwidth consumption is a primary
goal of this work. To achieve this objective, the OpenFlow technology
can be adopted. Therefore, it is a relevant and challenging case study
to test new SDN-based approaches.
Moreover, even though wireless technologies have been proposed for
automation systems from 1988 [11], existing radio technologies posed
significant problems to be overcome in these environments. In this
regard, industrial networks have traditionally used wired communica-
tions for transmission of critical information. However, as identified
in [12], it emerges the need for wireless monitoring and control systems,
which reduce installation and maintenance costs compared to wired ones.
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Moreover, these scenarios more frequently require the interconnection of
mobile nodes, as well as rapid network deployment and configuration.
Therefore, although still in an early stage of development, wireless solu-
tions offer numerous advantages for the industry automation. In partic-
ular, IEEE 802.11-based Wireless LANs (WLANs) will be analyzed in
this work. In such a case, since wireless links suffer from unreliable data
transmission due to non-deterministic factors, these networks should en-
sure continuity of operations, so that availability and performance are
not affected.
From these motivations, several objectives have been addressed in this
research.
1.3 Objective of the thesis
In order to contribute to the development of future Software-Defined
Cyber-Physical Networks, the aim of this work is summarized below.
1.3.1 Thesis statement
For the purpose of maintaining proper network performance, manage-
ment and control functions have to be aware of the network resources
and traffic requirements. Limitations of traditional networking capabili-
ties have led to the analysis of the potential benefits of SDN technologies
on critical industrial networks (e.g., substation automation) and how the
stringent requirements can be met. The resulting thesis statement is:
Using SDN technologies allows mission-critical systems to achieve
greater levels of network resources management capabilities, while
meeting QoS requirements. Moreover, demanding protection and
control applications can operate with high reliability through a
flow-based traffic processing approach.
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1.3.2 Research questions and aims
This dissertation is motivated by the following open issues2:
ä How does the use of SDN technologies impact on industrial net-
works, such as IEC 61850-based systems? RQ1
ä RQ2Could software-defined networks improve performance character-
istics of redundancy protocols used in high-availability systems?
As a consequence, this thesis is structured into two separate dimensions,
including the following research objectives:
ä To study how to improve the network management and control of
IEC 61850 networks by using SDN technologies.
l With this aim, an overview of the communication model of
this standard shall be provided.
l In this research goal, it is necessary to analyze pros and cons
of an SDN approach over the use of traditional networks for
critical industrial infrastructures.
l To define a software-defined architecture to provide advanced
features to support the IEC 61850 protocol stack, such as QoS
or security.
l The proposed framework should implement monitoring and
management tasks that build a global view of network uti-
lization, allowing it to act quickly and accurately, and even
providing new levels of network security.
ä To provide a software-defined approach to efficiently control re-
dundant topologies.
l To achieve lower latencies, which is an essential requirement
in critical, time-sensitive applications, it is necessary to ana-
2Margin notes are used to point out important concepts being discussed in the para-
graphs next to them. For example, in this case, research questions are highlighted
to draw the reader’s attention.
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lyze the relation between the network meshing and load bal-
ancing with the latency.
l It is required to determine the potential of the SDN paradigm
in achieving a better utilization of available resources in sit-
uations of active redundancy; as well as to facilitate its man-
agement and increasing responsiveness, also considering the
challenges of a centralized approach.
l To assess the overall effect of combining the OpenFlow and
parallel redundancy protocols.
l To meet this objective, it is also necessary to study the possi-
bility of resisting multiple network failures without interrup-
tion, by establishing multiple redundant paths.
l To consider heterogeneous network infrastructures, even con-
sidering the deployment of wireless technology in critical in-
dustrial environments.
The decision of choosing an SDN approach is supported by qualitative
arguments throughout this dissertation. Otherwise, in order to address
these research questions and to evaluate the proposals, this work relies on
analytical and emulation-based results, which demonstrate the feasibility
of them from a performance perspective.
1.4 Thesis outline
The structure of this document is made to reflect the two main objectives
of the thesis. Thus, the remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: Literature review This chapter encompasses the state-of-
the-art of Smart Grid communications. After giving a general de-
scription of electric power delivery systems in Section 2.1, Section
2.2 provides an overview of the basis of the IEC 61850 standard.
Likewise, specific QoS metrics illustrate key requirements of in-
dustrial networks. Section 2.3 analyzes the relationship between
redundancy and availability, and it presents a general review of
10
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layer 2 redundancy protocols, outlining the characteristics of PRP
and HSR. Moreover, Section 2.4 explores the opportunities of
wireless networks in critical systems. Also, Section 2.5 describes
the main features of SDN and the OpenFlow protocol. Findings
and requirements detailed throughout the chapter are summarized
in Section 2.6.
Chapter 3: A proposal for applying SDN in industrial networks An
application case is given in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents an
overall architecture that fulfills requirements previously identified.
The solution approach is detailed in Section 3.3, where the main
control and management technologies used in the proposal, and
the offered services are explained. Section 3.4 focuses on how
the proposed architecture can be used in redundant networks,
as well as its integration with PRP and HSR to enhance their
performance.
Chapter 4: Validation and discussion This chapter contains the tech-
nical implementation of the proposals and it discusses the func-
tional and performance evaluation results, demonstrating how an
SDN framework can accommodate diverse and stringent require-
ments of industrial networks.
Chapter 5: Conclusion Finally, directions for further research and con-
clusions are drawn. In addition, this chapter lists the publications
derived from this research.
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This chapter discusses related work and presents some characteristics
and trends of the Smart Grid development. As a representative model,
the IEC 61850 standard is focused on communication networks in
power automation systems, which impose diverse industrial-grade
requirements, detailed below. To facilitate an easier understanding of
the needs and motivations of this research, throughout the document
a series of margin notes will briefly highlight some relevant general
network requirements. Once gathered all needs, qualitative design goals
are specified at the end of this chapter.
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2.1 Smart Grid
Electric utilities must accomplish the primary mission of providing power
supply in transmission and distribution grids. Adding intelligence to
the delivery processes is associated with quality management and cost
efficiency of the whole energy system. Indeed, according to the definition
of Smart Grid provided by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) [13], “a Smart Grid is an electricity network that can
cost efficiently integrate the behavior and actions of all users connected
to it –generators, consumers and those that do both –in order to ensure
economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high
levels of quality and security of supply and safety”.
Smart Grid industry makes use of ICT infrastructures for the manage-
ment of the generation, storage, transmission, distribution and consump-
tion of electrical energy to increase the efficiency of remote control and
automation systems. Figure 2.1 illustrates the different systems that
support an end-to-end Smart Grid architecture, being consistent with
the Smart Grid conceptual model of the NIST [14] which includes seven
functional domains:
ä Markets
ä Service Providers
ä Customer
ä Operations
ä Generation
ä Transmission
ä Distribution
Communications in transmission and distribution infrastructures are
crucial for proper operation of this large-scale CPS, where real-time
power grid operations take place (e.g., control signals between trans-
formers, relays, circuit breakers, etcetera), as well as the connection
with back-office Energy Management Systems (EMSs) and Wide Area
Measurement Systems (WAMSs). These operations include monitoring
equipment and transformers, measuring power quality and fault man-
agement.
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Figure 2.1: Smart Grid domains [14] and a simplified single line diagram of the grid
model.
2.1.1 SGAM framework
The reference Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM), defined by the
CEN–CENELEC–ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group [15], can be
used to identify and describe the mapping of the use case in ques-
tion, SASs, into an entire Smart Grid architecture decomposed in a
layered three-dimensional model (Figure 2.2). Each layer (interoperabil-
ity dimension) includes the activities and actors in a plane with vertical
(zones) and horizontal (domains) dependencies. The latter represent the
“energy conversion chain”, whereas the vertical axis reflects the “hierar-
chical levels of power system management”. In focusing on ICT within
15
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substations, the relations in information, communication and, to a lesser
extent on component layers, are:
ä The first layer represents the data models and information ex-
changed between functions, services, and components. They can
be identified by analyzing the information exchanged between the
actors. It corresponds with the presentation and application layers
in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model.
ä The communication layer, corresponding to the first five layers
of the OSI model, consists of suitable protocols and mechanisms
for exchanging that information and the data models allocated in
the upper layer. It has to take into account the different service
requirements.
ä Finally, the component layer is derived from the actors involved
in the use case, comprising physical components such as assets,
devices, grid equipment and operators.
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Figure 2.2: Entire layered three-dimensional model in agreement with the SGAM frame-
work.
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According to the domains that form the energy conversion chain, substa-
tions transfer power from the transmission to the distribution network.
Hence, they include high-voltage (HV) and medium-voltage (MV) equip-
ment; whereas among the zones of power system management, the use
case is situated on the station zone. This zone encompasses the aggre-
gation of the field level (equipment to monitor, protect and control) and
connects with the operation zone (power control operation).
2.1.2 Convergence and standardization
Due to the fact that Operational Technology (OT) is generally associated
with low latency and high-robustness requirements, power utilities and
industrial plants have separated them from the Information Technol-
ogy (IT) infrastructure, which includes a variety of complex computing,
networking, and security systems. However, as introduced in Section
1.2, driven by the use of Ethernet and TCP/IP in automation systems,
management functions tend to overlap, which means that maintenance
and operating costs can be reduced by using common resources [16].
In this way, the IT and OT convergence implies that requirements, re-
sources and security are managed in a consistent manner, which can be
accomplished by employing a unified management interface.
From another point of view, power utility automation is a representa-
tive example of mission-critical system where interoperability is required
for seamlessly transferring power control data. Among different stan-
dardization bodies, it is important to emphasize that the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is currently the most important one
in this area. While the Technical Committee 65 is responsible for stan-
dardizing industrial-process measurement and control systems, working
groups of the IEC Technical Committee 57 have the purpose of provid-
ing a reference architecture for power management and acquisition and
exchange of the associated information. Particularly, the IEC 61850
standard, entitled “Communication Networks and Systems for Power
Utility Automation”, is being adopted worldwide for the design of elec-
trical substations, and transmission and distribution networks. So, it is
considered as a core IEC project for the Smart Grid Development [17].
Figure 2.3, based on [15], shows key IEC standards for the Smart Grid,
where the IEC 61850 is placed in field and station levels of utility au-
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tomation environments, whereas other standards, such as the IEC 61970
or the IEC 61968, are targeted to define common interfaces and data
models for components in power systems, which are widely used in EMS
by utilities worldwide. Also, IEC 61508 and IEC 62351 define safety and
security aspects, respectively, which can be seen as common issues for
all domains.
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Figure 2.3: Domains of core IEC Smart Grid standards.
From a historical perspective, because of the variety of protocols emerg-
ing over the last decades to support power protection and control sys-
tems, the IEC 61850 was originally developed with the goal of unify-
ing the Utility Communication Architecture (UCA) and European stan-
dards, and it is based on the earlier work of legacy protocols. Yet, besides
the IEC 61850 and proprietary solutions, other standardized technolo-
gies should also be considered. The following ones have been among
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the most used in the communication of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs),
SASs and control centers:
ä Modbus TCP/IP specifies a master-slave communication model. It
is considered too simple and inefficient. For example, slaves cannot
start a new connection to the master, nor there are “common data
formats between devices” [18].
ä IEEE 1815 Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) and IEC 60870-
5-104 standards define protocols used for telecontrol in power sys-
tem automation applications. They are mainly used for communi-
cating RTUs or Intelligent Electrical Devices (IEDs) with a master
station.
DNP 3.0 and IEC 60870-5-101 achieved wide market acceptance in USA
and Europe, respectively. However, compared to these previous tech-
nologies, IEC 61850 is now more flexible and includes more functionali-
ties, allowing the design of power automation system as a whole, beyond
the pure protocol level between devices. Other specific advantages can
be found in [18]. Moreover, in any case, IEC 61850-based systems gener-
ally include protocol converters to support legacy or other technologies,
as specified in 61850-80-x documents (Table 2.1). For all these reasons,
the IEC 61850 is one of the most advanced protocols for SCADA com-
munications, and may be considered the successor to DNP3 and IEC
60870. In fact, although, as mentioned above, DNP3 is the de facto
standard in the USA energy market, the IEC 61850 standard is increas-
ingly defined as a future benchmark for local communications within a
substation.
2.2 IEC 61850-based communication networks: a case study
The main purpose of the emerging IEC 61850 standard is to make sub-
station automation flexible, expandable and cost-effective, by provid-
ing interoperability among devices from different manufacturers. As a
consequence, the IEC 61850 specification avoids vendor-specific imple-
mentations, promoting technology-neutral ones. In this sense, the IEC
61850 communication stack is built on standard-based solutions, such
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as TCP/IP and Ethernet technologies. Besides this, the IEC 61850 re-
lies on standardized protocols for basic services such as synchronization,
security or redundancy.
Table 2.1 shows the structure of the IEC 61850 series, including techni-
cal reports (TR). Its first edition was published as an international stan-
dard in 2003 and restricted to intra-substation communications (LANs),
whereas the second edition1 covers areas beyond power substations, such
as distributed generation systems (photovoltaic, wind and hydro power
plants, fuel cells, etcetera) or communications between substations and
remote operations centers. Moreover, the IEC 61850 Edition 2 specifies
more stringent network requirements such as, for example, using the
Precision Time Protocol (PTP, IEEE 1588-2008) instead of the Simple
Network Time Protocol (SNTP, RFC 4330) in order to reduce synchro-
nization accuracy. Also, regarding the network availability, the new
specifications require higher redundancy for those critical assets which
cannot tolerate data loss.
Table 2.1: IEC 61850 standard specifications.
Part Title Ed.- Date
-1 TR Introduction and overview 2- 2013/03
-2 Glossary 1- 2003/03
-3 General requirements 2- 2013/12
-4 System and project management 2- 2011/04
-5 Communication requirements for functions and device models 2- 2013/01
-6 Configuration description language for communication in electrical
substations related to IEDs
2- 2009/12
-7 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment
-7-1 – Principles and models 2- 2011/07
-7-2 – Abstract communication service interface (ACSI) 2- 2010/08
-7-3 – Common Data Classes 2- 2010/12
-7-4 – Compatible logical node classes and data classes 2- 2010/03
-7-410 – Hydroelectric power plants - Communication for monitoring and
control
2- 2012/10
-7-420 – Distributed energy resources logical nodes 1- 2009/03
-7-510 TR – Hydroelectric power plants - Modelling concepts and guidelines 1- 2012/03
-8-1 Specific communication Service Mapping (SCSM) - Mappings to MMS
(ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
2- 2011/06
-9-2 Specific communication Service Mapping (SCSM) - Sampled values over
ISO/IEC 8802-3
2- 2011/09
-9-3 Precision time protocol profile for power utility automation 1- 2015/12
-10 Conformance testing 2- 2012/12
-80-1 Guideline to exchanging information from a CDC-based data model using
IEC 60870-5-101 or IEC 60870-5-104
1- 2008/12
-80-3 TR Mapping to web protocols - Requirements and technical choices 1- 2015/11
-80-4 Translation from the COSEM object model (IEC 62056) to the IEC 61850
data model
1- 2016/03
-90-1 TR Use of IEC 61850 for the communication between substations 1- 2010/03
-90-2 TR Using IEC 61850 for communication between substations and control
centres
1- 2016/02
-90-3 TR Using IEC 61850 for condition monitoring diagnosis and analysis 1- 2016/05
-90-4 TR Network engineering guidelines 1- 2013/08
-90-5 TR Use of IEC 61850 to transmit synchrophasor information according to
IEEE C37.118
1- 2012/05
1The first part of this edition was published in 2011.
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Part Title Ed.- Date
-90-7 TR Object models for power converters in distributed energy resources (DER)
systems
1- 2013/02
-90-8 TR Object model for E-mobility 1- 2016/04
-90-12 TR Wide area network engineering guidelines 1- 2015/07
The IEC 61850 documents cover all topics related to the equipment and
interfaces that globally define the configuration of a power substation,
either internally or externally, including network engineering guidelines.
For this work, the relevant parts of the standard are those focused on the
definition of the information model and communication services. These
parts are separated with the aim of achieving long-term stability with
the set of mappings, found in IEC 61850-8-x and in IEC 61850-9-x, of
data objects and services to communication layers. According to the IEC
Technical Committee 57, this separation can be summarized as follows:
ä IEC 61850
l Object models
n IEC 61850-7-3, 7-4, 7-410, 7-420
l Service models
n IEC 61850-7-2 ACSI and Generic Object Oriented Sub-
station Event (GOOSE)
l Profiles and mapping
n IEC 61850-8 and IEC 61850-9
Before detailing information and communication aspects, it is appropri-
ate to outline a possible logical structure of a substation. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that an IEC 61850 compliant system must ensure that the
demanding communication requirements specified in IEC 61850-5 are
met, which are discussed below from Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 Substation Automation Systems
Similar to the layered architecture defined in ISA-95 for general ICSs,
IEC 61850-based SASs rely on high-speed data acquisition to monitor
and track power electronic devices, and they are organized in the fol-
lowing levels:
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ä Process level: it includes primary equipment, such as instrument
transformers, disconnectors or circuit breakers which, for example,
are used to open and close switches in electrical switchyards.
ä Bay level: it includes protection and control IEDs (e.g., sensors,
relays, meters, etcetera).
ä Station level: it is focused on operations and supervision func-
tions, also including relays and gateways to communicate with
control centers.
As represented in Figure 2.4, besides this logical architecture, a SAS con-
sists of a process bus and a station bus2, which allow sensor, monitoring,
protection and control units to communicate to each other. The former
bus handles data communication among primary process equipment and
protective relays, while the station and bay levels are connected through
the latter. While the transmission of critical data was generally done
via dedicated wires, modern substation communication buses are based
on the Ethernet technology in order to displace traditional serial data
buses. Figure 2.4 shows different communication protocols (MMS, SV
and GOOSE), which will be explained in detail in Section 2.2.3. Like-
wise, this figure also sketches interfaces for WAN connectivity, that is,
to communicate control centers with substations, phasor measurement
units or distributed energy resources.
2.2.2 Formal configuration language
The configuration of IEC 61850-based systems is based on object-
oriented information modeling. Namely, for example, protection and
control equipment are defined objects that exchange standardized
data. The information models are included in IEC 61850-7-x doc-
uments, which lead to design substations in Logical Nodes (LNs),
and characterize their data inputs and outputs following a standard
naming convention. In addition, the IEC 61850-6 [19] defines the
System Configuration description Language (SCL), based on eXtensible
2This is a logical network structure and station and process buses could fit into a
single physical network.
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Markup Language (XML) schema, to describe and exchange substation
parameters, e.g., system topology or IED configurations.
Different SCL file formats are available depending on their objectives.
More specifically, the Substation Configuration Description (SCD) files
are intended to design and configure a whole substation, including the
definition of client-server reports, “data sets”, and SV/GOOSE trans-
mission parameters. Particularly, the communication section of an SCD
file allows the definition of operational attributes such as IP addresses,
destination MAC addresses or Virtual LAN (VLAN) parameters (i.e.,
VLAN-Identifier and VLAN-Priority) for each service exposed by a de-
vice. However, the current information model is not complete enough to
represent the communication network in detail; for example, it does not
describe the physical network topology. According to [20], the specifica-
tion should integrate the network configuration in the unified engineer-
ing process of substation automation. In any case, according to the IEC
61850-6 clause 9, SCL files contain five sections: Header, Substation,
Communication, IEDs and Datatype template. Below a partial example
of an SCD file is given.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2006/SCL"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2006/SCL">
3 <Header id="SCD Example">...</Header>
4 <!--
5 This section identifies the version and configuration of the
SCL file.
6 -->
7 <Substation name="Substation_name">
8 <!--
9 This section defines the functional structure, and includes a
list of the available logical nodes with their relation to
the primary equipment.
10 It can be used to build a single line diagram.
11 -->
12 <VoltageLevel name="E1">...
13 <Bay name="Q1">
14 <ConNode Nam="L1"/>
15 <Device Nam="QA1" Type="CBR">
16 <LNode Inst="1" LNClass="CSWI" IEDName="AA1"/>
17 <Connection CNodeNam="L1"/>
18 </Device>
19 </Bay>
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20 </VoltageLevel>
21 <VoltageLevel>...</VoltageLevel>
22 </Substation>
23 <IED name="LE_IED">
24 <!--
25 It contains the description and attributes of the different
communication services, access points and logical devices
and nodes.
26 -->
27 </IED>
28 <Communication>
29 <!--
30 It determines the configuration of subnetworks (independent of
the substation structure) and the connection of IEDs,
including also their access points, network addresses and
properties.
31 It also allows the declaration of GOOSE/SV multicast
subscriber information.
32 -->
33 <SubNetwork name="Subnetwork_name" type="8-MMS">.
34 <Text>Station bus</Text>
35 <BitRate unit="b/s" multiplier="M">10</BitRate>
36 </SubNetwork>
37 </Communication>
38 <DataTypeTemplates>
39 <!--
40 This section declares the types of logical nodes and data
models.
41 -->
42 </DataTypeTemplates>
43 </SCL>
This configuration language enables engineering tools for bottom-up sys-
tem designs. A simple engineering design workflow is represented in
Figure 2.5, where IEDs import and export SCL files that include the
device-specific configuration data.
2.2.3 Communication services
In addition to the criticality-driven nature, different types of IEC 61850
services are expected. While the IEC 61850-7-2 defines the semantic
of the so-called abstract services (Abstract Communication Service In-
terface, ACSI), the format and encoding of messages that contain the
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Figure 2.5: IEC 61850 engineering stage and workflow [19].
service parameters are defined in the Specific Communication Service
Mapping (SCSM). Concretely, the IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2
specifications describe communication profiles for teleprotection, mea-
surement and control signals over packet-switched networks. These are
mapped to a protocol stack that differentiates two models of communi-
cation, as shown in Figure 2.6.
2.2.3.1 Publisher/subscriber scheme
In this model, the following high-priority services are defined:
ä IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV): analog measures of voltage
and current samples generated by transducers. Thus, sequences
of status measurements are periodically reported from Merging
Units (MUs) to IEDs using unicast or multicast messages. If SVs
26
2.2 IEC 61850-based communication networks: a case study
Network
Transport
Session
Presentation
Application
Data link
Physical
IP
ISO/TCP
Session
Presentation
MMS
Ethernet {Ethertype – 802.1Q x8100}
10/100/1000Base-F/T(X), ...
GOOSE SV
x88b8 x88ba
Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI)
SCL IEC 61850 
Information Model
x0800, x0806, ...
RFC 1006
Figure 2.6: Different IEC 61850 communication protocols.
are transmitted in compliance with the 61850-9-2 SV-LE (“Light
Edition”, [21]) guideline, the frame size must be fixed to 126 bytes,
at 4 kHz sampling rate for 50 Hz line frequency (80 samples per
nominal cycle). This results in a steady-state rate of 4.032 Mbit/s
per merging unit.
ä IEC 61850-8-1 GOOSE: signals for control and protection oper-
ations (e.g., tripping or interlocking actions, as well as diagnostic
functions). In this way, a device continuously transmits heartbeat
multicast frames, which contains status information (e.g., breaker
position indication) that is grouped into “data sets”. But more-
over, GOOSE frames are immediately sent upon certain events
(e.g., notification of an alarm), being retransmitted several times
to prevent possible network failures.
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As respectively defined in 61850-9-2 and 61850-8-1, Figure 2.7 shows SV
and GOOSE frame structures and Wireshark screenshots of example
frames. Both Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) are directly
carried in the payload of link layer frames in order to reduce protocol
overhead, and consequently, to increase the performance of real-time
services. Hence, they are suitable for rapid exchange of time-critical
data between MUs and IEDs.
Regarding communications outside the substations (Figure 2.4), that is,
between substations or between substations (it is also applicable, for
example, to power plants) and control centers, GOOSE and SV mes-
sages can be transmitted through tunnel technologies (IEC/TR 61850-
90-1 and 61850-90-2) or by using Routable-GOOSE and Routable-SV
(IEC/TR 61850-90-5), which are based on TCP or UDP over IP multi-
cast.
2.2.3.2 Client/server scheme
According to the IEC 61850-8-1 part, this scheme includes, among other
data applications, the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) pro-
tocol (ISO 9506) to exchange, via unicast TCP connections, operational
information (e.g., monitoring device information and reports). This
low-priority information normally flows from IEDs to the substation
administrator (e.g., substation central unit or SCADA), and it is not
as low-latency demanding as the previous ones. In fact, according to
[22], MMS communications are medium priority, and consist of uncon-
firmed messages collecting periodic information and confirmed messages
for request/response interactions.
2.2.4 Bandwidth and latency requirements
With regard to traffic patterns, like typical ICS applications, IEC 61850
devices generate periodic Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic, and aperiodic
messages, both Variable-Bit Rate (VBR) and Available-Bit Rate (ABR)
traffic.
ä CBR: SV is used to continuously send measures.
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Protocol Frame size (B) Frames/s
SV 126 4000
C
ri
ti
ca
l
GOOSE 92-250 1-200
MMS 100-700 20-60
SNMP 150-500 20
N
on
-c
ri
ti
ca
l
Others 60-90 3
Table 2.2: Data traffic patterns of IEC 61850-based systems.
ä VBR: GOOSE to periodically transmit messages and send data
bursts upon the occurrence of a trigger.
ä ABR: MMS to asynchronously transmit general purpose and su-
pervisory control data.
Concerning the size and volume of data traffic, digital measurements
are usually carried in small packets [4]. Data traffic patterns of systems
operating under the IEC 61850 can be extracted from [23], [24] and are
shown in Table 2.2, where SV messages are the most demanding ones
due to their relatively high frequency.
Regarding latency, specific delay requirements for several industrial ap-
plications are summarized in [25]. In the case of IEC 61850-based sys-
tems, maximum transmission times depend on the protection and con-
trol applications thereof (the so-called “performance class”). Hence,
according to the IEC 61850-5 specification [26], the most stringent ser-
vices, such as SV raw data or GOOSE messages to provide teleprotection
commands, or implement inter-tripping between circuit breakers, can
tolerate a maximum “transfer time” (defined as depicted in Figure 2.8)
of 3 ms, which must be guaranteed independently of the network condi-
tion. On the other hand, MMS may require up to 100 ms for “medium
speed” messages. Table 2.5 lists different categories of message types
and performance classes defined in [26].
Table 2.3: IEC 61850 services and transfer time requirements [26].
Function Application Message Delay (ms) Bandwidth Priority
Raw data Process bus SV <4 High High
Trip Protection GOOSE <3 Low High
Other Protection GOOSE 10-100 Low Medium-High
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Function Application Message Delay (ms) Bandwidth Priority
Medium speed Control MMS <100 Low Medium-Low
Low speed Control MMS <500 Low Medium-Low
File transfer Management MMS >1000 Medium Low
Command Control MMS - Low Medium-Low
Time sync. Phasors, SV PTP - Low Medium-High
It is necessary to consider that Table 2.5 shows communications con-
straints in terms of “transfer time”, from which, according to the IEC
61850-10, 20% of the total transmission time is reserved for network la-
tency, being the remaining 80% related to the processing times at the
sender and receiver. Additionally, in accordance with the processing
time for end nodes set forth in the IEC TR 61850-90-4 [23], the network
has a maximum budget of 0.6 ms of latency. The network latency is af-
fected largely by the layer 2 control technologies, including redundancy
and multihoming ones, which are detailed in Section 2.3.3.
To achieve adequate performance in industrial networks and taking into
account the bandwidth-sharing techniques in IEEE 802.3, latency re-
duction can be achieved by logical traffic filtering and prioritization3.
R1
Traffic prioriti-
zation
Hence, for example, Virtual LAN (VLAN, IEEE 802.1Q) tags provide
network segmentation and identify the priority of frames. Because of
this, its use in IEC 61850 networks is recommended by [23]. More specif-
ically, latencies caused by waiting for a lower-priority frame to egress a
port are analyzed in [23].
Moreover, by and large, layer 2 multicast traffic is used by numerous
industrial applications, as is the case with IEC 61850-based ones. Al-
though using VLANs reduces traffic on the network, end hosts experi-
ence overload of unwanted frames on their respective VLAN. In such
a scenario, one option is to support dynamic multicast filtering; for ex-
ample, the Multiple Multicast Registration Protocol (MMRP, specified
in IEEE 802.1Q) allows the dynamic configuration of multicast group
subscriptions. That is to say, dynamic filtering allows end hosts to in-
dicate to the network which addresses they are subscribed to, and then
switches share this information with each other. The authors of [27]
showed the expected network load reduction achieved in large industrial
3Margin annotations are used to summarize relevant requirements that should be
satisfied in industrial networks.
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Figure 2.8: The definition of transfer time in IEC 61850-5 [26].
automation networks by using MMRP. However, dynamic multicast con-
trol protocols are poorly supported by current IEDs and, as stated in
[28], the support for MMRP in Ethernet switches is almost non-existent.
Moreover, according to the IEC 61850-90-4 [23], the use of this kind of
protocol is not recommended. On the contrary, “static configuration
in conjunction with tools that predict network performance for all seg-
ments is strongly recommended”. Therefore, “the whole traffic must be
calculated before the substation is ever put into operation” to ensure
predictable operation.
Reference [29] evaluated a VLAN-based substation using mathematical
models for typical IEC 61850 traffic. On the other hand, Ingram et
al. [24] analyzed that network segmentation may help to manage those
networks whose resources are shared by process and station buses. Fur-
thermore, rate limiting or policing mechanisms adjust the incurred frame
latency in a switch. Besides, the authors experimentally verify the la-
tency in an IEC 61850-based substation, where the network resources are
shared among data with different priorities, such as SV, GOOSE along
with competing background traffic, and they suggest that “port ingress
rate limiting is one way of protecting against failures related to network
flooding, but this also complicates network design and configuration”.
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2.2.4.1 Predictability and timeliness
Hard real-time services require time-sensitive networks, whose control
and management planes guarantee a low deterministic latency and jitter.
Also, as stated in [30], to achieve a deterministic network, it must have
a “formal verification of maximum end-to-end latencies” and “mecha-
nisms to guarantee that ill-behaved end-systems will not interfere with
well-behaved end-systems”. Thus, using the OPNET Modeler software,
the authors of [31] proposed a simulation model on basis of the Net-
work Calculus (NC) framework4 that allows network designers to iden-
tify bounded delays for intra-substation communications.
Switched Ethernet networks avoid collisions and, thereby, improve effi-
ciency. However, despite being widely used in industrial applications,
they are not able to guarantee a deterministic delay. In the case of
avionics systems, the Avionics Full DupleX Switched Ethernet (AFDX),
standardized in 2004 by the Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC)
ARINC Specification 664 part 7 [32], is a suitable protocol for offer-
ing predictable timing behavior through the pre-establishment of the
so-called Virtual Links (VLs). VLs are static paths previously com-
puted by NC that, based on statistical multiplexing, guarantee a certain
bandwidth, and limited latency and jitter. Each VL is identified by the
packet’s destination MAC address and defines a unidirectional stream.
One of the main advantages of AFDX networks is to be based on com-
mercial off-the-shelf Ethernet components with support for QoS. Indeed,
it has been also considered to be applied in power substations [33]. How-
ever, according to [34], aircraft data and other mission-critical networks
will evolve to unified systems that mix AFDX traffic and TCP/IP best
effort services without using gateway functions. As an example, the
SAE AS6802 Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTEthernet) standard [35] is
another relevant technology used in aerospace and automotive indus-
tries. It is based on static time-triggered schedules and allows AFDX
and synchronous time-triggered traffic to share the same network [36].
It is worth to remark that an IEEE 802.11 wireless extension of the
SAE AS6802 standard was presented in [37]. Otherwise, the authors of
[38] proposed another Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) data link
layer protocol that is compatible with existing Wi-Fi networks.
4A theoretical model that can be used to analytically evaluate real-time constrained
applications.
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Nevertheless, in any case, SAE AS6802 and AFDX standards impose
static resource allocations. Hence, providing reconfiguration capability
in the event of failures “is one of the next great challenges for avionic
architectures” [39] and still applicable to Smart Grid applications.R2Flexible and
reconfigurable
network
2.2.5 Robustness and survivability requirements
The grace time of automation systems, namely the period that can be
tolerated without degrading system performance, delimits the network
recovery time. The IEC 62439 standard summarizes some examples of
grace periods, as shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Examples of application grace time [40].
Applications Typical grace time (s)
Uncritical automation, e.g. enterprise systems 20
Automation management, e.g. manufacturing, discrete automation 2
General automation, e.g. process automation, power plants 0.2
Time-critical automation, e.g. synchronized drives 0.02
With regard to the intended scope, the IEC 61850-5 specification [26]
defines the maximum allowed communication recovery times depending
on the class of service, as shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Requirements for recovery delay [26].
Communicating Partners Service Required recovery time
SCADA to IED Client-server IEC 61850-8-1 400 ms
IED to IED interlocking IEC 61850-8-1 4 ms
IED to IED, reserve blocking IEC 61850-8-1 4 ms
Protection trip excluding Bus Bar protection IEC 61850-8-1 4 ms
Bus Bar protection (GOOSE) IEC 61850-9-2 Bumpless
Sampled measured values (SV) IEC 61850-9-2 Bumpless
This way, to ensure no interruption in critical services, networks must
have redundant components and be able to seamlessly restore commu-
nications in the event of a network failure; that is, to simultaneously
duplicate a flow through different paths. The IEC 61850-90-4 [23] ana-
lyzes the behavior of robust topologies, including redundant trees, rings
or mesh ones.
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Since improving the availability and reliability of industrial networks is
a major goal of this work, a detailed analysis is given in Section 2.3.
2.2.6 Network security requirements
Securing industrial CPSs is essential to ensure integrity and confiden-
tiality for critical applications. The NIST identified [41] how to pro-
tect ICSs against common threats and vulnerabilities, suggesting coun-
termeasures to reduce their risks. A thorough overview was given by
Knowles et al. [42], who compared control system standards, guide-
lines and academic research to overcome cyber-security issues. Besides
mechanisms for ensuring authentication and integrity of critical services
[43], network security deeply depends on restricting physical and logical
access to cyber-physical components, as recommended in most security
standards (e.g., ISA-99/IEC 62443-1-3), such as:
ä Traffic control between industrial control levels. Access Control
Lists (ACLs), stateful packet inspection or application-gateway
firewalls provide traffic filtering.
ä Boundary protection, which can be obtained through demilitarized
zone (DMZ) deployments to enforce the control policy for external
information exchange.
ä Mitigation of malicious attacks by using intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDS/IPS). A mitigation strategy must be per-
formed after receiving an alarm from these systems.
With respect to power system operations, cyber-attacks to ICT and
SCADA systems can cause malfunction of physical equipment and may
result in blackouts. Hence, standardization bodies recommend priori-
tizing the promotion of Smart Grid cyber-security strategies. The IEC
62351 standard addresses security issues and specifies, in parts 4 and
6 [44], how to provide security mechanisms for IEC 61850 communica-
tion services, such as cryptographic algorithms or authentication cer-
tificates. Nevertheless, unlike MMS, “encryption is not recommended”
for SV and GOOSE services due to their stringent latency requirements
(transfer times below 3 ms), and therefore confidentiality is not manda-
tory. Likewise, this specification is also ambiguous regarding the need
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for ensuring data integrity and source authenticity. In this sense, several
previous studies have analyzed possible attacks on GOOSE and SV pro-
tocols [45], [46] by taking advantage of the lack of authentication and
encryption. Instead, “the communication path selection process (e.g.,
the fact that GOOSE and SV are supposed to be restricted to a logical
substation LAN) shall be used to provide confidentiality for information
exchanges” [44]. Therefore, the generation of network policies should be
appropriate to mitigate different vulnerabilities.R3Traffic restric-
tion
Different cyber-security
controls, such as access control, network isolation or monitoring will be
proposed in Section 3.2.3.
2.2.7 Network management and monitoring
Management plane functions generally include configuration, perfor-
mance monitoring and maintenance. Typical industrial network con-
figurations are mostly built on managed devices, which support priority
queuing and access control protocols, being also necessary to implement
physical redundancy. In the case of the Smart Grid, standardization
bodies have published network engineering recommendations [23] for
inter- and intra-substation communications, including traditional proto-
cols that meet general network requirements. Regarding network man-
agement tools, reference [48] stated that being able to access all devices
from a central location would facilitate faster troubleshooting and re-
configuration.R4Central
management
2.2.7.1 Management protocols
Typically, network elements are managed by configuration tools based on
proprietary Command Line Interfaces (CLIs) or Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol (SNMP, RFC 3411). In the case of SNMP, it allows
Network Management Systems (NMSs) to get and set Management In-
formation Base (MIB) parameters. Also, management functions can
be implemented with the NETCONF (RFC 6241), that is, a protocol
based on a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) paradigm that uses XML for
encoding. According to [49], NETCONF poses numerous advantages
over existing CLIs. On the other hand, it should be noted that multiple
industrial networks comprise constrained devices, such as Wireless Sen-
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sor Networks (WSNs). Regarding the management of this kind of net-
works, the RFC 7547 [50] differentiates between centralized, distributed
and hierarchical management. The authors of [51] studied how SNMP
and NETCONF protocols can be used on resource-constrained Internet
of Things (IoT) environments.
Regarding IEC 61850-based networks, MMS can be also used to obtain
and manage communication configuration parameters. As a matter of
fact, several LNs for the communication network are defined in IEC
61850-7-4 and IEC 61850-90-4, including a “bridge object model” to
unify the supervision of communication, protection and control devices.
For example, although its use is not widespread in network elements,
some commercial switches (e.g., the Moxa PowerTrans PT-7528 series)
integrate a built-in MMS server to facilitate network management. Nev-
ertheless, this information model is very limited and it “is not sufficient
to represent the comprehensive communication network” [20]. This pre-
vents the information model of a switch from being viewed as an indi-
vidual IED. Therefore, MMS is not a suitable alternative to traditional
management protocols.
In any case, a further demand for NMSs is to consider “the configura-
tion of the communication network in the unified engineering process
of substation automation”, as the authors of [20] suggested. R5Unified
management
In this re-
gard, reference [52] included the commercial product “Cisco Connected
Grid NMS” [53] as an approach that combines hardware and software to
unify the monitoring and management functionalities. However, being
a proprietary solution does not facilitate the interoperability, which is a
major goal of the Smart Grid [14]. R6Interoperable
solution
2.2.7.2 Monitoring techniques
Besides mentioned requirements, it is also necessary to support perfor-
mance and fault monitoring. This can be carried out with tools for
traffic passive monitoring, such as:
ä The sFlow standard (RFC 3176) operates via random packet sam-
pling, such that sFlow agents (switches or routers) push messages,
over UDP, containing their interface counters and sampled pack-
ets to an sFlow collector that is able to read packet headers for
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each flow. sFlow relies on a sampling-based method whose ac-
curacy depends on the reporting interval specified in the agents.
The estimation of the expected error can be extracted from [54].
Additionally, these authors concede that sFlow is suited to real-
time traffic engineering, providing flexibility, scalability, low la-
tency and advantages over other monitoring protocols such as the
following ones. Figure 2.9 shows different agents (servers and net-
work devices) sending sFlow datagrams to a sFlow collector and
analyzer.
ä The NetFlow protocol is a push-based monitoring technology de-
veloped by Cisco that has been superseded by the IP Flow In-
formation Export (IPFIX) as a standard (RFC 7011). Reference
[55] presented a lightweight adaption of IPFIX to be a suitable
candidate for CPSs. However, it must be taken into account that
visibility into layer 2 traffic is particularly important in the target
application of this research. Therefore, one of the main advan-
tages of sFlow is that it allows the monitoring of flows defined by
layer 2 to layer 7 information of the OSI reference model, while on
the contrary, NetFlow and IPFIX are oriented to collect IP traffic
information, not allowing the determination of flows using layer 2
headers. In other words, NetFlow and IPFIX can be considered
as WAN monitoring tools, whereas sFlow operates at the LAN
level. Moreover, according to the authors of the paper [54], Net-
Flow is not suitable for low-latency network measurements. All of
these features are indispensable for monitoring SV and GOOSE
messages in IEC 61850-based substations.
ä SNMP offers a widely accepted monitoring technology, and its use
for polling statistics in substations is suggested by IEC 61850-90-4
[23]. For example, like most traditional NMSs, the PROFINET
standard uses SNMP to retrieve Link Layer Discovery Protocol
(LLDP, IEEE 802.1AB) data and thereby to extract the net-
work topology of industrial networks. However, according to [56],
“SNMP is not well suited for end-to-end measurements that are
needed for performance metrics”. Additionally, the analysis of [57]
is remarkable in showing a “passive flow monitoring framework for
OpenFlow enabled experimental facilities” and discussing the ad-
vantages of sFlow over SNMP, such as “pushing counters is much
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more efficient than retrieving them using SNMP”. In addition,
sFlow uses the eXternal Data Representation (XDR, RFC 1832)
data format, which is simpler than that used in SNMP (based on
the exchange of ASN.1 objects, RFC 3641), “hence significantly
reducing CPU overhead in switches and collectors”, being more
advantageous to monitor large networks. On the other hand, the
Remote Network MONitoring (RMON, RFC 2819) specification is
based on SNMP to improve network monitoring and traffic anal-
ysis. Nevertheless, as stated in [56], “the use of RMON has been
limited due to the complexity and cost of the RMON probes”.
ä The OpenFlow protocol [9] itself allows the controller to retrieve
counters per flows, ports and queues from controlled switches, so it
could be an option for implementing the network monitoring task.
For example, reference [58] uses this feature for traffic engineer-
ing purposes, and estimates a traffic matrix, namely, the traffic
volume from every ingress point to every egress point. Neverthe-
less, these statistics are tightly associated with every flow entry
installed on switches5 and this is an inconvenience for anomaly
detection processes, as discussed in [59].
Taking into account scalability aspects, monitoring protocols that rely
on pull approaches (SNMP and OpenFlow) are usually less efficient than
push-based mechanisms (sFlow and IPFIX), which do not require gener-
ating requests and maintaining session information to correlate requests
and replies. As a consequence, among approaches that are supported by
most network equipment vendors, it can be said that the sFlow protocol
is the most adequate monitoring technique for the case study.
Furthermore, multiple Operations, Administration and Manage-
ment (OAM) technologies, including heartbeat mechanisms for
detecting liveness, have been standardized. For instance, some of the
most representative technologies are IEEE 802.3ah (Ethernet in the
First Mile), which provides Ethernet Link OAM, whereas end-to-end
Ethernet OAM can be supported by IEEE 802.1ag (Connectivity Fault
Management, CFM), as well as by the ITU-T Y.1731 standard, which
offers a variety of OAM and management features. Also, Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection (BFD, RFC 5880) provides continuity check
5The OpenFlow protocol will be further described in Section 2.5.1.
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Figure 2.9: sFlow architecture and datagram encapsulation.
between two end-points. BFD is a UDP-based layer-3 protocol that is
usually used for protection of tunnels, IP traffic or MPLS Fast Reroute.
2.3 Redundancy, load balancing, and high availability
According to [30], “the main task of safety-critical networks is to pro-
vide guaranteed delivery of all packets”. Thus, to ensure robustness of
mission-critical CPSs, underlying networks have to meet certain levels of
reliability. Quantitative metrics for resilient control systems, including
recovery time and performance degradation, are introduced in [60]. As
the authors stated, redundancy is the most accepted method for main-
taining continuous network operation. Indeed, legacy avionics systems,
such as those based on the MIL-STD-1553 standard, already duplicated
buses (wires and switches) in “hot backup” status, with only one of the
buses active at a time.
40
2.3 Redundancy, load balancing, and high availability
In particular, this study focus on the Ethernet data link layer since, as
previously mentioned, this technology is being selected for many critical
projects which demand dependable communication infrastructures that
meet stringent reliability requirements. In addition, as noted above,
GOOSE and SV serve as examples of messages that are transferred
without connection or confirmation via a TCP/IP stack. Because of this,
although upper layers can provide redundancy and perform recovery ac-
tions, it is important to note that retransmission and coding techniques
are not considered in this study as they counteract the delay require-
ments [61] and are not suitable for real-time communications. Therefore,
although multipath transport protocols that support the simultaneous
transmission of the same information in different paths may be men-
tioned, such as the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) or
variations of Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [62], they do not support the
protection of IEC 61850 services.
This section outlines different restoration and protection techniques in
connection with the availability of resources. Then, some of the most
relevant protocols to provide redundancy in Ethernet networks are sub-
sequently listed. A thorough review of Ethernet resilience techniques
can be found in [63].
2.3.1 Types of redundancy
Redundancy takes two forms: temporal and spatial, while the first form
replicates the information over time in a distributed manner, in the spa-
tial redundancy the components (nodes and links) or data in a network
are replicated, which is the object of study. Conventionally, two types
of redundancy are distinguished:
ä Standby redundancy: through passive resources, these redundant
networks switch from an active to a secondary path. It may be dis-
tinguished between partial, which only overcomes the failed link
or node, and global recovery, where the whole path is reconfig-
ured (Figure 2.10 exemplifies these principles). In any case, two
different schemes can be considered:
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l Protection schemes where standby paths are precomputed in
a proactive way.
l Restoration mechanisms that define recovery network ele-
ments reactively in the face of failures and changes in the
network.
Both approaches result in a certain communication downtime, but
protection typically incurs in a lower recovery delay than restora-
tion approaches.
ä Active or parallel redundancy: multiple copies of the same data
are transmitted along multiple paths simultaneously. The routes
can be link-disjoint or node-disjoint for tolerance to link and node
failures, respectively. The receiver expects incoming traffic on dif-
ferent routes, so it always receives the information transmitted as
long as all paths do not fail simultaneously. This approach elim-
inates any downtime and ensures that no data are lost due to a
single failure.
Regarding the disjoint paths problem, it can be formally defined as fol-
lows: given a connected, undirected graph 𝐺 = (𝒩,ℒ) of a set 𝒩 of
N nodes and a set ℒ of L weighted links, two nodes 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒩, and an
integer 𝑘 > 0; find 𝑘 paths 𝑃1, 𝑃2, ..., 𝑃𝑘 from 𝑠 to 𝑡, such that the paths
share no common links (or nodes). There are different possible criteria
for finding the disjoint paths [64].
As can be drawn from the different redundant mechanisms, one of the
main differences lies in the switchover time, in which time can be divided
into:
1. Detection time based on monitoring the communication paths in
order to detect failures. Common to all types.
2. Provision time: if any failure is detected, the network control plane
must calculate an alternative path. It only affects the restoration
case.
3. Switching time to the alternative path and the subsequent com-
munication reestablishment. It generally does not influence in the
case of parallel redundancy.
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Figure 2.10: Types of redundancy and recovery mechanisms.
In the design of a network, different redundant methods must be de-
termined on a risk-versus-reward trade-off, assessing the need to reduce
recovery times and the number of redundant paths compared to other
factors, such as management and deployment costs. Obviously, the use
of concurrent paths also implies an increase of resources and parallelism
management, so they are oriented toward critical use cases, like those
mentioned in Section 1.1.
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2.3.2 Availability calculation
The communication availability is essential for industrial applications,
however it never can be totally guaranteed. It is defined in ITU-T Rec-
ommendation E.800 as follows: “availability of an item to be in a state
to perform a required function at a given instant of time or at any in-
stant of time within a given time interval, assuming that the external
resources, if required, are provided”. On the other hand, ITU-T Recom-
mendation Y.1563 assesses performance parameters for the specific case
of Ethernet service availability.
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Figure 2.11: Availability model of parallel systems (comparing up to four redundant
paths).
In [65], the authors illustrate an exhaustive analysis of network avail-
ability and different recovery methods, applied to several technologies.
From a general view, the availability of the network (𝐴 ∈ [0, 1]) can be
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quantitatively defined by the parameters known as Mean Time to Fail-
ure (MTTF), Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time
To Repair (MTTR) with the Equation 2.1. As can be understood, re-
silience and redundancy are closely related through fault detection and
isolation techniques, which are covered by OAM tools. Depending on
the fault nature, the failover period may be reduced and, therefore, the
availability of a network is improved. This can be achieved by automat-
ing the prevention and detection of certain faults, while on occasions,
the operators’ diagnosis and decision-making will be totally necessary.
R7
High availabil-
ity
𝐴 = 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 +𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (2.1)
Through an availability model based on Reliability Block Diagrams
(RBDs), the impact of parallel redundancy on the overall network avail-
ability can be crudely estimated. Because the availability of a single
path (𝐴𝑖) is defined by summation of the individual availabilities of the
network equipments and transmission links, the availability of parallel
systems (𝐴𝑝) may be calculated per the expression below:
𝐴𝑝 = 1 −
𝑁
∏
1
(1 − 𝐴𝑖) (2.2)
Likewise, the unavailability (𝑈 = 1 − 𝐴, 𝑈 ∈ [0, 1]) of subsystems can
be directly associated with the overall packet loss rate. Therefore, a
redundant system reduces such rate with respect to a non-redundant
one. For a parallel chain with unavailability 𝑞1 and 𝑞2,
𝑈𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 𝑞1 ≥ 𝑈𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = 𝑞1 ∗ 𝑞2 (2.3)
Relationship between redundancy and availability can be understood
from Figure 2.11, which shows how the network availability is improved
in accordance with a certain redundancy scheme. In this particular
figure, up to four parallel paths are compared, assuming that the avail-
ability of each connection path is the same.
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Regarding the packet loss ratio and following the model of Cena et al.,
[66], let 𝑀𝐿𝐺 and 𝑀𝐿𝑅 be, respectively, the number of packets generated
by a source node and received by a destination node through a path
𝐿 ∈ 𝐴,𝐵, where 𝐴 and 𝐵 refer to individual paths, while 𝐴𝐵 is the
combination of them. The sequence 𝑑𝑖 ∶ 𝑖 = 1...𝑀 indicates if a packet
was successfully delivered, 𝑑𝑖 = 0, or dropped, 𝑑𝑖 = 1. Then,
ä 𝑀𝐿𝑑 = ∑𝑖=1...𝑀 𝑑𝐿𝑖 is the amount of dropped packets on path 𝐿.
ä In active redundancy schemes, packets are lost only when they are
dropped on both redundant paths and, therefore, delivered packets
𝑀𝐴𝐵𝑅 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑀𝐴𝑅 ,𝑀𝐵𝑅 ) and 𝑀𝐴𝐵𝑑 = ∑𝑖=1...𝑀 𝑑𝐴𝑖 ∧ 𝑑𝐵𝑖 .
ä Finally, the packet loss ratio is Υ𝐿𝐷 = 𝑀𝐿𝐷/𝑀 , and the probability
of a packet loss event is 𝑃(𝑑𝐴𝑖 )∧𝑃(𝑑𝐵𝑖 ), and it equals 𝑃(𝑑𝐴𝑜 )⋅𝑃 (𝑑𝐵𝑗 )
if errors on 𝐴 and 𝐵 are statistically independent.
2.3.3 Spanning tree, link aggregation and other redundancy
approaches
An overview of common layer 2 redundancy protocols is presented below.
2.3.3.1 Spanning tree-based protocols
Given that in the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard there is no mechanism
to discard duplicated frames or any time-to-live field, the appearance of
loops should be avoided. To that end, the most commonly applicable
protocols for handling redundancy in Ethernet networks are based on the
spanning tree approach. These techniques obtain loop-free topologies
by disabling certain redundant links, and these passive resources are
activated in the event of a network element failure.
There are several distributed spanning tree algorithms, either stan-
dard, such as for example the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP,
IEEE 802.1D) and the Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP, IEEE
802.1s), or proprietary, such as the Rapid Per-VLAN Spanning-Tree
Plus (RPVST+) developed by Cisco. These two latter protocols enable
load balancing as creating multiple instances of Spanning Tree Protocol
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per Virtual LAN. The advantages of MSTP with respect to RSTP in the
effect of traffic interactions on SV and GOOSE messages were studied by
Ingram et al. in [24]. In any case, switches running MSTP lack a global
view of the network, and the resulting logical topologies do not take
advantage of all physical redundant links, which therefore prevents the
packets from being always forwarded through the shortest path. R8Higher re-
dundancy
efficiency
This
shortcoming directly affects the latency of time-sensitive services and it
will be examined in Section 3.3.
Furthermore, another common shortcoming of these protocols is that
they do not guarantee a deterministic failover behavior. For example,
although a method to calculate the maximum recovery time in a ring
configuration is provided in [40], the RSTP fault recovery time depends
on the configuration parameters and the location of the fault.
A remarkable approach is developed in [67], where the authors rely on
the MSTP protocol to define several trees and forward duplicated pack-
ets. However, it is a static configuration and the authors do not address
the issue of how the receivers should discard duplicates. Also, as the
authors claimed, this proposal “cannot be generalized for all the nodes
of the network, since the duplication of messages induces overload”, but
moreover, duplication depending on the traffic class would be more ef-
fective. R9Dynamic
redundancy
control
2.3.3.2 Link aggregation
End hosts with multiple interfaces, in which one or more may be active,
increase reliability. On the one hand, Ethernet channel bonding allows
multiple physical interfaces to bundle into a single logical one. Therefore,
bonding reduces the failover time by providing resilience between ports
in case of a link failure, as well as load balancing that increases band-
width. Several technologies allow nodes to use multiple links jointly,
such as, for example, the Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP,
IEEE 802.1AX) or proprietary Multi-Chassis Link Aggregation (MC-
LAG) implementations. The latter ones avoid a single point of failure
by aggregating the capacity of multiple switches, thereby requiring a
synchronization protocol between switches.
47
2 Literature review
Despite the fact that solutions like LACP can be perfectly used for load
balancing, they are not suitable for protecting services that require zero
recovery time as they require “non-negligible amount of time for giving
up on a path that has failed” [61].
2.3.3.3 Link-state routing protocols
Using Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) routing to
distribute link-state information has been recently proposed for layer
2 frame forwarding. The Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
(TRILL, RFC 7176) and Shortest Path Bridging (SPB, IEEE 802.1aq)
protocols rely on link-state routing algorithms to improve the Ethernet
control plane. Unlike spanning tree-based techniques, both technologies
enable shortest path forwarding in mesh topologies by calculating a hash
based on, for example, Ethernet addresses, IP addresses and TCP/UDP
port numbers of the packets. However, with these protocols, multi-
pathing can only be carried out through equal cost paths and, according
to [68], another disadvantage of the hashing technique is that “usually
all links get the same percentage of the hash values and therefore all the
paths need to have the same capacity”.
Despite the fact that both SPB and TRILL protocols has been mainly
developed for large layer-2 fabrics (data center scenarios), they have been
proposed to be used in industrial automation networks by [69], [70]. In
the specific case of TRILL, it results in “an enhanced alternative to
RSTP”; however it “is still unable to meet the required convergence
time claimed by the Smart Grid requirements” [70]. Indeed, they are
not conceived as active redundancy protocols. Hence, there are recent
attempts [71] to build active protection paths in TRILL networks so
that “when a link on the primary distribution tree fails, the preinstalled
backup forwarding table will be utilized without waiting for the recon-
vergence, which minimizes the service disruption”.
2.3.4 IEC 62439: High-availability Ethernet protocols
As indicated above, a very low, or even zero, recovery time and packet
loss rate are achieved by using spatial and temporal active redundan-
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cies. In this way, aforementioned redundancy mechanisms may not be
appropriate, in terms of recovery time, to critical networks.
Besides proprietary or exclusive solutions, the Technical Committee 65
standardized in the IEC 62439 different techniques applicable to any
industrial system to build high-availability networks. In particular, the
IEC 62439 standard suite, entitled “High availability automation net-
works”, includes a set of layer 2 redundancy control protocols for indus-
trial environments. From a general point of view, they are grouped into
two models:
ä “Redundancy managed within the network” with devices singly
attached to network devices, which implement redundancy man-
agement.
ä “Redundancy managed in the end nodes” using doubly attached
devices.
Otherwise, each included protocol is intended to be applied in specific
applications (Table 2.4) and topologies; for example, ring topologies can
be protected with the Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP), achieving
lower convergence time with respect to RSTP.
Under this umbrella, it is interesting to note Parallel Redundancy Proto-
col (PRP) and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) technolo-
gies, which are able to provide zero recovery time in case of any single
network failure. To achieve this, both protocols, defined in IEC 62439-3
[72], duplicate data and network resources. While in the MRP there is
a ring manager that is in charge of controlling the redundant resources,
in PRP and HSR redundancy management is implemented in the end
devices, which are connected by active redundant links. The principles
of these protocols will be described below, as well as the discussion of
related work.
It is important to emphasize that PRP and HSR have been selected by
the IEC 61850 Edition 2 [23] to avoid single point of failures and provide
a minimal failover time, being suitable for protecting SV and GOOSE
services. For example, [73] focuses on substation automation systems
and it studies the performance of time synchronization services in RSTP
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and PRP networks where multiple network failures are simulated and,
noticeably, PRP is much more tolerant to such failures.
2.3.5 Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP)
PRP (IEC 62439-3 Clause 4) guarantees seamless communication by
simultaneously duplicating data in two networks. The management of
redundant frames is fully implemented in the end nodes, called Double
Attached Nodes (DANs). Thus, a DAN is connected to two independent
LANs (see Figure 2.12) through interfaces with the same MAC address.
PRP DEVICE
PORT A PORT B
PRP DEVICE
PORT A PORT B
PRP DEVICE
PORT A PORT B
LAN A LAN B
Figure 2.12: PRP network topology.
According to the specification, these networks must be identical in pro-
tocol at the Logical Link Control (LLC) level and their switches have to
accommodate oversized frames (with length of up to 1532 bytes), since
DANs extend the Ethernet header. Yet, these networks are protocol-
agnostic and may have different topologies and performance, and even
the PRP specification is independent of intrinsic redundancy used in
the LANs6. Consequently, network switches can connect PRP incom-
6Like PRP, it should be noted that the above-mentioned AFDX protocol follows the
same dual-redundancy transmission principle. However, to reduce wire runs and
weight, AFDX only considers the use of cascaded star topologies.
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patible nodes, which are called Single Attached Nodes (SANs). Besides,
these off-the-shelf devices can become Virtual SANs by attaching to PRP
proxies (denominated PRP RedBoxes), which do redundantly connect
to both networks.
The specific PRP operation mode and the Ethernet frame specification
described below.
[LLC]
MAC
[LLC]
MAC
PHY PHY
Network Layer
Hard real-time
stack UDPTCP
LAN A LAN B
Link Redundancy
Entity
DAN
Figure 2.13: Scheme of a PRP device [72].
2.3.5.1 PRP operation process
A DAN implements a Link Redundancy Entity (LRE), which is respon-
sible for managing the redundancy and duplicates transparently to the
upper layers. A schematic PRP diagram is shown in Figure 2.13 accord-
ing to the architectural model of an IEEE 802.1 bridge. In addition,
PRP provides a mechanism for the network supervision, so that each
DAN monitors the status of each LAN and other PRP devices. This
facilitates the control of network errors, as well as discovering other
DANs. To this end, multicast frames, identified by a specific Ethertype
(0x88FB), are used. The PRP operation process is summarized in the
following pseudo-code:
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while true do
send a multicast supervision frame;
for every datagram received from upper layers do
create two frames by adding an Redundancy Control Trailer (RCT)
with the same sequence number and size field;
calculate a new checksum per frame;
send out the frames through its both ports at the same time;
end
end
Algorithm 1: PRP sender node operation.
while true do
receive multicast supervision frames;
for every frame received on one of the two ports do
check if the frame is a duplicate or not (MAC source address and
sequence number);
end
if yes then
discard the duplicate;
else
remove the RCT;
transparently forward the received frame to its upper layers;
end
end
Algorithm 2: PRP receiver node operation.
In other words, a PRP node works as follows:
ä When the Entity receives a message from upper layers, it creates
two frames by adding the so-called RCT and calculating a new
checksum.
ä The Entity sends out the frames through its both ports at the same
time. These two frames traverse the two independent networks.
ä At the destination node, the LRE has two operation modes to
handle the received frames.
l Duplicate Accept “for testing purpose” [72] or Duplicate Dis-
card: the latter, which is the most common mode, ensures
that the upper layer receives only the first data frame. For
this purpose, the LRE must maintain a buffer of the first re-
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ceived frames to recognize and discard duplicates. The buffer
implementation affects the algorithm to detect duplicates,
which is not specified by the standard. For instance, deci-
sions about timeouts and buffer sizes must be consistent with
network performance goals.
l In both cases, the LRE removes the RCT and forwards the
received frame to its upper layers. In case that the duplicates
are not discarded, upper protocols, such as IP and TCP pro-
tocols, can tolerate receiving and removing duplicates.
2.3.5.2 PRP Ethernet frame format
In order to enable detection of duplicated frames, each frame is extended
by the RCT, 6 bytes long, structured as follows:
ä Sequence number (16 bits): the source increments it for each frame
sent, allowing a receiver to detect missing messages and permanent
failures.
ä LAN A/B label (4 bits): it identifies the network to which send
the frame. The specification defines only the 0xA and 0xB codes.
ä Link Service Data Unit (LSDU) size (12 bits): the LSDU is the
content located between the Length/Type field and the Frame
Check Sequence. This field indicates the size of the Link Service
Data Unit [72] including the RCT.
ä PRP suffix (16 bits): it coincides with the Ethertype (0x88FB).
Preamble Destination
Length 
Type
LSDU
Seq. 
Number
LAN 
ID
LSDU 
Size
PRP 
Suffix
Frame Check 
Sequence
Source
---Redundancy Control Trailer---
Figure 2.14: PRP frame format.
Figure 2.14 shows the PRP frame format.
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2.3.5.3 Other characteristics and proposals for improvement of PRP
In general, PRP is not only useful for critical applications where data
loss is not permitted, but also it may be relevant in situations where
the loss rate may be relatively high, which may be applied to tolerate
arbitrary faults, such as accidents, natural disasters, malicious attacks
or blackouts.
It can be concluded that PRP is a simpler technique and more easily
implementable than other approaches such as [74], which proposes a
multiple path Ethernet scheme, along with congestion control and packet
retransmission mechanisms in order to be able of transmit data through
parallel paths in a reliable manner. However, PRP compliant devices
duplicate all packets regardless of their priorities, which entails that the
available network bandwidth is halved. This may be inefficient to meet
requirements of the applications in many aspects, such as scalability.
R10
PRP efficiency
enhancement
Consequently, it could be interesting to filter non-critical traffic in order
to free resources.
Otherwise, the approach presented in [70] combines PRP and TRILL
networks, however this combination does not provide greater redun-
dancy than conventional PRP deployments and, as asserted by the au-
thors, there are situations where their “proposal cannot cope with the
most stringent requirements”. Accordingly, this paper encourages prac-
titioners to supplement it by taking into account some principles of the
PRP protocol. In order to maintain a very reliable networking infras-
tructure, multiple-failure scenarios will be analyzed in Section 3.3.3.
2.3.6 High Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) protocol
HSR (IEC 62439-3 Clause 5) can be considered a special version of
PRP applied to certain topologies. Unlike PRP, HSR requires only an
additional path between two nodes; on that ground, HSR is typically
used in ring topologies, including rings of rings and mesh topologies. A
single HSR ring network is composed of nodes connected to each other,
with-out needing an intermediary. To this effect, HSR devices, also
called DANs, incorporates a bridge function that forwards frames from
port to port. All components must be HSR-aware so that legacy switches
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or general purpose nodes are not allowed. For this reason, SANs require
the capabilities of a proxy (HSR RedBox) as depicted in Figure 2.15.
Moreover, another proxy called QuadBox can connect HSR rings to each
other. Specifically, two quadruple-port devices must be used to avoid
single points of failure; both forward packets from ring to ring.
5
DAN
8
2 4
6
3
HSR Ring
RedBox
SAN
Source
Destination
Figure 2.15: HSR network diagram.
2.3.6.1 HSR operation process
Regarding the operation, every node, which transmits in both directions
of the ring, is responsible for detecting and removing duplicates from the
network to prevent loops. The behavior of these nodes is summarized
as follows:
ä For unicast traffic:
1. The LRE of the receiver removes the duplicated frames and
passes the valid ones to upper layers.
2. In case that the receiver does not operate properly and a sent
frame returns to the sender, this must delete it to avoid loops.
ä For broadcast/multicast traffic:
1. Each node forwards frames from one port to another, and also
it passes the filtered frames to upper layers, if applicable.
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2. Broadcast/multicast frames traverse the complete topology
before being removed by the sender.
In addition to the above, an HSR node is expected to support certain
functionalities to improve the use of available resources, such as network
segmentation and traffic prioritization through IEEE 802.1Q to differ-
entiate services that require real-time processing. Moreover, similar to
PRP, each DAN has a network supervision mechanism that generates
layer 2 multicast frames with a specific Ethertype, 0x88FB, through its
both ports.
2.3.6.2 HSR Ethernet frame format
As illustrated in Figure 2.16, a tag is added to the Ethernet frames
by the sender so HSR devices can detect duplicates. These frames are
identified by the Ethertype 0x892F and include the following fields:
ä LAN Identifier (4 bits): it is necessary to handle complex networks
that connects multiple PRP and HSR networks.
ä LSDU size (12 bits): it specifies the size of the LSDU including
the HSR header.
ä Sequence Number (16 bits): it is incremented at each hop.
Preamble Destination
Length 
Type
LSDU
Seq. 
Number
LAN 
ID
LSDU 
Size
Frame Check 
Sequence
Source
---      HSR Header    ---
Figure 2.16: HSR frame format.
As in PRP, the introduction of an additional overhead due to the HSR
header reduces the actual throughput.
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2.3.6.3 Comparison between HSR and PRP
Differences between HSR and PRP make each one of them more appro-
priate in certain use cases, so the pros and cons of each protocol are
summarized as follows:
ä While the PRP scheme depends on the network elements and sup-
ports two independent LANs of any topology, HSR is limited to
ring-based topologies7.
ä One limitation of PRP is that it is not strictly deterministic, since
communication delays may vary depending on the topologies. In
contrast, a major strength of HSR is that facilitates the determi-
nation of latencies, since it is only necessary to know the number
of nodes and their corresponding switching time. However, on the
other hand, ring topologies also present inherent limitations, such
as the maximum number of hops that does not cause the maximum
latency is exceeded.
ä While PRP means a duplication of network equipment, HSR does
not suppose this overhead, making it less expensive to deploy and
maintain than PRP.
ä The latter implies HSR works without dedicated Ethernet
switches. By contrast, HSR nodes must implement switching
function between their two ports. Accordingly, HSR should be
implemented in hardware to meet acceptable time requirements;
on the contrary, the PRP nodes can implement the LRE in
software.
ä These requirements are related to the flexibility to accommodate
off-the-shelf devices: unlike PRP, SANs cannot be inserted in HSR
topologies without using a RedBox, as mentioned before.
A further analysis of other IEC 62439 redundancy protocols can be found
in [63]. Among them, the IEC 62439-4 Cross-Network Redundancy Pro-
tocol (CRP) and the IEC 62439-5 Beacon Redundancy Protocol (BRP)
implement standby redundancy so that they do not provide a seamless
7The IEC 62439-3 specification also describes different robust topologies that employ
PRP and HSR jointly.
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communication. However, in contrast to PRP, they permit establishing
cross-links between parallel LANs, which can be considered a limitation
of PRP.
2.3.6.4 Network usage analysis of HSR
As discussed in [75], an upper latency bound exists in ring topologies,
as a specific case of non-feedforward networks, if
𝛼 ≤ 1𝐻 − 1 (2.4)
where 𝛼 is the maximum utilization rate of any link and𝐻 the maximum
path length. That is to say, the utilization rate decreases with increasing
network size or, in other words, the number of hops is restricted by time
constraints. This way, it is necessary to emphasize that the waste of
bandwidth is one of the main drawbacks of HSR networks, since all
frames are sent in both directions around the whole ring; “note that
these are useless frames, which will later be removed from the network”
[76]. In single HSR rings, duplication of traffic means that two unicast
frames traverse the total number of links (𝐿) in the network. Thus, the
number of hops (ℎ) is constant for all types of traffic and independent of
the location of the source (‘S’) and the destination (‘S’), as shown in 2.6
in Table 2.6. Consequently, frames generated by a node affect the overall
network capacity. This is more noticeable when the topology consists of
several rings, where unicast packets are also doubly transmitted along
those rings that do not contain the destination node. In this case, the
number of hops only depends on the location of the destination, as given
in 2.6, where 𝐿𝑟 is the number of links in each ring, and 𝑅 is the ring
containing the destination node.
One of the main goals of this work is to reduce the average number of
hops per frame delivery and, therefore, to decrease the total network
traffic. If network topologies are determined by the sets of nodes (𝒩)
and links (ℒ), where end nodes (𝒩𝐸) generate and receive traffic; and
for any pair of end nodes 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩𝐸, the source-destination pair is given
by 𝑠𝑑𝑖, 𝑗. Then, let 𝑓(𝑠𝑑𝑖,𝑗) denote traffic flow sent from node 𝑖 to node
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Table 2.6: Number of hops in HSR networks.
Single ring S D ℎ = 𝐿 (2.5)
Coupled rings S
QB
QB
D ℎ = ∑𝑅−1𝑟=1 2𝐿𝑟 + 𝐿𝑅 (2.6)
𝑗, and 𝑇𝑓[𝑡] denote the number of frames generated by a flow 𝑓 at time
𝑡. The above-mentioned goal can be expressed as follows:
min ∑
𝑓∈ℱ,ℎ
ℎ𝑇𝑓,ℎ (2.7)
where 𝑇𝑓,ℎ is the traffic volume due to the flow 𝑓 (ℱ is the set of all
flows in the network) using paths with ℎ hops.
2.3.6.5 Proposals for improvement of HSR
Reducing unnecessary traffic in HSR networks has been analyzed in [77],
where MAC learning is implemented in QuadBoxes; whereas in [78], the
authors introduced a traffic control node in charge of network moni-
toring and duplicating packets if necessary. With a similar approach,
references [76], [79] proposed algorithms that remove duplicated frames
to reduce throughput. Moreover, the latter proposes the creation of
“virtual rings” that connect sources and destinations to restrict network
traffic. Despite these proposals, no studies have focused on distinguish-
ing types of services or providing methods of traffic control. R11Improvement
of HSR per-
formance and
efficacy
In the pro-
posal presented in Section 3.3.4, the OpenFlow technology is adopted to
achieve this objective.
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2.4 Wireless industrial networks
It is becoming increasingly common to deploy industrial wireless net-
works, since they have numerous advantages, such as lower installation
costs due to cabling reduction or enabling users and equipment mobil-
ity. In fact, the Industry 4.0 framework largely relies on the expansion
of ubiquitous wireless sensor systems. However, wireless communica-
tions suffer from unreliable data transmission due to non-deterministic
factors. Therefore, these networks have to ensure continuity of opera-
tions, so that availability and performance are not affected. Specifically,
wireless automation requirements are specified in IEC 62657-1, differ-
entiating them according to the critically of applications. According to
[80], in 2006, there was no vendors had developed wireless networks for
relay protection within a substation, which is one of the most demanding
mission-critical and time-sensitive services in SASs (Table 2.5); whereas
wireless communications could be used for the transmission of moni-
toring data. However, the same document envisaged that “future en-
hancements of wireless equipment robustness, security, and capabilities,
particularly with meshed networks, could possibly meet the stringent
requirements”.
Willing et al. [81] analyzed how mature wireless technologies, including
IEEE 802.11, 802.15.1 or 802.15.4 standards, can be applied in industrial
applications through robust network designs in error-prone channels. In
the case of the Smart Grid systems, the opportunities posed by wireless
sensor networks were assessed in [12], which described technical chal-
lenges, such as ensuring a certain latency or QoS. These challenges are
associated with changes in the topology and connectivity due to the con-
ditions of the physical layer. The propagation loss in power substations
was also obtained in [12].
Furthermore, there are emerging wireless standards focused on pro-
viding industrial-grade reliability, such as WirelessHART (IEC 62591),
ISA100.11a (IEC 62734) or WIA-PA (IEC 62601). They are all based
on the IEEE 802.15.4e MAC layer, which uses Time Slotted Channel
Hopping (TSCH) to provide reliable communication and deterministic
latency. TSCH combines multi-channel TDMA with a very low cycle
time, and frequency hopping. In addition, WirelessHART provides a
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reliable, connectionless transport service, whereas ISA100.11a supports
unacknowledged and acknowledged services, and retry mechanisms to
assure end-to-end delivery of messages based on UDP/IPv6. ISA100.11a
is also capable of running TCP for non-real-time communications.
In these approaches, the “Network Manager” (following the nomencla-
ture of WirelessHART) is responsible for configuring the network re-
sources and managing routes between devices, so that field nodes need
not be concerned with these tasks. WirelessHART has been proposed
to be used in industrial CPSs [82], where the authors highlighted differ-
ent research directions, among which hierarchical network architectures
would enhance scalability. Thus, Lu et al. [82] proposed to divide large
WSNs into multiple subnetworks and local network managers, which
have to be coordinated with a global manager. Moreover, Lu et al.
suggested establishing a unified codesign where the network resource
allocation should be dependent on the control design.
These technologies are used at the sensor/actuator level for monitoring
and automation applications. Therefore, all of them are aimed at short-
distance (about 10 m) Wireless Sensor and Personal Area Networks.
They can only achieve a low-data rate and, besides, they are not directly
interoperable with Ethernet. As stated in [83], these issues may be
overcome by using IEEE 802.11.
On the one hand, regarding the interoperability of Ethernet and Wi-Fi
networks in industrial environments, reference [83] studies hybrid de-
signs where link-layer frames are transmitted from wired backbones to
the wireless channels and vice versa. On the other hand, unlike the Car-
rier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) tech-
nique, the polling-based mechanism of IEEE 802.11, offers predictable
communications and achieves shorter packet delay. This Controlled
Channel Access (CCA) is based on the original Point Coordination Func-
tion (PCF) and “matches the requirements for automating various Smart
Grid applications” [84]. In particular, the authors of [85] evaluated the
latency of GOOSE messages defined in IEEE 802.11g wireless LANs,
in the presence of interference previously characterized at different sub-
stations and scenarios. They “demonstrate suitability of an industrial
WLAN for some innovative smart-distribution substation applications”
[85].
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There have also been proposals to integrate Real-Time Ethernet pro-
tocols into IEEE 802.11 networks by means of a scheduling function
carried out by a managing node. For example, Ethernet Powerlink is
used in [86] and a proprietary extension to PCF based on PROFINET
IO (Industrial PCF, developed by Siemens) is studied in [87].
2.4.1 Redundancy in industrial WLANs
Previously mentioned WirelessHart, ISA100.11a and WIA-PA are
mainly used in inherently redundant mesh networks with the aim of
increasing redundancy, diversity and, hence, reliability. Moreover,
the ISA100.11a standard includes the duocast feature, which allows a
device to send packets to multiple APs and receive acknowledgements
in the same time slot. In [88], the advantages of duocast are applied to
industrial plants.
Otherwise, although IEEE 802.11 is not used in [89]–[91], they show
the benefits of adopting redundancy in industrial wireless plants. Refer-
ence [89] decreases the failure probability by performing retransmissions
that use different independent antenna and channels. As in PRP/HSR,
the authors assume that the receivers may be responsible for processing
multiple copies of the same packet. ReInForM [90] establishes multi-
ple redundant paths, for which nodes have to be aware of the network
topology and status. Hence, diverse information (e.g., desired reliabil-
ity, channel quality and number of hops needed to reach destination)
is added to the data packets, and it is needed to determine the trans-
mission paths. Due to low-latency constraints, this approach is hardly
applicable to industrial control systems. In fact, it should be taken into
account that, despite reducing throughput, one of the benefits of sending
redundant packets along multiple paths is not only avoiding retransmis-
sion, but also providing lower delay, which has been demonstrated in
[91].
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that PRP was initially targeted to be
used in wired Ethernet deployments, recent researches have proposed
the use of PRP in wireless scenarios with the aim of increasing network
resilience. Reference [87] proposes the use of PRP in hybrid topolo-
gies, where a node is connected through a primary wired link and a
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secondary wireless connection. As a consequence, although the wireless
connection provides lower performance, it is valid as a backup mecha-
nism. Rentschler et al. also proposed in [92] to communicate two PRP
nodes via two different wireless channels, which operate as point-to-point
links. As a result, lower error rate, latency and jitter are obtained. With
the same approach, in paper [66] sending redundant frames is optimized
with the addition of control messages, which prevent the transmission
over lossy and erroneous channels.
These studies demonstrate the advantages of combining PRP and
WLAN in applications with demanding availability requirements.
However, point-to-multipoint connections and mobility scenarios have
not been analyzed. Moreover, none of the above proposals is focused on
the network management. On the other hand, in this study OpenFlow
is proposed as the control mechanism (Section 3.3.3).
R12
Robust WLAN
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2.5 OpenFlow and Software Defined Networking
This section provides an overview of the OpenFlow protocol, which
emerged to develop a clean-slate network control architecture [93], [94]
and it is the cornerstone of the SDN paradigm at present. The details
of this paradigm are described later.
2.5.1 The OpenFlow protocol
From a historical perspective, OpenFlow was proposed in [94] as a
promising solution to provide programmability and flexibility in campus
networks. OpenFlow [9] is a protocol whereby a controller establishes
the forwarding rules for flows arriving at a network device. Hence, a
controller can access and establish the data path by adding, updating
and deleting flow entries in the forwarding tables of switches, enabling
data and control plane separation. In order to define the packet for-
warding path, the forwarding rules are based on packet headers, input
ports, priorities and instructions associated with each input flow.
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Regarding the communication process between an OpenFlow switch and
a controller, it is important to emphasize that these rules can be installed
in two different ways:
ä Reactive mode: in which the controller dynamically sets en-
tries in response to requests from switches, through the so-called
“packet-in” messages.
ä Proactive mode: the flow tables are statically pre-populated by
a controller, thereby reducing the flow insertion delay, which is
required by time-sensitive scenarios.
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Figure 2.17: OpenFlow pipeline.
Figure 2.17 shows a scheme of an externally controlled switch and the
OpenFlow rules of forwarding tables of switches, which contain multiple
match fields (ingress port, metadata and packet headers), instructions
and metadata that define the data path. Match fields enable a flow-
level control scheme based on layer 2 to layer 4 headers. The number
of possible fields from packets used to match against flow entries have
increased as new versions of OpenFlow are released. Table 2.7 illustrates
the 12-tuple supported by OpenFlow 1.0, to which new match fields have
been added. For example, OpenFlow 1.1 introduced support for adding,
modifying and removing Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) labels;
IPv6 match and header rewrite was added in OpenFlow 1.2; or, in the
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Table 2.7: OpenFlow 1.0 match fields
Ingress Port Ether Src VLAN Id IP Src TCP-UDP Src Port / ICMP Type
Ether Dst VLAN Prior IP Dst TCP-UDP Dst Port / ICMP Code
Ether Type IP Proto
IP ToS bits
current version (OpenFlow 1.5.1), flag bits in the TCP header (e.g.,
SYN, ACK and FIN) can be used to detect TCP connections.
With respect to the control channel, two scenarios are distinguished:
in-band and out-of-band control planes. On the one hand, the former
configuration does not need additional physical resources, whereas an
out-of-band control plane may result expensive for wide-area networks
with multiple controllers (detailed below). On the other hand, not sepa-
rating control from data traffic may involve reliability issues as network
failures affect both planes; in that event the control channel needs to be
repaired before the controller can recover the data plane. Consequently,
both approaches have advantages and disadvantages depending on the
specific use case. For instance, Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs)
and WANs (e.g., internet service providers or mobile backhaul networks)
usually implement in-band solutions, while out-of-band control is more
appropriate for LANs (e.g., data centers). Sharma et al. have stud-
ied extensively the failure recovery in OpenFlow networks and, in their
paper [95], suggested a hybrid approach where out-of-band control is
used in a failure free scenario, reverting to in-band control when the
out-of-band network goes down.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the OpenFlow specification does
not specify how control traffic paths should be implemented. Besides
that, according to [96], network bootstrapping (including control chan-
nel setup) is a key issue of in-band facilities. The authors describe the
control connection establishment phase after a Dynamic Host Configu-
ration Protocol (DHCP) lease. However, they do not study the impli-
cations of mesh in-band networks. Precisely, typical configurations of
in-band networks run a spanning tree protocol in the control VLANs
to isolate the OpenFlow control and data traffic, as well as to prevent
loops.
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2.5.2 The SDN concept
According to Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 [97], the SDN term is
defined as “a set of techniques that enables to directly program, or-
chestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the
design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scal-
able manner”. The necessity for software-defined networks first emerged
in campus networks, with the introduction of OpenFlow, but now it is
also used in data center and WAN environments.
Improving network management through SDN has been shown in dif-
ferent studies. As summarized in [98], traditional methods require net-
work operators to deal with low-level vendor-specific configurations to
enforce complex high-level network policies. On the contrary, manage-
ment of software-defined networks are highly simplified as elements are
controlled with standard protocols. Thus, SDN provides network pro-
grammability, which has actually “become a must for next-generation
networks” [49]. Regarding the comparison with other legacy control
technologies, there are several studies that provides an overview of ad-
vantages and disadvantages of SDN. For example, references [98], [99]
presented a general overview, in which the programmability added by
the SDN paradigm may ease network management, proposing techniques
to improve network configurations and policy specification, focusing on
reaction to frequent and continual changes to network state. Also, re-
quirements that are emerging with the advent of this new paradigm are
identified in [99].
In this way, the emerging SDN concept tends to homogenize the low-level
interfaces. Unlike proprietary implementations, the control of vendor-
neutral network devices is unified as the forwarding tables are config-
ured by open controller-network device protocols. This improves the
manageability and interoperability of heterogeneous cyber-physical net-
works. On the other hand, an important challenge is the compatibility
of SDN with proprietary or legacy systems. For example, a preliminary
proposal for the integration of the SDN concepts with the PROFINET
standard is provided in [100].
As can be seen in Figure 2.18, which compares the traditional networking
scheme with an SDN architecture, the control plane is generally decou-
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pled from the data plane in software-defined networks. While in the
traditional approach, distributed protocols (e.g., STP, OSPF or BGP)
are used to exchange and propagate routing and topology information,
which is used by network devices to establish the forwarding path; in
a pure SDN solution the data plane consists of programmable switches,
and all of the control functions are implemented in external entities.
Obviously, there is the possibility of hybrid models.
Although OpenFlow [9] is the most prominent protocol to communicate
both network planes, the so-called southbound Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs), others technologies, such as ForCES, PCE, In-
terface to Routing System (I2RS) or OpFlex (by Cisco) define SDN
interfaces. Actually, ForCES (RFC 3746), published in 2004, was the
first attempt to standardize an open interface between the control and
data planes. While ForCES separates both planes in one network ele-
ment, maintaining the traditional network architecture, OpenFlow sep-
arates control plane from network devices and use a logically central-
ized controller. ForCES was proposed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) but was not significantly adopted by the vendors. For its
part, the OpenFlow technology is being promoted, standardized, and
supported by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF).
Moreover, in addition to the emergence of OpenFlow, different propos-
als have been published to remotely configure SDN switches. How-
ever, currently, there is no unified standard for managing all aspects
of an SDN/OpenFlow device. Among other options, the OpenFlow
Management and Configuration Protocol (OF-Config) could be high-
lighted; it is developed by the ONF and makes use of the NETCONF
protocol. Nevertheless, the OF-Config protocol appeared recently and
its degree of deployment is reduced. Another notable example is the
Open vSwitch Database Management Protocol (OVSDB), standardized
in [101], which uses a remote procedure call encoded in JavaScript Ob-
ject Notation (JSON-RPC). Although OVSDB was initially supported
by Open vSwitch (OVS), which is currently the most widely used soft-
ware switch in virtualized environments, it is now being supported by
vendors, such as Juniper, Arista, or Dell.
Summarizing the above, it can be said that, despite the purpose of
eliminating vendor-centric solutions and ongoing efforts towards inter-
operable systems, this current lack of interoperability is an important
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Figure 2.18: Traditional vs. software-defined architectures.
issue to support multi-vendor networks. Thus, there is still a need for
close coordination between standardization bodies, industry forums and
open-source projects, as stated in [102].
2.5.3 Evaluation of the OpenFlow specification and
challenges of a logically centralized control
In contrast to traditional network models, programming the data path
by external software enables the set up of forwarding policies according
to awareness of the network state. Thus, a more efficient traffic engineer-
ing can be performed through a logically centralized entity having global
visibility, enabling automated configuration based on network changes
and external requirements.
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On the other hand, the physically centralized approach initially pro-
posed by OpenFlow could pose scalability and reliability concerns, as
the controller could become a bottleneck and a single point of failure.
However, as OpenFlow technology has advanced, new versions of the
protocol have included features that improve the reliability of the cen-
tralized control plane, which makes it more profitable to be applied to
industrial-grade networks, as will be described next. This section also
presents several studies that have focused on the resilience and recovery
issues of SDN facilities. Other issues related to the protection of con-
trol and management planes and SDN security challenges have not been
considered in this thesis.
In this way, though the original SDN/OpenFlow centralized architecture
seems to contradict with features identified in critical time-sensitive en-
vironments, these possible drawbacks can be overcome as summarized
below:
ä Behavior during a control plane failure: With respect to
failures of the control channel, the initial version (1.0) of OpenFlow
specified that, when a switch-controller connection goes down, the
switch deletes all normal entries and matches flows according to
the “emergency flow table”. However, this table was removed in
version 1.1, which defines two operation modes that are triggered
by a connectivity interruption:
l Fail secure mode, in which switches continue operating in
OpenFlow mode, until they reconnect to a controller.
l Fail standalone mode, where switches revert to a non-
OpenFlow pipeline, performing Layer 2/Layer 3 switching
functions. Switches that support both Operation and legacy
forwarding operation (using the OFPP_NORMAL reserved
port according to the OpenFlow specification [9]) are known
as OpenFlow-hybrid switches.
ä Minimal latencies: because the control plane is decoupled, be-
ing communicated via the OpenFlow protocol that runs over TCP,
it may experience higher latencies than in monolithic approaches.
Although the authors of [103] provide a quantitative study “on the
non-negligible amount of control traffic in a SDN network running
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in reactive mode”, it should be kept in mind that time-sensitive
flows require a proactive behavior, where paths are precomputed,
which does not introduce additional delays. This mode of op-
eration is not required for non-critical traffic, such as MMS or
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The importance of using
a proactive operation mode in order to reduce communication la-
tency is contrasted in [104].
ä Multiple controllers: regarding scalability and the control plane
fault tolerance, OpenFlow version 1.2 brought the possibility of
connecting switches to multiple controllers, which enables load bal-
ancing and reduces recovery time during a controller failure. In a
scenario with multiple controllers, master and slaves roles are as-
signed. Obviously, controllers must be coordinated between them
to maintain a consistent global state; however, synchronization
mechanisms are “outside the scope of the OpenFlow specification”
[9]. References [105], [106] studied distributed and robust topolo-
gies, considering the optimal number and location of controllers in
WANs. Likewise, in [107], the authors of the paper simulate the
latencies between switches and a different number and locations
of controllers to find the appropriate recovery process after link
failures, proposing a robust architecture against disasters.
ä Fast failover groups: with regard to the failover capability of
an OpenFlow network, starting on version 1.1, the OpenFlow
specification [9] defines group tables, oriented to implement
“multipath or link aggregation” features. These tables also
support the so called “fast failover group” entries as a protec-
tion mechanism. They are designed to accelerate the recovery
process, by allowing OpenFlow switches to forward traffic to
alternative paths without involving the controller. Fast failover
groups are composed of a series of buckets, executing the first
active one (flag OFPPS_LIVE). Specifically, buckets include the
watch_port and watch_group8 fields that indicate liveness. The
port config bit OFPPC_PORT_DOWN and the port state bit
OFPPS_LINK_DOWN indicate whether a port and a link are
down, respectively. As a consequence, it is required to implement
liveness monitoring and, according to the OpenFlow specification,
8A group is live if at least of one its buckets is live.
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this can be managed outside of the OpenFlow pipeline, either
via “spanning tree or a keep-alive mechanism” [9]. In addition,
it can be combined with a backup path computation proactively
installed by the controller, so that the failover time is reduced.
Obviously, the reliability of SDN-based networks is related to the control
plane availability. Improving the performance, reliability and scalability
of the distributed control channel has already been studied [108]–[111],
as well as determining how many controllers, topology and controller
location, inter-controller communication, consistency and synchroniza-
tion. Reference [108] analyzes the controller placement in SDN networks
with respect to resilience, latencies and load balancing in the control
plane, both from nodes to controllers and among controllers. Also, the
survey presented in [109] includes an overview of several distributed
control plane approaches, where the majority of research suggest archi-
tectures divided into domains each with their own controller, such as
in HyperFlow [110] or in Kandoo [111]. Specifically, Kandoo proposes
a hybrid configuration where local and global controllers work together
to handle the data path according to the required network information.
In this way, faster requests are managed by a local control services, re-
ducing the amount of traffic on the global controllers. From a general
point of view, the authors of [112] summarized different approaches that
make these networks more robust, such as using multiple controllers,
backup forwarding rules, as well as delegating the failure detection to
the network devices.
2.5.4 Opportunities for SDN in industrial networks
After taking into account important aspects like scalability or reliability,
the suitability of the SDN/OpenFlow paradigm is considered in order to
meet the lack of programmability in previous networking architectures.
Indeed, an SDN controller would be able to establish paths between
sensors and actuators according to bandwidth, latency, redundancy, and
safety considerations. As will be seen below, there are recent position
papers that have envisaged proposals where the advantages of the SDN
paradigm may be used for industrial networks.
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One of the most prominent examples of the appropriateness of SDN
technologies in the industrial context is that the CPS Public Working
Group (PWG), formed by the NIST, has recently determined the adop-
tion of SDN technologies to dynamically manage cyber-physical net-
works [43], due to the aforementioned reasons. Similarly, the DetNet
group has adopted an SDN architecture to support the required traffic
engineering capabilities for providing bounds on delay, jitter, and packet
loss. In the same way, the 6TiSCH protocol [113] is another IETF ini-
tiative to centralize the flow scheduling and route computation tasks
in time-sensitive wireless networks, and it considers that existing SDN
protocols could be extended to address such needs.
2.5.4.1 Redundancy control
Recent projects have studied the use of OpenFlow in redundant topolo-
gies, in so far as it makes it possible to overcome some limitations of
traditional redundancy protocols, such as configuring multiple failover
end-to-end paths. Particularly, although the MPTCP is used for load
balancing in OLiMPS [68], it is notable the shown interest for using
OpenFlow in the computation and provision of multiple link disjoint
paths. In addition, this paper studies the reactivity of the network ar-
chitecture when some links go down. However, it is noteworthy that mul-
tipath approaches oriented to centralized load balancing are not usually
applied to safety critical systems because, as stated in [114], “structural
redundancy is typically not used to increase bandwidth, but to send re-
dundant information over redundant paths”, which is a primary focus
of this research.
Moreover, traditional link aggregation protocols, such as LACP, are be-
ing combined with SDN, as studied in [115], where new possible scenarios
are provided. The authors of this paper added LACP functionalities to
a controller so that it takes care of its management but offloading LACP
to the switches, further than leaving the management of LACP locally
to the switches themselves or handling it entirely in the controller, which
would lead to scalability issues.
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2.5.4.2 SDN for Smart Grid communications
Regarding the use of SDN/OpenFlow as enabling technologies for the
development of Smart Grid solutions, several studies have recently per-
ceived opportunities for this integration, along with other SDN-related
research applicable to IEC 61850 compliant systems. On the one hand,
reference [116] experimentally evaluated the modularity and flexibility
offered by an OpenFlow solution by analyzing how it can provide MPLS-
like features and the coexistence of both technologies in the context of
a Smart Grid application. Furthermore, taking into account that Open-
Flow emerged for achieving network isolation to enable researchers to
run experiments on production networks, the authors of [116] proposed
using OpenFlow to test new technologies for Smart Grid development.
However, this paper is not focused on the inter-substation environment.
On the other hand, regarding the scope of OpenFlow in IEC 61850
facilities, reference [117] is mainly focused automating the substation
network configuration. However, with respect to maintenance of the
operating network, it only contains ideas, as also identified in [118],
such as the configurable packet inspection, dynamic monitoring, security
policies and access control between connected IEDs, thereby enabling
“the controller can easily manage traffic and curtail congestion events”,
or it can “open the door for control applications or recording tools driven
by network events and traffic patterns”. However, while both papers
only suggest the opportunities without implementing a solution, many
mentioned capabilities will be detailed in Chapter 3.
2.5.4.3 Wireless communication control
Prior to SDN/OpenFlow, the Control And Provisioning of Wireless
Access Points (CAPWAP, RFC 5415) protocol enables a centralized
management of wireless APs, being adequate for multi-vendor deploy-
ments. However, as identified by the ONF, this standard fails to ad-
dress essential gaps, which can be filled with the combination of an
SDN/OpenFlow-based control plane. Specifically, by using this ap-
proach would enable the network management and monitoring of unified,
wired and wireless, infrastructures. For example, running both Open-
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Flow and CAPWAP under the same controller could provide end-to-end
control of QoS policies [119].
Route computation in a centralized way by an OpenFlow controller is
similar to the Network Manager used in ISA100.11a, WirelessHART
and 6TiSCH9. This manager is certainly the main component of those
architectures and is responsible for configuring the network resources
and managing routing between devices. Thus, “thanks to the central-
ized approach, field device complexity is kept low” [120]. Similarly, an
OpenFlow controller is able to create, by using a common control in-
terface, redundant paths based on the network status and information
received from the network devices.
In relation to the object of study, SDN is being proposed [119] to trans-
parently manage hybrid networks, where wireless and wired systems in-
teract. Also, reference [121] uses OpenFlow for the mobility management
in wireless mesh networks. Likewise, the OpenRoads project [122] uses
OpenFlow to actively establish redundant wireless links, whether under
Wi-Fi and WiMAX technology, achieving an uninterrupted communi-
cation in roaming situations. The detection and removal of duplicated
packets by the receiver is performed by a Linux kernel module (called
nf_mobility). This module provides a sequence number for connection
(based on the 5-tuple: protocol, source and destination IP addresses and
TCP/UDP ports).
OLiMPS and OpenRoads projects aimed at increasing the resilience
where the duplication management function is relegated to the end
nodes, as occurs in PRP. However, in contrast to PRP, these approaches
are not compatible with those protocols that send data directly into
lower layers; as occurs, for example, in the IEC 61850 standard, where
GOOSE and SV services transport critical information and are mapped
directly on layer 2 frames.
96TiSCH also supports distributed and hybrid approaches.
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2.6 Summary
After the overview of network technologies used in industrial systems,
and particularly in IEC 61850-based ones, multiple network functions
have been identified as necessary to properly support the target ap-
plication, which involves, among other things, meeting latency, priority,
security and reliability constraints. In traditional switched Ethernet net-
works, the path computation is based on MAC learning over spanning
trees, which is performed by means of distributed control protocols. In
fact, distributed algorithms are well-suited for best-effort service deliv-
ery models [93]. Nevertheless, satisfying the goals of today’s industrial
applications requires the support of sophisticated functionalities, such
as traffic engineering and restoration mechanisms. However, complex
industrial networks are generally designed, configured and tested ac-
cording to a predefined policy enforcement in order to meet high levels
of performance and availability. In the majority of cases, this is car-
ried out in a static way, requiring a great deal of manual configuration.
Hence, despite the fact that fixed and dedicated infrastructures make
easier to provide QoS guarantees for critical services, they do not sup-
port the adaptability demanded by reconfigurable CPSs [123]. Moreover,
in agreement with [124]–[126], conventional fixed network protocols fail
to address the dynamic aspects of CPS applications. To overcome this
ossification, as the complexity of network management increases, it is
necessary a control scheme that separates discovery, computation and
decision processes from the data plane [93], [94].
As a result, a proper critical infrastructure design must be well adapt-
able to network conditions in order to provide the required performance
and meet specific application needs. Thus, all of previously described
requirements and shortcomings, which are listed in Table 2.8, demand
a global control of network resources. Quality goals have been grouped
into four broad categories for ease of understanding.
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Table 2.8: Demands of target industrial networks.
Requirements Qualitative design goals
R1 Traffic prioritization
R2
Flexible and reconfigurable
network
Programmability:
QoS and Security G1
R3 Traffic restriction
R4 Central management
Manageability G2
R5 Unified management
R6 Interoperable solution Interoperability G3
R7 High availability
High availability
and efficient
utilization of
resources
R8 Higher redundancy efficiency
R9 Dynamic redundancy control
G4
R10 Efficiency improvement of PRP
R11
Improvement of HSR control
performance and efficacy
R12 Robust WLAN connectivity
Taking into account the arguments above, the SDN technologies can play
an important role in the future cyber-physical networks. With this aim,
several state-of-the-art control and management technologies have been
analyzed to determine the best choice to build an SDN platform suitable
for demanding environments like IEC 61850-based systems. Likewise, it
is necessary to study the benefits that software-defined networks can of-
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fer to high-availability industrial systems, including wireless ones where
connections are more susceptible to interference.
77

It is not the strongest of the
species that survives, nor the
most intelligent, but the one
most responsive to change.
Charles Darwin, On the Origin
of Species
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After reviewing the state of the art and the main requirements of in-
dustrial networks, it is worth describing an application scenario where
to apply the SDN architecture proposed in this chapter to provide au-
tomated control and provisioning of network resources. As indicated by
the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [127], a reference architecture must be purely
abstract and its description should identify characteristics and features.
So, first, logical building blocks that match specified qualitative goals
are mapped onto a high-level conceptual representation. Then, an in-
stantiation of the reference architecture achieved by substitution of the
abstract entities with concrete elements, which meet the correspond-
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ing requirements1, is described. Thus, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 ex-
plain the features of the proposed solution, where the latter specifically
focuses on the performance enhancement of redundancy management.
This separation is because low latency and high availability challenges
are especially important in this context.
3.1 Application scenario
Like any other infrastructure, in IEC 61850-based networks, nodes per-
form different protection and control functions, sending and receiving
different data flows. To exemplify the situation, Figure 3.1 depicts a
typical scenario where a switched Ethernet backbone hierarchically in-
terconnects station, bay, and process levels. Moreover, monitoring and
control systems may exchange data with external networks. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2.1, this communication infrastructure comprises
heterogeneous equipment, such as SCADA and HMI units for monitor-
ing and visualization information from RTUs and IEDs, which, in turn,
receive data from sensors and metering devices, and perform control
and protection functions in power systems. In addition, Figure 3.1 also
contains PRP/HSR and wireless communication technologies, which are
present in today´s complex substations, as well as other devices, such
as personal computers, printers, cameras, etcetera. This scenario could
be used to support a variety of different types of traffic including, for
example, SV, GOOSE and MMS messages, as well as others like FTP,
HTTP or SNMP [23].
As described in [128], large-scale IEC 61850 systems can integrate more
than 600 devices organized, for example, as a combination of ring and
star topologies. There is a lack of interoperability in the deployment of
such a variety of communication devices and characteristics, which usu-
ally leads to vendor-specific management systems. Furthermore, varying
communication conditions, such as bandwidth or network load, may af-
fect the message transfer performance. Thus, control functions should
depend on network state information to make dynamic decisions, so
resource monitoring is essential to maintain performance accordingly.
1Again, margin notes are used to improve readability as they highlight the qualitative
goals and requirements considered in the architecture design.
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Figure 3.1: Substation communication scenario.
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Nevertheless, in traditional networking, network condition monitoring
and diagnosis are performed at device and port level, and data path is
based on a predetermined profile. All packets are forwarded in the same
way, and operational management tools (e.g., SNMP and web-interface
based NMSs) need to configure VLAN and multicast MAC filters for
all switches in the substation. Likewise, the static behavior of PRP
and HSR can be a limitation when future smart grid scenarios tend
to integrate changing and more bandwidth consuming services. As a
consequence, a traditional approach is not able to efficiently meet the
demands of modern control systems. On the contrary, an SDN-based
approach to provision connectivity services in IEC 61850 systems can
overcome these challenges and address new opportunities. Such an ap-
proach is presented below.
3.2 An SDN architecture to manage IEC 61850 network traffic
The proposed architecture, which is shown in Figure 3.2, is based on a
complete Network Operating System (NOS)2, which consists of a set of
control, monitoring and management (CMM) functionalities:
ä Control plane, which is responsible for computing and setting
up routes and reacting to changes in network conditions.
ä Resource monitoring, and its integration into the control plane,
allows the system to act dynamically.
ä Management capabilities with the aim of provisioning network
resources, so that an external agent is responsible for creating,
deleting or modifying operating parameters, such as interfaces,
queues, etcetera.
The SDN architecture has to be designed in such a way as to agree
with the qualitative arguments included in Table 2.8, as highlighted
in the following margin notes. In this way, the NOS acts as a cen-
tral interface where the control plane may receive diverse information,
such as commands or status alerts, which are translated into flow en-
tries to be automatically populated in the deployed networking devices.
2As defined in [129], a NOS provides “a uniform and centralized programmatic
interface to the entire network”.
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Figure 3.2: Proposed SDN architecture.
Then, it instantly varies the behavior of a network, being able, for ex-
ample, to allocate resources to different type of traffic, exposing more
paths to increase reliability, etcetera. As shown in Figure 3.2, appli-
cations written on top of the CMM architecture connect to each other
via northbound APIs, whereas communication with network elements is
performed through vendor-independent southbound APIs
G3
Interoperability
. The arrows
between the network device and the NOS indicate the main direction of
the flow of information, which can be grouped as follows:
ä Downstream (from the NOS to network devices): flow-level pro-
gramming and network configuration.
83
3 A proposal for applying SDN in industrial networks
ä Upstream: feedback information from the network (i.e., packet-
in, traffic flow statistics, device condition and failure reporting,
etcetera).
It is necessary to note that certain control functions are delegated to
these network elements. Thus, besides storing the flow tables, they
provide distributed capabilities to enable, for example, failure detection
and discovery mechanisms, or to support active redundancy.
The following is a description of the main functionalities to be provided
by the architecture:
ä Context and network status awareness. Analogous to con-
trol theory, where stability, observability and controllability are
key concepts, the monitoring system receive real-time feedback
and the platform allows network planners to define thresholds for
triggering appropriate actions. Figure 3.3 outlines a control dia-
gram where an adaptive system dynamically operates according to
the received measures, events or triggers. For example, changes in
network topology, bandwidth saturation or failures must be taken
into account by the control plane to act consequently. Moreover,
the NOS is also based on exogenous context information, which
enables a unified method for configuring the communication net-
work after the design phase of a SASG2
Manageability
. By operating in this way,
this forms a IT/OT convergence between substation and commu-
nication designs. There are commercial proprietary systems [53],
of which there are no results or appraisals available, that address
the integration of network management and control of IEC 61850-
based substations without using the capabilities of SDN. On the
contrary, the proposed framework facilitates the interoperability
by relying on standard solutions, a main objective of IEC 61850
to avoid vendor-specific configurations.
ä Flow-based traffic control. Unlike commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) switches that forward traffic based upon a spanning tree,
the VLAN tag, and address learning processes, the SDN-based
data path control processes the traffic according to flexible packet-
forwarding rules
G1
Programmability:
QoS and Secu-
rity
, that can be exploited for implementing services
such as:
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Figure 3.3: An SDN approach based on a control-loop feedback mechanism commonly
used in ICSs.
l Traffic filtering policy enforcement: the ability to define the
granularity of a flow (e.g., a flow could be defined as a com-
bination of header fields, from layer 1 to layer 4) enables fine-
grained control policies. This feature should also be present
in PRP/HSR nodes to increase flexibility in inbound and out-
bound rules.
l QoS support: the CMM platform allows network designers to
establish traffic shaping policies that distinguish flow types
in a centralized manner, so that it is possible to take into
consideration priority requirements of GOOSE or SV services.
l Layer 2 tunneling: although the platform disclosed herein is
conceived in the context of switched LANs, it should be con-
sidered that new automation features may also need to tra-
verse the WAN. Thus, it is necessary to set the appropriate
parameters in network devices to establish tunneling (or en-
capsulation) techniques to transmit GOOSE or SV Ethernet
frames between substations, and control centers.
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l Network security: as analyzed in Section 2.2.6, security fea-
tures built into network architectures are essential to any
industrial deployment. Preventive protection through traf-
fic isolation and access control mechanisms, should be aug-
mented with anomaly detection mechanisms that react to
threats.
ä Path diversity control. The proposed scheme improves the
network utilization through a network global view and dynamic
actions
G4
High availabil-
ity and efficient
utilization of
resources
, as follows.
l Traffic forwarding and latency reduction: latency and jitter
are affected by the number of hops and amount of traffic in
layer 2 networks. Unlike spanning tree-based approaches, a
combination of load balancing and multipath techniques takes
advantage of partial mesh topologies to improve communica-
tion performance in time-sensitive environments. For exam-
ple, in contrast to proposals based on static MSTP configu-
rations [24], SDN can provide flexibility so that non-critical
flows can be forwarded reactively with the aim of using un-
derutilized routes.
l Performance improvement of PRP/HSR technologies: aware-
ness of DAN/SAN, critical traffic and network status allows
processing the data path and managing resources efficiently.
Taking into consideration that PRP does not specify how to
compute routes and instead of using this protocol in con-
junction with common spanning tree technologies, it is pro-
posed that the network control plane may be not agnostic
about PRP nodes by introducing SDN-enabled switches. This
choice is aimed at getting the best of both worlds: central-
izing forwarding decisions and the implementation of the re-
dundancy control mechanisms in the end nodes. With a sim-
ilar approach, this SDN approach aims to efficiently improve
HSR performance through flow-based multipath forwarding
that ensures network reliability without introducing delay or
inconvenience to critical data.
l Redundant wireless communication control: although wire-
less management systems must consider many factors, from
the robustness point of view, wireless networks need to pro-
vide reliable data transfer in order to be used in safety-critical
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applications. Therefore, the CMM platform has to deal with
mobile devices through redundancy mechanisms that reduce
interruptions.
In consequence, this approach takes advantage of having a global view
of the network status to flexibly assign resources to different services.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the SDN framework centralizes the network
intelligence and, as outlined, acts as a closed-loop feedback control that
reconfigures QoS and routing policies according to changes, while guar-
anteeing security, reliability, and real-time requirements at the same
time. Subsequently, the previously described features are illustrated by
a specific solution.
3.3 Instantiation and solution features
While in the previous section the architectural capabilities have been cor-
related with the above-mentioned qualitative goals, main requirements
identified in Chapter 2 have not yet been explicitly matched. Thus,
following the recommendations for architecture descriptions defined in
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010, the previously-described architecture captures
the essential attributes and provides a basis for instantiation of concrete
components. Likewise, the ISO 15704 defines “the genericity dimension”,
which ranges from a “reference architecture” resembling generic build-
ing blocks, to a “particular architecture” that instantiates those generic
blocks. Therefore, after an abstract description, control, monitoring and
management functionalities can be particularized in the following way:
ä Control plane composed of OpenFlow controllers3 responsible for
establishing forwarding rules at network switches. This involves,
among others, the following tasks:
l A discovery service module allows the controller to know the
existing topology. To achieve this, the controller periodi-
cally sends LLDP and Broadcast Domain Discovery Proto-
3An OpenFlow-based control plane also supports a distributed architecture that
increases the scalability and reliability of the network as the switches can be
controlled by more than one controller.
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col (BDDP) packets to all controlled switches and receives
returned packets from them. Hosts can be passively iden-
tified by examining their injected packet-in messages. An
analysis of the control traffic in a topology discovery process
for SDN networks is given in [130].
l A path computation module, which determines a route from
origin to destination and is capable of preventing loops.
ä Resource monitoring: real-time passive measurement is based
on distributed sFlow agents that constantly report traffic statis-
tics into sFlow datagrams to the collector. Once analyzed the
obtained information, the network state can be estimated and,
consequently, a feedback loop allows the controller to react to
changes in the network conditions, and adjust the resources as
needed. In this way, considering the increasingly effective com-
bination of sFlow and OpenFlow, some of the anomaly detection
and actuation methods implemented in [59] are here placed in the
context of substations.
ä Management capabilities: the OVSDB protocol has been cho-
sen to carry out management and configuration operations on the
network devices as it allows the creation, configuration and dele-
tion of ports, queues and tunnels of switches. In this way, the man-
agement agent exchanges requests and replies, in JSON-RPC ob-
jects, with the ovsdb-servers running on network devices. OVSDB
Figure 3.4 shows the instantiated architecture, including the above-
mentioned components, along the IEC 61850 protocol stack. From
the network device perspective, remote programmability features are
achieved by supporting OpenFlow, sFlow and OVSDB protocols to in-
teract with the centralizedR4Central
management
NOS, as well as by including PRP and HSR
protocols for high availability. Using open-standardized communication
protocols reduces reliance on vendor-specific appliances and facilitate
seamless integration of independent implementationsR6Interoperable
solution
.
From another point of view, the reference SGAM has been applied for
this instantiation. The methodology employed by the SGAM expedites
the design of new structured power system developments. In fact, this
method has facilitated the identification of the Smart Grid use case and
88
3.3 Instantiation and solution features
Application tier
Traffic 
Filtering
Redundancy 
Control QoS Security
Resource
MonitoringTunneling Isolation
Engineering Stage
HMI
Forwarding Path
sFlow AgentOpenFlow channel ovsdb-server
IEDs
Controllers CollectorManager
OVSDB
SCD
File
IP
ISO/TCP
Session
Presentation
MMS
Ethernet
Physical
GOOSE SV
SC
L 
Pa
rs
in
g
Links and 
topology
Device 
manager
Metrics 
and packet 
sampling
Discovery service Path computation service
Loop 
prevention
Routing 
manager
Flow and 
threshold 
definitions
Traffic data analysisResource allocation
Ports
Tunnels
Queues
Figure 3.4: NOS functionalities.
the design of the solution disaggregated into specific data models, proto-
cols, and control functions. Figure 3.5 shows the resulting transmission
domain in the zones and layers of interest: information, communication
and component ones. Moreover, the actual configuration attributes and
rules of an IEC 61850 system can be integrated into the NOS, which is
described in the following section.
In the following, general network functions provided by the architecture
are particularized below. Since several requirements are intended to
improve the use and availability of redundant systems, Section 3.4 par-
ticularly focuses on the suitability of this approach for high-availability
networks.
3.3.1 Context and network status awareness
The following describes how the solution import SCL configuration files
and gathers information on the state of the network.
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3.3.1.1 IEC 61850 integration
The proposed architecture benefits from the programmability feature
of OpenFlow to map the IEC 61850 communication and data models,.
Thus, SCL data parsing provides a mapping method between the en-
gineering stage and the CMM platform. In this process, SCD files are
translated into information that can be handled by the OpenFlow con-
troller, obtaining accurate information about the substation configu-
ration (Figure 3.6). This way, the controller can distinguish existing
devices in the managed LAN and their data flow parameters, so it may
automatically determine the logical topology of the substation, and de-
cide how to route, modify or discard traffic flows, providing exactly the
required performance.
Several properties are obtained after an appropriate SCD file parsing
to build flow forwarding entries that are installed in switches, enabling
IEDs to publish and subscribe information. Specifically, each IED sec-
tion is parsed, for which there are a series of input subsections that define
all external signals of interest identified by the name of the publisher IED
(iedName). Figure 3.7 partially illustrates an SCD file, where elements
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and values mapped on OpenFlow fields can be identified. To establish
the flows correctly, the controller has to know the connection between
the switches and the IEDs (ports and physical topology). In particu-
lar, it is considered that the connection of each device with each switch
in a network is known, so this information is statically incorporated
in the controller logic. Namely, the controller has an a priori knowl-
edge of IED connections, associating a particular IED with a concrete
edge switch. This involves installing rules, which associate a publisher-
subscriber flow to the corresponding input/output switch ports. Though
inflexible, this choice, where a particular port is assigned to an IED, is
preferable and makes it difficult the port swapping once the network is
deployed. Another alternative to obtain the physical connection of IEDs
is the approach described in [117], where the controller proactively com-
municates with IEDs by ICMP; likewise, this is suitable because static
IP addresses are recommended [23]. Nevertheless, this restricts the use
of simpler devices that only implement SV and GOOSE (layer 2 only
devices), which is very common in process bus equipment.
Consequently, this proposal may be an appropriate tool to automate
network administration R5Unified
management
, which is a need reinforced by [28], where the
authors suggested that “the complexity of the data network configura-
tion for a large substation makes automated management of network
switches an attractive option […] automated tools could be developed to
extract this information to streamline the VLAN and multicast address
filter configuration of Ethernet switches from multiple vendors”. More-
over, despite the fact that [118] proposed to obtain network information
derived from IED device configuration, the authors did not use the IEC
61850-6 standard, while a description of the SCD parsing is included
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[...]
<Communication>
  <SubNetwork name="W01" type="8-MMS">
    <Text>Station bus</Text>
      <BitRate unit="b/s">10</BitRate>
        <ConnectedAP iedName="E1Q2SB1" apName="S1">
          <Address>
            <P type="IP">10.0.0.11</P>
            <P type="IP-SUBNET">255.255.255.0</P>
            <P type="IP-GATEWAY">10.0.0.101</P>
          [...]
          <GSE ldInst="C1" cbName="SyckResult">
            <Address>
              <P type="MAC-Address">01-0C-CD-01-00-01</P>
              <P type="APPID">3011</P>
              <P type="VLAN-ID">111</P>
              <P type="VLAN-PRIORITY">4</P>
              </Address>
          [...]
Src-IP
Dst-IP
EtherType
Dst-MAC
VLAN ID
VLAN Priority
Figure 3.7: Mapping of SCL parameters in OpenFlow fields.
here. Also, taking into account proposals for enhancing IEC 61850 as
found in [20], where several extensions related to network parameters
and communication monitoring are defined to be included in IEC 61850-
6, processing new SCL parameters may enable future scenarios that can
be handled centrally.
3.3.1.2 Responsiveness and resources monitoring
In order to implement effective traffic control and meet strict QoS con-
straints, collecting real-time network state information is required to
enable network-wide visibility and be responsive to network conditionsR2Flexible and
reconfigurable
network
.
The proposed SDN scheme is reported on link utilization data and packet
samples, so that it is able to detect network stress events during which
delays may increase. This is possible because sFlow provides information
about flows, communication interfaces and a number of other metrics
describing the status of the device. This could be also used for link
dimensioning for network planning purposes.
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Regarding network failure detection, the platform is able to operate
in two different modes: reactively or proactively triggered. The first
case is a suboptimal approach where a controller-based restoration
module is responsible for rearranging traffic in other paths when a
OFPT_PORT_STATUS notification has been received (i.e., when a
port or link goes down). More specifically, a failover manager module
removes the flows entries that forwards traffic to the downed port so
that the controller computes a new path as a new packet-in is received4.
As studied in [95], in a flow restoration scheme the dependency on
the centralized controller5 made “carrier-grade reliability” difficult to
achieve, suggesting to implement protection mechanisms. Effectively,
a faster recovery is achieved with the pre-configuration of backup
paths and switching automatically without the need of involving
to the controller. With this aim, switches have to perform liveness
detection where CFM or BFD sessions monitor different links or paths,
respectively. In order to reduce the recovery time, transmit intervals of
such sessions must be decreased.
3.3.2 Flow-based traffic control
Some exemplary traffic control features are described below.
3.3.2.1 QoS provisioning support
A QoS module
R1
Traffic prioriti-
zation
makes possible to push flow rules that redirect specific
traffic to different queues, which must be previously created and con-
figured on the particular switch; in this case, the OVSDB protocol is
used. As a result, OpenFlow actions are populated together with QoS
policies6, which can be exploited by all flow types including those whose
4It should be noted that, in the OpenFlow operation, if a network failure occurs and
the affected flow entries are not modified or deleted, the associated idle timeout
will not expire while packets are being received [9].
5Recovery time depends on failure detection, notification and reaction times.
6OpenFlow supports QoS [9] by setting the network Type of Service (ToS) bits and
enqueuing packets. However, as the specification indicates, “queue configuration
takes place outside the OpenFlow switch protocol, either through a command line
tool or through an external dedicated configuration protocol”.
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data rate can be known a priori, such as SV (SmpRate field indicated
during the engineering stage in the SCD files parsed).
With regard to the ingress rate control, the OpenFlow meter tables
can be used to perform actions based on the observed rate of received
packets. In particular, per-flow metering is based on bands that define
rate and burst size parameters. If the specified bandwidth is exceeded,
packets will be dropped or marked with DiffServ codepoint (DSCP)
values. However, metering is an OpenFlow optional feature (available
from version 1.3 onwards) and, for example, OVS does not currently
support it.
3.3.2.2 Traffic filtering
Because GOOSE and SV frames are both multicast (SV can be also
unicast), IEDs should be configured to subscribe or not to subscribe
to certain services according to the SCD files, which is indicated by the
LGOS and LSVS supervision logical nodes, as defined by the IEC 61850-
7-4 specification. Additionally, in order to reduce the network load,
switches should be configured to filter specific multicast MAC addresses
and VLAN IDs only to determined ports, which is recommended by the
IEC 61850 guidelines [23]. In the proposed architecture, the forwarding
rules are automatically generated from SCD parsing and are installed
into controlled switchesR3Traffic restric-
tion
. Therefore, this automatic and static behavior
facilitates the deployment and implementation of a network, allowing the
more critical traffic (only GOOSE and SV messages are predetermined
by SCD files) to flow efficiently through the network.
In this case, multicast flows are treated as a set of unicast paths as
publishers and subscribers are known. The establishment of these for-
warding rules is done by getting the union of shortest paths as follows:
1. For each subscriber to a GOOSE/SV service, a shortest path to
the publisher node is obtained by using the Dijkstra algorithm.
2. Once collected all the paths, that is 1-to-1 correspondences be-
tween nodes, the distribution tree is formed by the union of them.
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3. This process is repeated for each pair of publisher-subscribers and,
hence, the final delivery tree reaches all the receivers from the
senders.
The union of all shortest paths may not constitute a minimal tree inter-
connecting publisher and subscribers so, in order to achieve an optimal
solution, it would be necessary to compute the whole set of the shortest
paths and implement an algorithm for directed Steiner problems [131].
However, implementing these algorithms is considered to be out of the
scope of this work.
3.3.2.3 Layer 2 tunneling
Unless MUs and IEDs implement R-GOOSE and R-SV (IEC 61850-
90-5) to carry GOOSE and SV between substations, it is necessary to
encapsulate the exchange of layer 2 messages over a WAN. The platform
can create and manage different types of tunnels in a centralized and
common way R4Central
management
, which is achieved through OVSDB commands, as this
cannot be provisioned by OpenFlow messages. The OpenFlow protocol
does support the definition of logical ports (i.e., it is an abstraction and
not necessarily a physical port [9]), which may perform encapsulation.
WAN
Substation A Substation B
Tunnel 
endpoint 
A
Tunnel 
endpoint 
B
Dst IP Src IP […]
Dst 
MAC
GOOSE/SV 
APDUs
FCS
---GRE Payload---
[…]
---Outer IP Header--- ---GRE Header---
Src 
MAC
Type
Figure 3.8: GOOSE/SV message exchange between substations by using tunneling func-
tionality.
In particular, it is possible to forward Ethernet frames over a point-to-
point Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE, RFC 2784) tunnel, which
is one of the techniques adopted by the technical report IEC 61850-90-1
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to connect substation networks over a WAN. As shown in Figure 3.8,
the transmission of GOOSE or SV application messages (APDUs) on
top of an IP GRE tunnel can be provided between two substations. In
this case, the tunnel-id OpenFlow match field maps the key field from
the GRE header.
3.3.3 Network security
The following presents three protection mechanisms that are included
in the proposed solution to enhance the network survivability.
3.3.3.1 Traffic isolation
Traffic isolation by network virtualization may be necessary to separate
types of data in a substation, as previously mentioned (Section 2.2.4).
The platform makes network virtualization easier by using a filter mod-
ule that allows the creation of logical networks based on MAC addresses
without using VLAN; although at the same time, if VLANs are used,
VLAN IDs of each logical network can overlap each other. Therefore,
the proposed layer 2 segmentation is oriented to create a better isolation
among electrical circuit functionsR3Traffic restric-
tion
, and is an effective complement to the
VLAN-based traffic segregation proposed by [23].
In Figure 3.9, a diagram outlines an example where a network is parti-
tioned into logical networks based on different data flows: for example,
every MAC address of MUs in a process bus or a whole substation can
be assigned to the same logical network and, at the same time, allocate
each GOOSE or SV to a unique VLAN.
3.3.3.2 Anomaly detection
In this architecture, the sFlow collector detects when a certain thresh-
old is exceeded for a specific flow and communicates it to the Open-
Flow controller, which takes the appropriate actions. The platform al-
lows network designers to specify flows (defined by MAC/IP addresses,
Ethertype, VLAN, TCP/UDP ports, etcetera) and thresholds to moni-
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Figure 3.9: Example of network virtualization based on VLAN and MAC addresses.
tor them. By default, it establishes the SV rates obtained from the SCD
configuration file to detect abnormal rates in the transmission of SVs to
particular multicast MAC addresses.
Furthermore, with this feature, network designers can protect the con-
nected nodes against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In particular,
certain targets (for example, MAC addresses of IEDs or IPs of MMS
servers) can be protected from one or multiple source addresses (dis-
tributed DoS). Once the OpenFlow controller is notified when this in-
coming traffic exceeds a predetermined amount, it will limit these spe-
cific packets. Figure 3.10 sketches the process by which an event-driven
application written in node.js communicates with two northbound Rep-
resentational State Transfer (REST) APIs in order to establish thresh-
olds for different flows and deploy mitigation rules if appropriate.
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Figure 3.10: Traffic anomalies detection process.
3.3.3.3 Access control mechanisms
Because of the lack of need for implementing authentication and en-
cryption mechanisms for GOOSE and SV messages, references [45], [46]
demonstrated opportunities to compromise the security of an IEC 61850
system with MAC spoofing attacks. For the purpose of solving these
problems, a ACL module is used to enforce deny-by-default security
policies and to limit ingress traffic according to the MAC source ad-
dress, port and switch. Thus, the platformR3Traffic restric-
tion
allows network planners to
establish MAC ACLs statically so that only the enabled rules will be
able to transmit and receive data. Moreover, using a device manager
module, the controller continuously tracks and restricts the attachment
of devices to only a single MAC Address (the first connected one), help-
ing to avoid spoofing attacks and other traditional problems that may
well occur when addresses are duplicated.
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3.4 Performance enhancement of high-availability networks
This part of the work describes how the SDN/OpenFlow approach is
able to manage path diversity in layer 2 critical networks. In point of
fact, the main objective is to increase the manageability, and even the
performance of high-availability Ethernet LANs to make the most of
redundant topologies.
3.4.1 Reduction of Ethernet network latency
Obviously, the transmission of measurement and control data takes time,
and depends on network features and configuration in addition to its
current status. In order to meet timing requirements, latency analysis is
a required procedure. There are several sources of latency of an Ethernet
network. Although other parameters, such as QoS policies (priority
queuing, classification of traffic, etcetera), also affects overall latency,
the main ones are the following:
ä Physical paths (either copper, fiber or radio links): elapsed time
to traverse the physical medium.
ä Store-and-forward latency, defined as last bit in first bit out. Oth-
erwise, according to [23], using cut-through (bit forwarding) “re-
duces average latency but does not improve its worst case”.
ä Switch port-to-port latency: delay incurred by frames traversing
the switch fabric.
ä Queuing latency, which depends on the traffic pattern, and the
output scheduling policy.
An analytical calculation of the worst case latency for Ethernet frames is
detailed in [132], whereas these latencies are calculated for SV, GOOSE
and MMS frames in [133]. With regard to the forwarding latency of
an OpenFlow switch, it has not been increased, per se, when flow rules
are already installed. It should be borne in mind that latency-critical
data forwarding must be carried out proactively. Rotsos et al. [134]
evaluated the switching performance of software and hardware Open-
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Flow switches, which improve the switching performance. Additionally,
Congdon et al. [135] implemented a model of forwarding prediction to
reduce the OpenFlow forwarding latency, as well as the power consump-
tion. These authors manage to reduce the low latency of a cut-through
(bit forwarding, which is usual, for example, in HSR nodes) switch “by
a factor of 3”.
3.4.1.1 Shortest path forwarding: number of hops and connectivity
Obviously, previous factors must be multiplied by the number of switches
that the data traffic has to traverse to reach the destination. That is to
say, latency increases with the number of switches in series. Therefore,
performance and real-time response depends on the number of hops per
path. Concretely, given a connected, undirected graph (𝐺), the average
shortest path length is:
𝑎𝑠 = ∑
𝑠,𝑡∈𝑉
𝑑(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑛(𝑛 − 1) (3.1)
where 𝑉 is the set of nodes in 𝐺, 𝑑(𝑠, 𝑡) is the shortest path from 𝑠 to 𝑡,
and 𝑛 is the number of nodes in 𝐺.
In the proposed scheme, the OpenFlow controller is aware of the net-
work topology through discovery services (Figure 3.4). Thus, an SDN
controller is able to perform unicast data traffic forwarding along the
shortest path in mesh topologies7. The effect of this change can be
clearly seen in Figure 3.11.
Table 3.1 contains a comparison of the average path length (𝑎) for dif-
ferent topologies8: rings, two-tier and three-tier designs, grids and full
mesh networks. All except the last two of these networks can be found in
data center, campus infrastructures and industrial automation networks.
Grids and full mesh topologies have been included to complement the
results in [69], where the authors obtain the minimum and maximum
7For example, an OpenFlow controller can be also configured to perform a traditional
MAC learning function and install the forwarding rules accordingly.
8The number of end hosts has not been considered in the calculation, therefore only
the distribution nodes are taken into account.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison between spanning tree and shortest path forwarding in a mesh
topology.
number of hops in SPB partial mesh networks without comparing them
with spanning tree-based ones. All of this implies a latency improvement
associated with the number of hops
R8
HIgher redun-
dancy efficiency
. This information complements and
extends the analysis of the components of delay in IEC 61850 networks
given in reference [136], which differently studied the latency of different
flows along a specific a spanning tree topology.
Network robustness can be improved by increasing the connectivity of
the network, where connectivity is the number of nodes to which a node
is connected. Table 3.1 also includes the average connectivity degree,
which is the average nearest neighbor degree of nodes with degree 𝑘.
Each connection can be weighted by network characteristics (i.e., band-
width). Thus, for a node 𝑖,
𝑘𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑖 =
1
𝑠𝑖
∑
𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑗 (3.2)
where 𝑠𝑖 is the weighted degree of node 𝑖, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the weight of the edge
that links 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝑁(𝑖) are the neighbors of node 𝑖. Table 3.1 col-
lects each degree 𝑘 with the value of average connectivity for unweighted
networks. As can be seen, the connectivity of a spanning tree is sub-
stantially worse; for example, a full mesh topology becomes a star one
when it is configured by a spanning tree protocol. Therefore, since the
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Full-meshThree-tierTwo-tierRing Grid
Spanning tree Entire redundant networkTopology Size 𝑎 𝑘 𝑎 𝑘
5 2 1:2.0, 2:1.67 1.5 2:2
Ring 10 3.67 1:2.0, 2:1.88 2.78 2:2
15 5.33 1:2.0, 2:1.92 4 2:2
2,2 1.67 1:2, 2:1.5 1.33 2:2
Two-tier 2,4 1.87 1:3.5, 2:2.5, 4:1.25 1.47 2:4, 4:2
core, edge 4,8 2.15 8:1.38, 1:6.8, 4:2.75 1.52 8:4, 4:8
2,2,4 1.93 1:5.33, 2:3.5, 6:1.16 1.86 1: 6.0, 2:3.32, 6:1.33
Three-tier 2,4,8 2.24 8:1.63, 1:7.167, 6:2.17 2.09 8:2.5, 1:6.0, 2:8.0, 6:3.33
core, aggreg., edge 2,4,16 2.23 16:1.31, 1:13.5, 6:3.5 2.10 16:2.25, 1:6, 2:16, 6:6
3x3 2.61 1:2.25, 2:2, 3:2.17 2 2:3, 3:2.67, 4:3
Grid 4x4 4.1 1:2.33, 2:2.33, 3:2 2.67 2:3, 3:3, 4:3.5
5x5 4.85 1:2.91, 2:2.81, 3:2, 4:1.92 3.33 2:3, 3:3.11, 4:3.67
5 1.6 1:4, 4:1 1 4:4
Full-mesh 10 1.8 1:9, 9:1 1 9:9
15 1.87 1:14, 14:1 1 14:14
Table 3.1: Avg. shortest path length and connectivity for different networks.
spanning tree construction allows each host interface to communicate
with another one along a single path, multipath connections and load
balancing are infeasible. With the proposed approach, traffic can be
spread among multiple paths of any length, including the shortest one
and, as a consequence, the partial network load is reducedR8Higher re-
dundancy
efficiency
.
3.4.1.2 Network load and traffic spreading
Paying attention to the queuing latency, in [133] and [132] the average
latency due to queuing (𝐿𝑄) “is assumed to be” directly proportional to
the network load (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘), as indicated by the following formula:
𝐿𝑄 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝐿𝑆𝐹(𝑚𝑎𝑥) (3.3)
Where 𝐿𝑆𝐹(𝑚𝑎𝑥) is the store and forward latency, which is the ratio of
the size of the frames and the bit-rate capacity. From an experimental
point of view, the traffic performance of a sampled value process bus is
analyzed in [137], focusing on the maximum number of connected de-
vices sending SVs without packet loss. The authors stated that “once
sampled value frames are queued by an Ethernet switch, the additional
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delay incurred by subsequent switches is minimal”. However, the men-
tioned paper does not take into consideration a possible variation in
the network load or load balancing techniques. Consequently, frames
that are forwarded “in the same direction on the same path result in
additional queuing delays”.
Therefore, flow-aware load balancing may prove beneficial to reduce traf-
fic latency, meeting the IEC 61850 requirements. In fact, the OpenFlow
controller dynamically sets up paths according to the existing resources
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(bandwidth usage monitoring) and data flows. Unlike spanning tree
topologies, in this proposal data packets are spread among nodes and
links. As a consequence, flows do not have to follow the same path in
redundant topologies but they can be balanced through all the network
resources.
Furthermore, a load balancer pool is created to enable the distribution
of the traffic load in a set of members determined through a REST
interface R4Central
management
. The module offers load distribution for several protocols
(UDP, TCP, or ICMP flows) to different servers. This functionality
may be used in redundant systems, where data concentrators or gate-
ways are balanced.
3.4.2 Combination of PRP and OpenFlow
A full integration of PRP operation into an OpenFlow switch is pro-
posed to enhance the control and adaptation ability with respect to the
standard scheme.
3.4.2.1 A further active redundancy
In contrast to traditional deployments, and with the aim of creating mul-
tiple paths for pertinent data flows to achieve a better reliability, in this
approach two different implementations are distinguished to establish
more than a single path between PRP nodes:
ä DAN-based operation mode: in which redundant paths are set in
one or more LANs to which DANs are attached, so that a PRP
node receives more than once the same frame through each LAN.
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This is consistent with the IEC 62439-3 standard since the dupli-
cated frames within 400 milliseconds must be handled by the LRE.
While a common deployment is impaired when a second failure oc-
curs in one LAN during the recovery period of the another one, in
this proposal the performance is not degraded (without consider-
ing simultaneous failures in the node access links).
ä SAN-based operation mode: it allows network designers to increase
notably the availability without having to deploy a complete re-
dundant system. In this way, a PRP node is connected to a single
LAN, in which an OpenFlow controller configures more than one
path for the transmission of the same content. Hence, a PRP
device still receives duplicated frames through its only single in-
terface, having to discard duplicates. This new operation mode
reduces redundant resources (cabling and hardware) and, there-
fore, its capital and operational expenditures.
In both cases, the OpenFlow controller pushes flow entries that repli-
cate certain unicast traffic along predetermined multiple paths towards
the destination. The first mode means an increase in the availability
R7
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ity
compared to a common PRP deployment based on, for example, Rapid
Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP), whereas the latter is not as robust as
the first one since nodes are not doubled attached, but it involves an
improvement over a traditional layer 2 LAN with non-PRP compliant
nodes.
Furthermore, disasters and large-scale events may cause multiple points
of failure, of which is difficult to determine complete knowledge in sit-
uations where the redundancy control protocol is delegated to the end
nodes, such as defined by IEC 62439-3. Although, as previously de-
scribed, PRP allows to control the network integrity and to detect er-
rors, the provided mechanisms only are measured in a counter, which
is typically accessible via the SNMP. This methodology may be com-
plemented with the global view provided by an SDN controller, which
can greatly improve the response performance in such extreme circum-
stances. This involves the integration of disaster management systems
with the control plane, identifying non-affected routes and where the
resource management system must take into account not only the avail-
ability of resources and policy, but also the QoS requirements of the
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application. This approach is clearly reflected in [138], where different
disaster metrics are detected, evaluated and corrected by an OpenFlow
controller.
3.4.2.2 Awareness of DAN/SAN and network status
In spite of the fact that, by default, multicast PRP supervision frames
flood the LANs and reach all devices, they are only interpreted by PRP
nodes. Although “a RedBox should be configured to stop the transfer
of the supervision frames to the SAN devices, so there is no supervi-
sion frame flooding to the SANs” [139], this is not required for switches
to which the SAN nodes are directly connected. Consequently, in ad-
dition to needlessly overloading the network, this traffic is received by
them. For the purpose of reducing such traffic, a supervision frames
filtering method that uses the device manager and ACL modules is pro-
posed. Thus, periodically, the control plane obtains information about
connected devices (attachment points and MAC/IP addresses), being
aware of nodes that are SAN or DAN. Accordingly, the above-mentioned
multicast frames are filtered at egress ports/switches. Therefore, it is
ensured that the supervision flows, which are determined by the Ether-
type (0x88FB) and a unique set of multicast addresses9, only reaches
devices with two interfaces; minimizing the amount of global traffic
R10
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Other advantages are related to responsiveness and resources monitoring
capabilities (Section 3.2.1), since they make use of flow statistics to adapt
the network to the instantaneous needs, including the following actions:
ä Enabling and disabling redundant paths according to the resource
utilization; specifically, when a threshold is exceeded.
ä Supervision frame rate checking, which is possible because the
monitoring module retrieves counters about multicast frames and
it checks that they are in line with the expected rates.
9The IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2 specifications recommend specific MAC
address ranges for multicast SV and GOOSE services: 01-0C-CD-04-00-00 ↔
01-0C-CD-04-01-FF and 01-0C-CD-01-00-00↔ 01-0C-CD-01-01-FF, respectively.
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Figure 3.12: Process flow for identifying and forwarding data traffic.
3.4.2.3 Critical traffic awareness
Contrary to what happens in traditional networks, the network control
plane may be aware of the needs of PRP nodes. Therefore, unlike for
non-critical traffic, parallel routes between sender and receiver nodes can
be established for those frames that require very high availability. This
is in accordance with the suggested in [114]: “while critical messages
are sent in both directions, it is sufficient for non-critical messages to
be sent in one direction only”. This can be performed in two different
modes:
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ä Data blocking: it prevents the non-critical traffic propagation in
one of the LANs, which is performed by using the ACL module
R10
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.
ä Data rate limitation: as mentioned before, using the QoS module
allows network designers to distinguish flow types by establishing
traffic shaping policies in a centralized way.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the process flow for identifying and forwarding
data traffic.
3.4.2.4 Traffic filtering policies in PRP nodes
In addition to the foregoing, it has also been studied how including an
OpenFlow pipeline in PRP nodes allows them to distinguish data flows.
Match fields that form forwarding rules enable the differentiation of flows
requiring active protection from those which do not. Accordingly, traffic
control in the end nodes is based on priority policies, that is, critical
services will be protected with the PRP frame format; while services
that tolerate communication disruptions will be transmitted without
PRP encapsulation through one of the available interfaces. As a result,
a node can distinguish between critical and non-critical flows, protecting
them according to their needs. For example, some entries configured on
a node PRP could include:
1 {"prp+of device": {
2 "id": "prp_switch",
3 "entries": [
4 {"dl_type":"0x88B8","actions":"output:lre_prp"},
5 {"in_port":"prp1-eth0","dl_type":"0x88B8","actions":"output:lre_prp"},
6 {"in_port":"prp1-eth1","dl_type":"0x88B8","actions":"output:lre_prp"},
7 {"dl_type":"0x0800","nw_dst":"192.168.60.2",
8 "nw_proto":"17","tp_dst":161","actions":"output:prp1-eth0"}]}}
Specifically, the first rule determines that the incoming traffic with
Ethertype 0x88B8, corresponding to GOOSE frames, will be forwarded
to the inner port lre_prp, which will append an RCT trailer to the
frames and send them to the physical interfaces prp1-eth0 and prp1-
eth1 (the following two rules set up the reverse path). On the other
hand, the last rule determines that the UDP traffic, with IP destination
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address 192.168.60.2 and destination port 161, will be directly forwarded
by the prp1-eth0 port.
Start
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Figure 3.13: Traffic processing by combining PRP and OpenFlow technologies.
Figure 3.13 represents the data-flow processing in PRP nodes to dis-
tinguish critical and non-critical traffic. Although these policies are
installed by using OpenFlow messages, the end nodes may be beyond
the control of the controller.
3.4.2.5 Managing redundant wireless links
After showing how to ensure a high availability while improving the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of PRP networks, the present proposal also
aims to support wireless LAN connectivity for industrial environments.
In particular, taking into account that PRP provides a high level of
failure tolerance
R10
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connectivity
, each end node is assumed to be equipped with two
interfaces, and connected to one or several IEEE 802.11 APs, and an
OpenFlow controller establishes the forwarding rules in the networking
devices (Figure 3.14). In this way, first, there is less chance of losing
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Figure 3.14: Wireless network with PRP nodes under OpenFlow control.
a higher priority packet due to interference or mobility
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; and second,
OpenFlow-capable wireless forwarding devices, for example at the AP
level, add fine grained control of the network traffic. In terms of ro-
bustness improvement, Section 4.3 will examine the benefits obtained in
such a use case.
.
3.4.3 Integration of HSR and OpenFlow
In the proposed solution, which is in line with the previous analysis,
HSR networks consist of nodes whose control plane is managed by an
OpenFlow controller. In the following, HSR+OF refers to a node that
does not only implement HSR functionalities, but also a flow-based traf-
fic processing founded on the OpenFlow data path. Figure 3.15 outlines
the structure of an HSR+OF node, along with the main elements of a
flow entry in an OpenFlow forwarding table [9]. Specifically, a node
exposes its ports to the controller: two physical interfaces and an in-
ternal interface, hereinafter referred to as “HSR port”. The HSR port
is attached to the external ports through two virtual interfaces and is
responsible for handling duplicated frames.
Thus, the node implements two forwarding pipelines:
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Figure 3.15: Forwarding in HSR+OF nodes.
ä The simple pipeline forwards frames unchanged to one of the ring
ports, as determined by the controller.
ä The HSR pipeline protect higher priority flows by tagging and re-
dundant forwarding. For example, matching the destination MAC
address and the Ethertype could distinguish non-critical and crit-
ical GOOSE frames.
The configuration of an HSR+OF node may include, for example, the
following configuration:
1 {"hsr+of device": {
2 "ports": [
3 {"s1-eth1": "Ring port 1"},
4 {"s1-eth2": "Ring port 2"},
5 {"s1-eth3": "Interlink to SAN"}
6 {"veth1_1": "Virtual HSR interface 1"}
7 {"veth1_2": "Virtual HSR interface 2"}
8 {"hsr1": "HSR interface attached to veth1_1 and veth1_2"}
9 ]}}
In this example, some flow entries may be the following:
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1 {"Openflow flow table": {
2 "entries": [
3 {"in_port":"s1-eth1" , "dl_type":"0x892F",
4 "actions":"output:veth1_1"}
5 {"in_port":"s1-eth2" , "dl_type":"0x892F",
6 "actions":"output:veth1_2"}
7 {"in_port":"veth1_1" , "actions":"output:s1-eth1"}
8 {"in_port":"veth1_2" , "actions":"output:s1-eth2"}
9 {"in_port":"s1-eth3" , "dl_type":"0x88B8",
10 "actions":"output:hsr1"}
11 {"in_port":"s1-eth3" , "dl_type":"0x0800",
12 "nw_dst":"192.168.40.11", "nw_proto":"17",
13 "tcp_dst":102", "actions":"output:s1-eth1"}]}}
The first four entries allow the node to forward incoming HSR-tagged
packets (Ethertype 0x892F) to the HSR pipeline (veth interfaces), and
reversely pass from the HSR pipeline to the physical ring. The last
two entries illustrate how to differentiate flows received from the SAN
(s1-eth3 interface). It should be noted that flow entries for latency-
critical applications must be proactively installed, without introducing
additional delays by a switch-controller interaction; and, besides, both
pipelines are compatible with multicast and VLAN filtering or QoS reser-
vation schemes.
With this scheme, the controller is able to decide whether forward data
redundantly or not, changing the HSR forwarding rules in order to con-
sider QoS priorities
R11
Improvement
of HSR control
performance
and efficacy
. A similar feature has been found in [140], which
describes a policy framework for incoming frames; this policy may be
drop, forward to certain ports, and forward without HSR tags. How-
ever, this so-called “Inbound Policy Operation” only checks source and
destination MAC addresses, and the policy configurations are not tied
to the whole node but to each port individually, with a maximum of
16 inbound configurations per port. Moreover, it is a proprietary solu-
tion, whereas with the presented method a node can be configured by
an interoperable protocol like OpenFlow.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter has described an SDN architecture that addresses the needs
raised by new IEC 61850-based scenarios. By separating control and
data planes, networking devices do not determine their own routing
path, but CMM elements do it based on a centralized view of the current
network state. The matrix shown in Figure 3.16 summarizes how the
different functionalities are seen to respond to the targeted requirements,
where the most relevant one is marked in dark gray.
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Figure 3.16: Solution features/Requirements trace matrix.
In summary, the proposed approach provides features that are also
present in traditional LANs, such as, for instance, VLAN and prioritiza-
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tion mechanisms, means of remote connectivity and security functions.
In addition, this SDN architecture also offers other benefits including
improved physical resource utilization, availability, etcetera. As a rep-
resentative example, this preserves the benefits of PRP and HSR tech-
nologies, while making them more flexible and scalable, thereby reducing
the need to over-provision links.
113

All life is an experiment. The
more experiments you make the
better
Ralph Waldo Emerson
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This chapter details different validation activities conducted to evaluate
and test the main contributions described in Chapter 3. For such pur-
pose, the testbed environment that enables the performance evaluation
of SDN/OpenFlow scenarios is detailed, and then the experiments and
achieved results are discussed. Different network functions and improve-
ment in network availability have been tested and demonstrated by using
both emulation and analytical evaluations, which serve to analyze the
appropriateness of the presented proposals. Finally, a summary of the
results is given in Section 4.3, which also includes a correlation matrix
that furnishes the connection between actual requirements, architectural
design and validation criteria.
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4.1 Practical implementation and testbed configurations
Firstly, tools used in the evaluation process, along with some GUIs, are
presented. After that, test methodologies are described.
4.1.1 Software tools
The technical development is based on several open-source software
projects and tools, as indicated below:
ä Mininet software [141]: experiments have been run on the most
widespread tool for emulating SDN-based networks, Mininet, by
which it is possible to construct “virtual networks, running real
kernel, on a single machine”. Mininet allows the emulation of
end hosts and software switches by using Linux lightweight vir-
tualization techniques, in which processes run in isolated network
namespaces1. Moreover, the OpenNet [143] simulation tool adds
functionalities of the ns-3 simulator to Mininet. It implements
Wi-Fi scan mechanisms to support layer-2 handover between APs
working on two different frequency bands. As a result, wireless
connections and mobile nodes have been evaluated. In addition,
the NetAnim tool is useful to conduct a further analysis as it shows
the transmitted frames and the movement of the nodes within the
network when OpenNet is used (Figure 4.1).
ä OVS software switch [144]: it has been used as OpenFlow net-
working device supporting the sFlow2 and OVSDB protocols, as
well. OVS executes a software application (ovsdb-server3) that is
responsible for processing the OVSDB configuration protocol mes-
sages and configuring the switch accordingly. Regarding the con-
figurable QoS parameters, OVS supports Hierarchy Token Bucket
(HBT) and Hierarchical Fair Service Curve (HFSC) Linux classi-
1Performance fidelity and limitations of Mininet were studied in [142].
2OVS also supports NetFlow and IPFIX protocols, but they are less appropriate for
monitoring IEC 61850 traffic, as justified in Section 2.2.7.
3For example, the ovsdb-client software can be used to interact with a running
ovsdb-server process.
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Figure 4.1: NetAnim visualization tool.
fiers. Both types allow the definition and configuration, for each
queue and port, of the maximum rate shared by all queued traffic
and the minimum guaranteed bandwidth. Other features sup-
ported by OVS such as, for example, LACP, have not been used.
ä sFlow-RT collector: regarding the deployed resource monitor-
ing method, an sFlow-RT application continuously receives sFlow
datagrams from network devices, which have to be configured with
the IP address of the collector, a packet sampling rate and an in-
terface polling interval. sFlow-RT can be used to translate the
sFlow datagrams into meaningful metrics, accessible through a
REST API. Moreover, these metrics can be selectively sent to
a visualization software, system such as Graphite, through which
time-series data can be stored and displayed on a dashboard in-
terface.
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Figure 4.2: Screenshot of Floodlight, sFlow-RT and Graphite GUIs.
ä As detailed below, two OpenFlow controllers, namely the Flood-
light and OpenDaylight software projects, have been used in
order to test different functionalities. They provide a fully func-
tional control plane responsible for different tasks, such as the
discovery and management of topologies and devices, route calcu-
lation and loop prevention. Besides, other notable modules used
are as follows:
l The QoS Floodlight module published in [145] is used to
determine rate limits associated with the OpenFlow match
fields. It also offers a type-of-service scheme based on the
definition of different priorities.
l The MultipathODL fork [146] enables link-layer multipath
switching, which is specifically used to determine redundant
paths for mission critical applications. It calculates multiple
link disjoint paths per flow that are exposed as a path-finder
service. Moreover, MultipathODL includes multipathing re-
active flow handling that pushes, with each new flow, the
forwarding rules to all switches on the paths. In addition, it
provides different path calculators and selectors that may be
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linked to the dynamic network status, for example: “short-
est path, random path, round robin path, maximum available
bandwidth path, path with fewest flows or path with the high-
est capacity”. These selectors can be chosen via a REST API.
Figure 4.2 includes screenshots of the Floodlight, sFlow-RT and
Graphite GUIs used for displaying the network performance, and
Figure 4.3 shows the OpenDaylight management application, which
displays the network topology, information about the discovered devices
and the installed flow rules.
Figure 4.3: OpenDaylight GUI.
Moreover, a software implementation of PRP and HSR redundancy
mechanisms is used:
ä End nodes use the PRP stack published in [147], which runs on
the Linux user space. Hence, each emulated host over Mininet can
have two network interfaces virtualized in a single PRP interface,
and therefore, it is able to detect and discard duplicated frames,
as well as send PRP supervision messages every two seconds.
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ä The HSR stack and the generation of supervision multicast
messages are supported in Linux kernel from version 3.13. An
HSR+OF node overcomes several limitations of the current HSR
module; for example, Quadbox’s proxy capabilities and stacked
HSR headers on top of VLAN are not yet supported. However,
these features are provided HSR+OF nodes by delegating them to
the OVS.
In summary, this whole architecture allows the emulation of switches
supporting PRP and HSR protocols, and to assess different network
topologies and traffic scenarios. The fact that all these studies have been
conducted by emulating network topologies and using virtual devices
rather than physical machines or networks could be considered as a
limitation. For example, regarding the performance of PRP and HSR
nodes, it could be improved from a hardware perspective, since hardware
implementation is desirable to obtain a lower per-hop latency. Despite
this, the hardware implementation is out of the scope of this work. In
any case, for example, the average delay introduced by HSR pipeline
over the simple pipeline has been obtained with a ping test between
two end nodes connected through two switches, increasing the average
round-trip time by 0.056 ms.
4.1.2 Emulation Conditions
Figure 4.4 shows a networking domain example that includes different
network namespaces and virtual Ethernet pairs. Although OVS sup-
ports in-band control-plane configurations, the results presented here
correspond to out-of-band configurations in which Mininet uses OVS
to create a set of Ethernet switches that interact with an OpenFlow
controller running on another machine, through independent network
resources. Thus, OpenFlow traffic does not affect data plane operation
and failures that affect control traffic are excluded from the analysis. As
explained in Section 2.5.1, the implications of in-band schemes, where
data and control planes share the same resources, have been studied by
other authors. For example, in [148] the authors implement restoration
and protection mechanisms in in-band OpenFlow networks and show
recovery times for data and control traffic. Regarding controller redun-
dancy, OVS allows interacting multiple controllers simultaneously, en-
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abling backup schemes where bridges communicate preferentially with a
master controller, otherwise with slave ones. Moreover, according to the
OpenFlow and as detailed in Section 2.5.2, OpenFlow switches can be
configured to change to “standalone mode” if the switch-controller con-
nection fails, during which the switch behaves as a legacy one (without
external controllers), or remain in “fail secure mode”, in which switches
drop the packets destined to controllers until they successfully connects
to a controller.
Mininet
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Global namespace
Controllers Manager
Host 1
Namespace h1
Host 2
Namespace h2
Host 3
Namespace h3
h1-eth1
s1-eth1
s3-eth1
h2-eth1
h3-eth1
Collector
s1
s4
s2
s3-eth2
s3
Figure 4.4: Testbed internal elements.
With regard to the emulation parameters, Linux Traffic Control and
NetEm tools [149] serve to emulate various capabilities of links and set
different network conditions, such as:
ä To configure parameters of links and packet queues on interfaces,
being possible to fix bandwidth constraints, which serves to char-
acterize saturations. By contrast, despite being possible in NetEm,
additional synthetic delays were not included.
ä To characterize path performance degradation as NetEm allows
the variable packet loss rate emulation. The smallest possible
nonzero value causes 1 out of 43103448 packets to be randomly
dropped [149]. In addition, Mininet was modified to enable deci-
mal values of rate inputs.
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Regarding traffic flows, different tools, such as ping, iperf or Netperf,
have been used for generating ICMP, TCP and UDP flows. The latter
type of traffic serves to obtain the recovery connection time; since, as de-
fined in the RFC 6201 [150], test tools that offer monitoring the number
of lost frames allow to know the recovery time of a system, calculated
by the following expression:
𝑅 = Lost framesOffered rate (4.1)
As a result, sending a continuous packet stream would allow one to
determine the packet loss rate when network elements fail, which enables
the comparison of the recovery time and packet loss rate obtained with
different technologies and conditions.
Additionally, to build scenarios where the hosts send and receive SV and
GOOSE frames, the rapid61850 open-source project has been used. This
project, published in [151], processes an SCD file to generate the data
model and communications code required for an IED. This code im-
plements the communications stack that allows IEDs to send predefined
messages (with the indicated VLANs, Multicast addresses, etcetera),
and they are able to encode and decode GOOSE and SV packets. In
other words, the rapid61850 tool parses an SCD file and performs SCL
schema validation, and then it generates C source code that models each
IED existing in the SCD file, which, once complied, are included them
in the emulation process.
Therefore, the emulation process allows to check the proper operation of
a network design and validate the traffic engineering methods. In fact,
it is possible to emulate the SV and GOOSE data communications of a
substation without using any real IEDs, and test the proper operation
of a network design and validating different traffic engineering meth-
ods. Moreover, since Mininet provides a Python API with which any
topology can be defined, different scenarios are selected in accordance
with the specific features and metrics being tested. Although there are
approaches for modeling and simulating IEC 61850 networks and Smart
Grid communications, as explored in [152], there are no industrial net-
work simulators that integrate OpenFlow switches and inter-IED com-
munication. Otherwise, the AMICI tool [153] combines network emu-
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lation with real-time software simulators. Indeed, the used emulation
platform raises the possibility to integrate simulation tools to recreate
physical processes such as the system described in the previously men-
tioned framework [153], which was proposed to analyze the security and
reliability of interdependent infrastructures, such as the power grid and
ICT.
4.2 Functional and experimental analysis
In this section, several emulation case studies and results serve to eval-
uate and validate the capabilities of the proposals.
4.2.1 Functional evaluation based on use cases
The proposed architecture heavily relies on flow-based traffic control
functions (e.g., filtering). Representative examples of handling data
flows in IEC 61850-based substation communication systems are shown
below, which, making use of the Graphite software for real-time record-
ing and graphing data, illustrate some of the advantages provided by the
platform. The results are performed on a ring network, where the nodes
are attached by edge links (100 Mbit/s) and switches are connected
among themselves with trunk links (1 Gbit/s). This simple topology,
extracted from [23], is widely used in real substations and, as described
in this technical report, it may correspond to an architecture deployed
in a 500/220/33 kV substation. Figure 4.5 shows how the following use
cases represent different data flows that are transmitted on the same
physical resources.
ä QoS provisioning support: Figure 4.6 shows the throughput
of multiple traffic streams in scenarios where the following rate
thresholds are established:
l TCP flow: 20 Mbit/s.
l UDP flow: 2 Mbit/s.
l SV flow: 4.5 Mbit/s.
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   B.1    B.2    B.3
A.2
D.1  
   C.1
A.1
DoS
QoS pushing
Load Balancing
A.3
Figure 4.5: Testing network topology used in validation.
As verified, there are no QoS policies during the first 25 seconds;
afterwards, the following egress rate limits are set during the next
20 seconds, from 09:02:50 until 09:03:10 (flows recover their previ-
ous rate when the traffic shaping is disabled).
Figure 4.6: QoS effect for TCP, UDP and SV flows.
ä DoS attack detection and mitigation: Figure 4.7 exemplifies
a situation in which DoS attacks can be detected in near real-time.
Through a simple ping flood attack, where a node is overwhelmed
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with ICMP Echo Request packets, it can be seen a first phase
during which DoS control is disabled and a second phase with
DoS control enabled; that is, the controller is configured to drop
packets from an attacker. Then, the countermeasure is deactivated
after a predetermined time period. Specifically, a threshold of 100
IP packets per second is set.
Figure 4.7: Detection of exceeded thresholds.
ä Load balancer pool: the SDN controller holds a list of IP ad-
dresses and TCP/UDP ports of hosts configured as servers to
which the incoming flows are distributed. In particular, Figure 4.8
shows the TCP throughput from two nodes to two different IP
addresses (IP.1 and IP.2) even though, in principle, the applica-
tion (iperf) had generated traffic to one and the same IP address
(IP.100).
4.2.2 Path diversity control and latency reduction
The latency reduction is an important goal in the proposed solution,
and is analyzed in the following validation test, where it is compared
the effect of traffic interactions when frames are dynamically balanced.
A two-tier network topology, widely adopted in real critical infrastruc-
tures, is used in the following tests, where end hosts and switches are
connected through 100 Mbit/s full-duplex interfaces. Figure 4.9 shows
two screenshots of the OpenDayLight web interface: the entire setup is
given in Figure 4.9a, whereas Figure 4.9b displays the same topology,
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Figure 4.8: Load balancing effect over TCP traffic.
but where the switches run single-rooted RSTP, proving the reduction
in the number of available links.
Traffic spreading among redundant paths allows to evaluate the impact
in the network latency when different data flows are being transmitted at
the same time. Specifically, ICMP, UDP and TCP streams are generated
and may represent the interaction between critical real-time data and
non-critical background ones. In this experiment, two incoming ports in
switch ‘1’ (in green) receive the following traffic:
ä UDP requests/responses and ICMP echo requests, respectively
generated through Netperf and ping tools, are used to measure
the round-trip latency. This final value is computed as the aver-
age of both services.
ä A TCP connection injected with the iperf tool at different data
rates. The data rates are limited by the output link capacities
in the sender, and the edge switch has also installed an ingress
policing rule to limit the maximum rate.
Nodes ‘1’ (in blue) and ‘5’ (in light blue) communicate with ‘3’ (in blue)
and ‘7’ (in light blue), respectively, as depicted in Figure 4.9. The size
of all packets transmitted by ‘1’ are fixed to 126 bytes, which is in com-
pliance with the 61850-9 SV-LE specification; while frames sent by are
fixed to 300 bytes, a typical value for MMS services [23]. Load balancing
is based on destination MAC addresses so that, since ICMP messages
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1 5
1
7 3
ICMP + UDP
TCP
(a) Topology with all links enabled and load balancing.
1 5 7 3
1
ICMP + UDP
TCP
(b) RSTP configuration where distribution switch 6 is root.
Figure 4.9: Two-tier network topology discovered by the OpenDayLight controller and
flow paths..
and UDP datagrams provide no protection from duplication and no
guarantees for delivery, traffic behavior is comparable to SV/GOOSE
frames.
Figure 4.10a shows box plots including minimum, first quartile, median,
third quartile and maximum value correspond to 30 samples from which
information is collected for 10 seconds. These figures summarize the
distributions of the round-trip latency for different data rates of TCP
background connections (0, 20, 40, 60 and 80 Mbit/s). These statistics
have been performed in 30 trials, each 10 seconds long. As a result, it
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(b) Real time response under load - without load balancing.
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(c) Real time response under load - with load balancing.
Figure 4.10: Latency comparison with and without load balancing.
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can be said that ‘1’-to-‘3’ transmission results in significant lower latency
when traffic is balanced compared to the non-balanced case.
Moreover, Figure 4.10b and Figure 4.10c show two experiments where ‘5’
establishes a TCP connection that tries to consume all the bandwidth,
limited in this case to 60 Mbit/s. These graphs compare the TCP good-
put versus the ping and UDP request/response performance with and
without load balancing.
As a summary, detailed experiments outline that latency grows quickly
as TCP connection is set up for a linear topology, whereas latency is
slightly affected in the balanced case. This load balancing can be con-
figured statically (i.e., assigning links to critical and non-critical flows)
or dynamically based on parameters such as the bandwidth available on
the path.
4.2.3 Robustness analysis
Although jitter and packet loss can be reduced by queueing and priori-
tizing time-sensitive data streams, the loss of one or several time-critical
messages can have impact on protection functions, as studied in [154].
Thus, inappropriate configurations, network congestion or high electro-
magnetic interference could cause packet losses. This section demon-
strates the advantages that can be gained by controlling PRP and HSR
networks with an SDN agent. Separate use cases are considered to assess
the enhancement of robustness and the reduction of traffic in different
scenarios.
4.2.3.1 Higher robustness against packet loss
With the aim of ensuring high-availability of mission-critical applica-
tions, sending and receiving frames through redundant paths enhance
communication robustness. For instance, as mentioned before, PRP en-
sures that no messages are lost if one of the two established paths fails,
avoiding downtime. This does not depend on using OpenFlow, but it
corresponds to the overall availability of parallel systems, which is de-
tailed in Section 2.3.
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As a representative application of emerging industrial wireless networks,
monitoring and control devices can be provided with redundant wireless
interfaces to support robust transmissions. In particular, two use cases
show how employing parallel connections increases the successful com-
munication probability. The results presented here are obtained using
the following topology (sketched in Figure 4.11) and network conditions:
ä Using the IEEE 802.11g transmission standard, which operates in
the 2.4 GHz band and at 22 Mbit/s average throughput.
ä The channel assignment scheme allows two wireless interfaces of
PRP nodes to operate on different channels. While it is true that
the four non-overlapping channels 1, 5, 9, 13 (with 20 MHz sep-
aration between the center frequencies) are often used to prevent
interference, the frequency diversity would increase if the nodes
worked in different bands, e.g., 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz.
ä Wireless nodes are configured to operate in an infrastructure mode
served by several APs, which are star-wired to a distribution net-
work through 100 Mbit/s full-duplex interfaces.
To show the robustness against interference, the availability of a service
is studied when the probability of packet loss is the same, but statisti-
cally independent, for each wireless link which a node PRP is connected
to. Figure 4.12a plots a comparison of the packet-loss robustness for a
SAN and a DAN. Tests have been conducted under different packet loss
rates and with UDP traffic; that is, an unreliable transport protocol.
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Figure 4.11: Application scenarios for the utilization of PRP in WLAN networks.
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Moreover, in order to highlight the increase in the availability of TCP
services (reliable transport protocol), Figure 4.12b shows the throughput
of a TCP connection, limited to 1.05 Mbit/s by the sender.
4.2.3.2 Seamless roaming of mobile devices
One of the goals proposed by the architecture is to provide mobility
support with high reliability. This experiment illustrates the conti-
nuity of service during a handover process when simultaneous connec-
tions are established to different APs. Since, as discussed in [155], the
SDN/OpenFlow technologies can optimize the provision of resources
based upon predicting handover occurrences, it is also considered the
possibility of proactively transmitting data before a change in the end
node/AP connection. Nevertheless, the scanning and connection pro-
cesses involves, in any case except when using PRP, a communication
interruption, as shown in Figure 4.13b. In this case, it is necessary to
note that OpenNet does not yet support IEEE 802.11r Fast Roaming
standard or prescan mechanisms that select new APs before disconnec-
tion of current link to further shorten handover latency [143].
Particularly, Figure 4.13a represents three cases, in which a node receiv-
ing UDP traffic moves between two APs operating in different 802.11g
channels.
ä Node with a single interface (SAN):
l The controller installs OpenFlow rules in the network ele-
ments so they operate as a traditional learning switches. This
implies that a longer recovery time is seen, since the controller
has to react to the data in a different link with the installation
of new rules and changing or deleting the old ones.
l The controller installs rules in the network elements so that
the traffic is redundantly forwarded to the destination node
by the APs in order to reduce the interruption period.
ä Node with two interfaces (DAN) connected to two APs between
which it moves. Thus, the node remains connected at all times,
until it is out of range.
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Figure 4.12: Influence of lossy wireless links on reliable and unreliable transport proto-
cols.
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Figure 4.13: Node connectivity in an AP roaming scenario.
It is important to emphasize that these three examples also serve to
represent that one node supports the simultaneous transmission of PRP
encapsulated and non-encapsulated frames, depending on the criticality
of the data and network status. This means that, in non-critical flows,
there is no longer a need for duplicating frames.
4.2.3.3 High survivability in multiple failure scenarios
In line with the above results, the present approach can significantly im-
prove the availability and responsiveness over other traditional technolo-
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(a) Simple LAN. (b) SAN-redundant mode.
(c) Simple PRP. (d) DAN-redundant mode.
Fixed communication paths
A packet is sent through a single 
link, at most one copy is received
A packet is sent through a single 
link, two copies can be received
A packet is sent through a two links, 
most two copies can be received
A packet is sent through a single link, 
more than two copies can be received
(e) Legend.
Figure 4.14: Test cases.
gies based on a single active path when multiple failures can cause net-
work partitioning. Thus, the following validation experiments demon-
strate the robustness provided by establishing multiple active paths in
different lossy topologies and scenarios. As a test of concept, two iden-
tical and independent networks to which the PRP nodes are connected
enable the creation of disjoint paths of equal cost, which reduces the
possible number of cases and makes the understanding of them easier.
Figure 4.14e describes the different cases to be considered, that is, there
are four cases in which the number of possible receptions vary according
to the established paths. The other figures in Figure 4.14 show how re-
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Packet Loss Rate per link
Figure 4.15: Comparison of the packet-loss robustness in different topologies.
dundancy is allocated. In all experiments, iperf was configured to send
packets at a rate of 50 Mbit/s. A comparative evaluation in terms of
recovery time is performed for the following cases:
ä Simple LAN where only one path is established, Figure 4.14a.
ä SAN-based operation mode, Figure 4.14b.
ä Simple and common PRP deployment, Figure 4.14c.
ä DAN-based operation mode with multiple redundancy in both
LANs, Figure 4.14d.
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As an outcome, Figure 4.15 (for the clarity of the figure, note the loga-
rithmic scale of the vertical axis) shows the mean global loss rate, taking
into consideration the same packet loss rate (PLR) per link, which can
be expressed as follows for a link between two switches 𝑠𝑤1 and𝑠𝑤2
connected on ports 𝑠𝑤11 and 𝑠𝑤12 respectively:
𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑠𝑤1→𝑠𝑤2 = 1 −
𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑤12
𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑤11
(4.2)
which is inversely related to their availability, as also considered in [92].
These results show the reduction of global loss rate is achieved by using
multiple parallel links. Therefore, this scheme allows the implementation
of different robust topologies with extremely low packet losses.
4.2.4 Analysis of traffic reduction in HSR+OF networks
In this part, it is described how HSR+OF networks are tested. Specifi-
cally, an analytical model and experimental results show the throughput
efficiency improvement of the proposed scheme.
As mentioned before, the available bandwidth of HSR conventional net-
works is reduced. However, with the HSR+OF approach, non-critical
traffic traverses a single path, reducing the amount of data transferred,
while only critical traffic is forwarded along two paths towards the des-
tination node. As a result, the utilization of links varies with the type
of traffic, critical or non-critical; and the location of senders and desti-
nations. As analyzed in Section 3.3.1, the average shortest path length
for a connected graph (𝐺) is
𝑎𝑠 = ∑
𝑠,𝑡∈𝑉
𝑑(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑛(𝑛 − 1) (4.3)
The shortest pair of link-disjoint paths between a given pair of nodes
is established for critical traffic. The well-known Suurballe algorithm
[64] or the Bhandari’s one [156] can be used to find an optimal solution.
Algorithm 3 (where 𝑘 is an integer for the number of paths) presents
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the pseudo code of the latter technique, which is simpler to implement
than the Suurballe algorithm.
[Use a shortest path algorithm (e.g. Bellman-Ford) to find shortest paths
allowing for negative links weights];
Find the shortest path 𝑃1 from node 𝑠 to node 𝑡;
for 𝑖 = 2, ..., 𝑘 do
replace each link of all 𝑃𝑥 where 𝑥 < 𝑖 with a reverse link of inverted link
weight in the original graph;
find the shortest path 𝑃𝑖 from node 𝑠 to node 𝑡;
remove overlapping links to get 𝑖 disjoint paths 𝑃𝑥 where 𝑥 ≤ 𝑖;
end
Algorithm 3: Bhandari algorithm.
Figure 4.16 shows the reduction of the average number of hops per
packet delivery with respect to the HSR scheme for single (Figure 4.16a)
and coupled rings (a three-ring topology is considered, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.16b), where the rings size means the number of nodes in each
ring.
The priority-aware scheme makes HSR+OF approach more efficient than
the DVP algorithm [76], which, as far as this author knows, has been the
most significant method for HSR performance until now. DVP estab-
lishes a pair of disjoint paths4, but regardless of the requirements of the
data flows. As a result, critical and non-critical traffic use the same net-
work resources. Hence, the typical ratio of critical traffic to non-critical
traffic [23], [24] affects the performance improvement achieved by the
HSR+OF approach. Therefore, to quantify the improvement achieved,
traffic patterns of IEC 61850-based systems (Section 2.2.4) are consid-
ered. Figure 4.17 compares DVP and HSR+OF for a three-ring topology
when non-critical traffic patterns are more significant within the limits
of the typical values. That is, the most favorable situation, in terms of
saving resources, is analyzed. Additionally, it should be kept in mind
that other related work [77], less effective than the DVP approach, re-
duces the HSR traffic at the expense of introducing a setup process,
4In this analysis, it has been considered the possibility that DVP could establish a
shortest pair of disjoint paths, despite the fact that Nsaif et al. [76] do not describe
whether these paths are the shortest ones or not. Moreover, it is necessary to note
that the results in [76] are obtained for a specific topology and, unlike the HSR+OF
approach, this reference does not include any analysis of single HSR rings, since
such proposals do not reduce traffic in these cases.
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Figure 4.16: Reduction of the average number of hops.
which includes announcement and learning messages. Moreover, these
proposals define special frames that are not included in the IEC 62439-3
standard.
4.2.4.1 Protecting critical flows
This validation test5 aims to demonstrate that the proposed scheme
the efficiency in bandwidth consumption. Specifically, it illustrates how
the network is able to duplicate real-time critical information, just like
the standard procedure, while it transmits non-critical traffic only along
the shortest path, without HSR tag. Figure 4.18 shows this distinction
when the connection (link ‘1’-‘2’) between ‘Source’ and ‘Destination’
5In the topology used here, all the emulated nodes and switches are interconnected
by 100 Mbit/s full-duplex interfaces
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Figure 4.17: A comparison between DVP and HSR+OF for a three-ring topology con-
sidering data traffic patterns of IEC 61850-based systems.
goes down twice for several seconds. It is intended to highlight that no
service disruption is still ensured only for time-critical services, since it
can be checked that unicast SV frames [157] do not experience any loss
of packets, whereas the UDP flow does suffer packet loss. Figure 4.18b
also displays the decrease of incoming traffic on the destination RedBox,
while in a traditional HSR network the available bandwidth is halved.
Furthermore, it is also shown that the recovery time can be reduced
by using the “fast failover” OpenFlow feature, as occurs in the second
interruption. Thus, the availability of non-critical services is improved.
Figure 4.18b shows the average throughput, so packet loss is difficult to
perceive. However, a detailed analysis of the frames received by Desti-
nation reveals a recovery time of 0.086 ms in a reactive recovery strat-
egy, while fast-failover groups make it possible to reduce the recovery
time to 0.004 ms. These recovery times represent a significant reduction
over traditional spanning tree approaches such as RSTP (milliseconds
at best).
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(a) Protecting critical flows in a ring.
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(b) Throughput for different services in conventional HSR.
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(c) Throughput for different services in HSR+OF ap-
proach.
Figure 4.18: Throughput rate based on the priority of the flows.
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4.2.4.2 Exploting path diversity
2
11
3
10
5
9
6
8
S D
QB1
QB2
1 7
Protected flows
Unprotected flows
(a) Saving bandwidth in a doubled ring.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
it
/s
)
Time (s)
Throughput test using iperf
TCP Connection 1 - HSR+OF case
TCP Connection 2 - HSR+OF case
TCP Connection 1 - Conventional case
TCP Connection 2 - Conventional case
(b) Increasing of throughput due to the lack of redundancy for non-critical flows.
Figure 4.19: Bandwidth performance under different settings.
Controlling network resources is essential to maintain the required per-
formance, since the interaction among different types of flows may affect
to the latency of time-critical services. This experiment aims to mea-
sure the bidirectional bandwidth (in Figure 4.19a, from S to D, and
vice versa) in a coupled ring topology, for which the iperf tool serves
to measure the maximum achievable TCP bandwidth. As a result, the
OpenFlow controller is able to balance the load, so that in this case TCP
flows are transmitted through disjoint paths, enabling a better utiliza-
tion of network resources. Figure 4.19b shows the sum of throughput
achieved under the conventional approach and using a single path per
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flow. While in the former each TCP flow fully uses all links, the lat-
ter achieves higher throughput due to a lower bandwidth utilization for
non-critical flows, since each flow is balanced and does not compete for
bandwidth. Specifically, flow TCP-1 is transmitted through the nodes
‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘QB1’, ‘5’, ‘6’ and ‘7’ and flow TCP-2 pass through nodes
‘7’, ‘8’, ‘9’, ‘QB2’, ‘10’, ‘11’ and ‘1’.
4.3 Discussion
Some conclusions are reported in this section. In order to facilitate
the meeting of industrial communication requirements, and of the IEC
61850-based systems in particular, different QoS mechanisms should be
considered, such as traffic prioritization, traffic filtering or a load bal-
ancer service. Indeed, they are according to the stringent criteria im-
posed by the IEC 61850 standard [23], which is reflected throughout
the entire research. Consequently, the provided framework implements
suitable management and traffic engineering techniques required to en-
sure adequate network performance. A reasonable test system has been
provided to evaluate the effect of different parameters, such as network
loading or redundancy, on network performance. Thus, once the test
environment has been described, different parameters have been used in
the performance evaluations.
Figure 4.20 connects the requirements, identified in Chapter 2 and taken
as inputs to the proposal design, and validation tests. Although some
tests inherently cover various requirements, the two main objectives of
the experiments have been highlighted. As can be seen, those non-
functional requirements associated with high availability and efficiency
in the use of resources have been analyzed to a greater extent. On the
other hand, the need for interoperability and the unified data manage-
ment have been achieved in the SDN architecture design itself. Below
are summarized the results of the tests.
First, three applications of the SDN framework have been validated:
QoS pushing, DoS detection and load balancing, besides monitoring and
resources management implicit to them. These different applications il-
lustrate the usefulness of the flow-based approach. Other functionalities,
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4.2.4 Protecting critical flows in HSR+OF networksExploting path diversity in HSR+OF networks
4.2.1
QoS provisioning support
DoS attack detection and mitigation
Load balancer pool
Path diversity control and latency reduction
4.2.3
Higher robustness against packet loss
Seamless roaming of mobile devices
High survivability in multiple failure scenarios
Figure 4.20: Validation/Requirements trace matrix.
such as traffic isolation, tunneling or firewall are difficult to be repre-
sented in a visual manner.
Second, the results obtained from several experimental studies are re-
lated to the possibility of controlling all available network capacity.
The fact of using certain OpenFlow controller capabilities represents,
by default, an advantage with respect to traditional static spanning tree
deployments where data do not have to follow the optimal path and,
thereby, not achieving the optimal delay. By contrast, computing and
setting the flow entries that, for example, form the shortest path in
LANs can be considered essential for time-sensitive services. The pro-
posal leverages path diversity to enable a service-aware flow control,
which poses multiple advantages, such as a dynamic load-balancing or
an appropriate failure recovery for critical and non-critical traffic.
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Furthermore, improving the overall availability of critical services is a
primary objective of new IEC 61850-based substations, so that active re-
dundancy protocols are necessary to avoid retransmissions and recovery
delays. To date, this is the first time that PRP and HSR features are
included in OpenFlow networks. In this regard, the proposal increases
flexibility in the deployments of highly available industrial networks by
controlling, among other things, the redundant paths depending on the
traffic class. This approach enables the possibility of using the PRP and
HSR protocols as needed, reducing unnecessary traffic, which optimizes
available resources. This can be an important limitation because the
control and automation systems tend to integrate services that involve
large volumes of data. Thus, end-to-end redundancy provisioning is
based on traffic criticality, and several experiments have been conducted
to illustrate the improvements in using parallel redundancy schemes con-
trolled by an external entity that is not agnostic to network topology,
conditions and traffic flows. The main objective of this performance
analysis is to obtain significant results in terms of increased reliability,
for example, by achieving zero the failover time in case of multiple si-
multaneous failures. Moreover, taking into account the benefits wireless
solutions provide, the usability of the promising model which combines
PRP and OpenFlow protocols in IEEE 802.11 networks has been shown
in even the most demanding environments, such as in WLANs roaming
scenarios where critical data must be properly managed and protected.
Concerning the HSR+OF approach, conducted analytical studies have
demonstrated the versatility of this strategy, which affects resource con-
sumption by reducing the number of links traversed from source to desti-
nation. Then, to illustrate the benefits of this approach, the effectiveness
of the proposed priority-aware protection scheme is assessed in terms of
throughput efficiency by analyzing in detail some particular cases. As
a result, the bandwidth saving ratio obtained with this method is more
effective than previous ones.
From another point of view, the bandwidth management has been car-
ried out via traffic shaping, so that the resource reservation for different
streams would be necessary in order to provide strict guarantees regard-
ing message latency. Hence, a further analysis of the relations between
network performance and QoS configurations, frame sizes or inter-frame
arrival time will be addressed in future research. In addition, the impact
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that load balancing has on the network availability can be also examined
in further research Other next steps for the future work are detailed in
the next chapter.
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This chapter presents the summary and outlook of this work, and em-
phasizes the contribution of this thesis to the related research. Thus,
next section reviews how the thesis statement has been addressed in the
preceding chapters.
5.1 Thesis summary
Although the scope of industrial networks is extremely broad, ranging
from smart factories to chemical industries and transportation domains,
this thesis has chosen to focus on Smart Grid communications. In Smart
Grid applications, situational awareness and adaptability are key fea-
tures that simplify and enable flexible energy services. Besides this,
with the increasing trend of developing highly efficient and reliable elec-
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tric grids, as well as the integration of new distributed energy systems,
there is a real need to move to new ICT solutions that adapt to specific
constraints and dynamic changes. In particular, an IEC 61850-based sys-
tem can be considered a representative example of critical cyber-physical
infrastructure, which entails the deployment of robust topologies that
fulfill strong latency and reliability requirements.
In the current context, in which SDN is being strongly considered in a va-
riety of networking environments, it is of great significance to study the
benefits and challenges of its application to future industrial infrastruc-
tures, and analyze how reliability and efficiency can be affected. Thus,
the claim made in this thesis is that “using SDN technologies allows
mission-critical systems to achieve greater levels of network resources
management capabilities, while meeting QoS requirements. Moreover,
demanding protection and control applications can operate with high
reliability through a flow-based traffic processing approach”. The as-
sertion and associated research questions has been validated through
the contribution of this thesis, which has been to study applicability
of the SDN technologies to industrial networks, considering a twofold
perspective: first, manage data flows in IEC 61850-based SASs, as a use
case for ; and second, to improve performance of redundant Ethernet
networks through SDN/OpenFlow techniques, since there are numer-
ous mission-critical applications where packet loss or maximum recovery
time requirements are particularly demanding, thereby requiring high-
availability topologies.
In the first place, this study has provided a comprehensive overview
of emerging needs and limitations of current networking technologies.
In fact, after analyzing the issues involved in properly handling critical
data communications, traditional networking strategies generally lack
functionality to achieve adaptive systems as they are generally static
and inflexible. Thus, based on the collected requirements, it has been
proposed an SDN architecture which, unlike other authors [117] that first
analyzed the possibility of exploiting the benefits of OpenFlow in IEC
61850-based substations, also incorporates management and monitoring
capabilities to be aware of network configuration and traffic load in order
to provide QoS for specific services.
Accordingly, an SGAM-based procedure is introduced for conceptual-
izing the development of a modular NOS, which configures data flows
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by parsing standard configuration files and diagnosing network condi-
tions. This way, it has been proved to be able of handling an IEC
61850-based network efficiently, supporting the stringent communica-
tion requirements of power substations. This shows the benefits of us-
ing a logically centralized external agent that provides network control
policies to be adaptable for different applications, and facilitate the dy-
namic resource management according to the network status, making
the most of available resources. Concretely, this proposal includes au-
tomation techniques for performing a flow-based resource management
that enable features such as traffic filtering, traffic shaping or security
capabilities.
Furthermore, It has been concluded that avoiding single points of failure
is essential for critical infrastructures. However, despite the fact that
such networks have redundant resources, they are usually underused as
active-passive configurations, mainly based on spanning tree protocols,
which deteriorate the overall network performance. On the contrary, in
order to facilitate compliance with strict time-sensitive requirements, an
OpenFlow controller can be aware of the actual network topology and,
thereby, multiple paths can be simultaneously, and efficiently, exploited.
Thus, this proposal leverages the programmability provided by SDN
technologies to dynamically control network resources and set several
data paths between source and destination. As demonstrated, among
other actors that affect performance, communication latency is reduced
via load balancing as traffic spreading reduces the traffic interaction and
network load. The latency reduction has been illustrated using both an
analytical approximation and emulation tests.
In addition, the most representative standards for ensuring zero
switchover time when a link or switch fails, PRP and HSR, pose diverse
limitations due to the static replication of resources and information.
In particular, PRP and HSR compliant devices are responsible for
redundancy control and duplicate all traffic, regardless the type of
service, which may cause an inefficient use of network resources. This
implies significant drawbacks, such as providing unnecessary protection
for non-critical data, which might cause network congestion or delays.
Hence, an SDN approach is proposed to meet the existing necessities
taking into account that an external network control can flexibly provide
redundancy control and traffic prioritization. Specifically, the presented
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approach relies on the redundancy management capabilities of PRP
and HSR nodes, along with flow-oriented control and flexibility features
of OpenFlow. This choice is aimed at getting the best of both SDN
and the implementation of the redundancy control mechanisms in the
end nodes. In this manner, the redundancy degree can be established
according to the actual requirements of critical and non-critical flows,
so that the former are transmitted through active redundant paths,
but the others do not, saving bandwidth and avoiding saturation of
links. In particular, this has allowed, on the one hand, the provision of
a higher level of redundancy between PRP nodes along multiple active
paths in individual LANs, achieving a minimal disruption in case of
multiple failures, which improves performance of traditional networks
to which the PRP nodes are connected.
Moreover, an OpenFlow pipeline, based on the OVS software, has been
incorporated into PRP/HSR nodes for filtering flows, as well as it has
been also used as wireless APs. In fact, this thesis takes into account the
emerging wireless technologies in industrial automation systems and, in
order to reduce network downtime, the PRP is used in WLANs which are
implemented under the SDN paradigm. It should be emphasized that, as
far as the author is aware, no study has considered the potential impact
of the SDN techniques on parallel redundancy Ethernet protocols, this
being the first work on applying them to control PRP and HSR networks.
Regarding evaluation techniques, emulated network environments have
enabled the evaluation of the proposed features, and the qualitatively
discussion of the contributions, improvements and practical implications
of the findings. Thus, the SDN approach presented in this work includes
different added-value features providing mechanisms to meet the require-
ments specified by the IEC 61850 and IEC 62439 standards. These
research findings support the hypothesis that using SDN technologies
may become an appropriate solution to enable and enhance the devel-
opment of mission-critical networks. Likewise, the network reliability
improvement may enable new applications; especially those use cases
that require minimum latency and loss of information.
In summary, after analyzing the applicability of SDN to critical CPS
communications, the adoption of the SDN proposals would facilitate
and address the current limitations identified in Chapter 2.
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5.2 Future work
This thesis advances the understanding of SDN characteristics and per-
formance for industrial network architectures, and has highlighted areas
where further study is warranted. Firstly, some potential directions
for extending this thesis are related to the opportunity of testing the
novel contributions in field environments, thereby assessing their poten-
tial adoption and standardization. Other important topics for future
research are listed below:
ä Hardware implementation: performance tests undertaken us-
ing emulation techniques have allowed the reproduction of any
topology where the network performance meets different require-
ments as, for example, specifying the link properties (bandwidth,
loss, delay, and so on), without requiring a large amount of re-
sources. For example, it must be taken into account that, at the
present time, there is not available any commercial product that
combines HSR and OpenFlow protocols. Hence, a software imple-
mentation tested in emulated networks has been appropriate to
prove the advantages of this novel approach. Therefore, this study
serves as a preliminary step to implement a hardware design, which
is an interesting target for future work.
ä Integration of new control and monitoring algorithms:
other planned future activities include addressing some of the lim-
itations of the current study. Although the performance results
have demonstrated the usability of the all the aforementioned con-
tributions and, thereby, the applicability of the SDN, the opti-
mization of the existing solution is a future concern. Moreover,
the proposed framework works as a NOS where new functionali-
ties can be incorporated. Some improvements to be considered are
given below.
ä Studying richer topologies: with regard to network conditions
and topologies, it could be expected to improve the results by con-
sidering more scenarios. For example, mixing PRP and HSR in
redundant topologies could be considered in future research. In ad-
dition, it would be interesting to broaden the scope of IEEE 802.11
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wireless networks analyzed, and consider the performance on IEEE
802.11s mesh networks, and under the IEEE 802.11n standard, as
well as to consider QoS extensions. Concerning the use of PRP
nodes with only one interface (SAN-based operation mode), exper-
iments have use a standard PRP stack, without changes. However,
it is clear that the protocol may be modified to reduce its overload
and complexity: certain fields, for example, LAN ID, may not be
necessary in this configuration mode. Otherwise, the work here
presented manages unicast traffic redundancy; thus, it is consid-
ered necessary to study how the OpenFlow protocol may provide
multicast traffic filtering along active redundant paths.
ä Guaranteeing bounded latency: in another direction, it has
been shown that a flow-based modeling approach helps meet the
communication demands imposed by IEC 61850-based systems,
such as latency or bandwidth. However, fulfilling stringent real-
time application requirements could demand a predictable network
performance with bounded response times, so that future work
could include developing control services that conduct schedula-
bility analysis. In order to perform flow scheduling of high priority
traffic, it should be also necessary to implement synchronization
mechanisms. These features are in line with the ongoing IEEE
TSN and IETF DetNet projects, which are intended to provide
the support of deterministic time-sensitive streams. Both stan-
dardization projects are currently exploring additional capabili-
ties, such as spatial redundancy control or reservation protocols,
to increase the reliability and determinism of industrial networks.
It is necessary to mention that these projects are considering ap-
propriate an SDN approach to carry out these goals, since external
control agents enable the dynamic change of network policies and
the adaptation of networks to traffic conditions in an automated
way.
ä New application areas: in general terms, this study has concen-
trated on the design of SDN communication infrastructures to sup-
port IEC 61850-based substations; however the application range
could be extended to include more fields, such as WAN connecting
SASs and utility companies, as well as to other ICSs whose traffic
can be controlled by SDN controllers. Furthermore, despite SDN
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has drawn much research attention in the IT arena, it is in an early
developmental stage and its adoption in traditional infrastructures
is seen as a major challenge. Therefore, extensive experimental val-
idation is required for mission-critical systems where, in addition,
the long life cycles of industrial network equipment protect the
investment already made. Thus, it can be assumed that resistance
to change in IT systems, as well as organizational characteristics,
such as “resources, size, centralization, formalization, complexity
and expansion” [158], will affect the growing acceptance of SDN
in existing CPSs.
5.3 Dissemination of results
Finally, it is remarkable that previously-mentioned contributions and
research findings were published in different peer-reviewed journal ar-
ticles during the development of this thesis. Publications arising from
this work can be classified according their impact:
1. Journals indexed in published Journal Citation Reports (JCR):
ä E. Molina, E. Jacob, J. Matias, N. Moreira, and A. As-
tarloa, “Using Software Defined Networking to manage and
control IEC 61850-based systems,” Computers and Electri-
cal Engineering, vol. 43, pp. 142–154, April 2015. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2014.10.016
ä E. Molina, E. Jacob, J. Matias, N. Moreira, and A. Astar-
loa, “Availability Improvement of Layer 2 Seamless Networks
Using OpenFlow,” The Scientific World Journal, Jan 2015.
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/283165
ä E. Molina, E. Jacob, N. Toledo, and A. Astarloa, “Perfor-
mance Enhancement of High-Availability Seamless Redun-
dancy (HSR) Networks Using OpenFlow,” Communications
Letters, IEEE, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 364–367, Feb 2016. Avail-
able: http://dx.doi/10.1109/LCOMM.2015.2504442
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ä N. Moreira, E. Molina, J. Lázaro, E. Jacob, and A. Astarloa,
“Cyber-security in substation automation systems,” Renew-
able and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 54, pp. 1552–1562,
Feb 2016. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.
10.124
ä E. Molina and E. Jacob, “Software-Defined Networking in
Cyber-Physical Systems: a survey,” Computers and Electrical
Engineering, 2017, in press.
2. Publications in journals without impact factor and papers pub-
lished in international conferences:
ä E. Molina, E. Jacob, and A. Astarloa, “Using OpenFlow to
control redundant paths in wireless networks,” Network Pro-
tocols and Algorithms, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 90, May 2016. Avail-
able: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2014.10.016
ä E. Molina, J. Matias, A. Astarloa, and E. Jacob, “Managing
path diversity in layer 2 critical networks by using Open-
Flow,” in Network and Service Management (CNSM), Inter-
national Conference on, pp. 394–397, Nov 2015. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2014.10.016
ä N. Moreira, A. Astarloa, U. Kretzschmar, J. Lazaro, and
E. Molina, “Securing IEEE 1588 messages with message au-
thentication codes based on the KECCAK cryptographic al-
gorithm implemented in FPGAs,” in Industrial Electronics
(ISIE), IEEE International Symposium on, pp. 1899–1904,
June 2014. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/npa.v8i1.
8730
3. Peer-reviewed papers in national conferences
ä E. Molina, E. Jacob, and A. Astarloa, “Uso de OpenFlow para
la gestión de caminos redundantes en redes inalámbricas,” in
Actas de las XII Jornadas de Ingeniería Telemática (JITEL),
2015, pp. 226–231. Available: http://jitel15.uib.es/static/
actas-jitel-2015.pdf
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ä E. Molina, A. Astarloa, and E. Jacob, “Seguridad definida
por software en subestaciones eléctricas,” in I Jornadas Na-
cionales de Investigación en Ciberseguridad, 2015, pp. 78–
79. Available: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?
codigo=5469678
ä E. Molina and E. Jacob, “Aplicabilidad de las redes definidas
por software a los sistemas basados en el estándar IEC 61850,”
in III Congreso Smart Grids, 2016, pp. 209–214.
4. Participation in other research activities
ä E. Molina, “A study of the applicability of Software-Defined
Networking in industrial networks,” in Summer School Pro-
gram, IEEE Communications Society, 2016.
ä E. Molina, “Un estudio sobre la aplicabilidad de las redes
definidas por software a los sistemas industriales,” in I Jor-
nadas Doctorales de la UPV/EHU, 2016. Available: http:
//www.ehu.eus/es/web/doktoregojardunaldiak/home
ä E. Molina, “Aplicabilidad del concepto de Software-Defined
Networking en redes industriales,” in I & II Jornadas Zabal-
duz Eguna, 2014-2015.
The work made in this thesis has been partially sponsored by the Span-
ish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (MINECO),
under the S&N-SEC research project (“Despliegue seguro de servicios
con Redes Definidas por Software y Virtualización de Funciones de Red”
(01/01/2014 - 31/12/2016); and by the University of the Basque Coun-
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